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ABSTRACT
Buchholz, Florian. Ph.D., Purdue University, August, 2005. Pervasive Binding of
Labels to System Processes. Major Professor: Eugene H. Spaﬀord.
It is desirable to be able to gather more forensically valuable audit data from
computing systems than is currently done or possible. This is useful for the recon-
struction of events that took place on the system for the purpose of digital forensic
investigations. In this document, we analyze what kind of information is desired and
what is lacking in computing systems. We then propose a mechanism that allows
arbitrary information from a system to be propagated based on causality inﬂuenced
by information ﬂow. We further discuss how to implement such a mechanism for the
FreeBSD operating system and present a proof-of-concept implementation that has
little overhead compared to the system without label propagation.1
1 INTRODUCTION
It is desirable to be able to gather more forensically valuable audit data from com-
puting systems than is currently done or currently possible. This is useful for the
reconstruction of events that took place on the system for the purpose of digital
forensic investigations. In this document, we analyze what kind of information is
desired and what is lacking in computing systems. We then propose a mechanism
that allows arbitrary information from a system to be propagated based on causality
inﬂuenced by information ﬂow.
1.1 Background and Problem Statement
Security mechanisms on computing systems, such as intrusion detection systems,
access control, and audit facilities rely on the information that is available on the
system on which they are deployed. The information that is available on computing
systems about the events that occur, however, did not evolve from the need for good
security data but rather from the need to manage the available shared resources of
the system among its users. If the need arises to investigate an incident, as part
of a forensics investigation or incident response, the amount of information that is
actually stored on a permanent basis is often further reduced, making it diﬃcult
to draw sound conclusions from them. Most of the eﬀort to date in the digital
forensics community has been in the retrieval and analysis of existing information
from computing systems. Little has been done to increase the quantity and quality
of the forensic information on computing systems.
An operating system’s main function is to administer the limited available re-
sources to the programs that request them. Thus, much of the information a system
keeps about its processes and objects is related directly to the task of administering2
those resources. A large part of this information is kept for reasons of access control.
Other important security concerns do not play a prominent role. While processes
usually carry a user identiﬁer, it may be unclear whether this user is truly responsible
for the actions the process performs. Furthermore, there is no notion at all about
location, or origin, of a system’s processes and objects. From where was a session
initiated? Where did a ﬁle come from?
Third party extensions exist that add more information for the purpose of ac-
cess control [106] but also for detecting policy violations [56,118], adding a sense
of location [30,106] or more general security audit mechanisms [60,101]. Logging
facilities such as syslog for UNIX and the Event Viewer mechanism for the Win-
dows platform may record extra information about events as they occur. However,
most of these extensions lie outside the system itself, which means that they may
be subject to tampering. Event logs need to be correlated to establish any causal
relationship between events. This is at best a tedious task, but may even turn out
to be impossible in certain situations because not enough information is recorded or
propagated.
When adding information to a system, the goal is to preserve event relationships.
From a security perspective, one wants to determine answers to questions such as
“who is responsible for events?” or where the entities that caused the events are
located in the world (or network). To achieve this, it is not suﬃcient to simply have
one user identiﬁer per process or ﬁle, or introduce a location ﬁeld. This is because a
principal acting within a system is inﬂuenced by other principals or by the contents
of objects such as ﬁles. This causality is governed by the information ﬂow among
principals and objects on the system. A principal communicating with another
principal may inﬂuence/force/ask/trick/signal the latter into performing some sort
of action. The same is true for the content of an object that a principal accesses. This
dissertation presents a model that allows the system to bind arbitrary information in
the form of a label to its principals. Labels are then propagated to other principals
and objects on the system as information is exchanged between them. Depending3
on the nature of such a label, e.g. user identity or location information, valuable
audit data can be created on a system. This is especially useful for digital forensics,
intrusion detection, network traceback, and access control.
The information output by a principal can be described as its observable actions.
In many cases, these outputs are triggered in response to the principal’s inputs, i.e.
the information entering the principal. Thus, we may say that certain inputs cause
certain outputs of a principal. We will give a more detailed discussion of causality
in Section 4.1.
In our work, labels are propagated based on information ﬂow between subjects.
This includes cases where one principal (or more) controls the actions of another.
Our approach diﬀers from traditional information ﬂow analysis methods in the way
that we do not attempt to determine how information actually is exchanged but
rather how information could have been exchanged. We will focus on two categories
of information that may be desired during an investigation but current operating
systems cannot supply. These two categories are user inﬂuence and location infor-
mation (host causality [12]).
Location information is especially important for the area of network traceback
[10], where the goal is to trace attackers back through the network to the ultimate
source of an attack. As we will show in Chapter 2, existing research only takes into
consideration data obtained from a network perspective, neglecting traﬃc transfor-
mations that can be performed on a host to obfuscate any relations among network
packets or streams.
1.2 Thesis Statement
It is possible to add signiﬁcantly useful audit information to a system with little
computational overhead by binding labels that convey information such as user iden-
tity or location information to principals on the system and propagate those based
on how information ﬂows between principals and objects.4
1.3 Document Organization
This document is organized into six chapters, including this introductory chapter.
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the problem and discusses related work. Chapter 3
addresses the question of what kind of audit information is desired on computing
systems to aid in forensic investigations. This reﬂects work regarding the relation
between audit data and ﬁle system metadata for forensic purposes [13]. In Chapter 4
we present a model that can be used to obtain some of the information that is desired
but currently cannot be collected [14]. Chapter 5 discusses how to implement the
model for the FreeBSD platform and show an actual proof-of-concept implementation
and results. We give concluding remarks, discuss the limitations of our approach and
outline future work in Chapter 6.5
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Computing systems are generally not designed with security in mind. While op-
erating systems exist that conform to the Orange Book’s [31] security divisions of
B-2 (Multics, VSLAN, Xenix), B-3 (XTS-300), and A-1 (Boeing MLS LAN, Gemini
Trusted Network Processor, Honeywell SCOMP), these are not widely distributed
and limited in their usability. Other approaches such as Microsoft’s eﬀorts to secure
its Windows XP platform and the SELinux project [64] are intended to enhance se-
curity on the system, but inherit the design from their “ancestor” operating systems.
Because of the lack of systems designed for security, the amount and quality of audit
data that is useful for digital forensics, network traceback, or intrusion detection is
small. This chapter gives an overview of what kind of information is inherently avail-
able by current computing systems, and what research has been done to improve the
amount, quality, and integrity of audit data. We further give an overview of network
traceback research and explain what data is lacking in that area. Finally, we discuss
past research in information ﬂow analysis to establish how our approach diﬀers from
previous work.
2.1 System Information
When gathering audit data on a system, we are interested in information that
describes the events that took place within the system. This data can then be used
to detect policy violations, proﬁle system behavior, or to reconstruct what events
occurred and how, if the need arises. Audit information can either be present at run-
time, or it can be preserved in permanent objects. The information that is kept in
the system’s long-term storage can either be recorded explicitly in the form of audit
logs, or it can be a byproduct of a system object’s meta information (e.g. ﬁle system6
metadata). In the latter case the meta information might not have been stored with
the intent of creating audit data about the system, but the very nature of describing
some of the attributes about the object may lead to conclusions regarding events
that involved the object itself.
When a computer system is running, and while non-persistent objects reside on
the system, the amount of available audit information is at its largest. Running
processes on a system carry with them information about the programs they are
executing, the users who executed those programs, open ﬁles and sockets, etc.
Valuable audit information may be lost when network connections or ﬁle de-
scriptors are closed, processes terminate, or data that is not needed anymore for
the immediate execution of programs is discarded. In some cases information may
persist in the system memory for a certain amount of time [36], but eventually the
information will fade away. For this reason, certain information is stored on a more
permanent basis. This is either done in log ﬁles, or implicitly by the system through
meta information associated with long-term storage objects.
In the following we will give a brief overview of the sources of audit information
on a system and what kind of information is available.
2.1.1 Log Files
The most obvious location to preserve audit data on a system is by storing them
in the system’s long-term storage objects (ﬁles) as log ﬁles. These log ﬁles can
originate from the system itself (e.g. user login events, access control violations,
ﬁrewall data, or changes in the system’s conﬁguration), or applications can supply
log information about the events they can witness. In either case, the information is
stored in ﬁles, which inherently brings with it the danger of tampering or deletion.
Sometimes logs may be protected by cryptographic mechanisms [92] or by the more
common techniques of being written to write-only media or being sent to a more
secure central logging facility. In general, however, this is not commonly done.7
Many operating systems provide some sort of logging facility for system events.
For the UNIX-like operating systems, this is the syslog(3) facility and for the more
recent versions of the Windows operating systems the Event Viewer system keeps a
Security log, a System log, and an Application log. Programs outside the system may
also choose to add log entries to those facilities as is frequently done by intrusion
detection systems, ﬁrewalls and network daemon processes.
Tcpwrappers [106] is a tool that allows a system administrator to set up ac-
cess control policies for accepting network connections for well-known services based
on where those connections originate. Apart from authenticating network connec-
tions tcpwrappers can also be used to collect extensive log information about the
connections, whether they are accepted or rejected.
Tripwire is a tool developed by Kim and Spaﬀord [56]. Tripwire monitors changes
in the contents and metadata of a list of ﬁle as well as the creation and deletion of
new ﬁles, and compares the observed behavior against a system policy.
Denning and MacDoran proposed an access control mechanism based on GPS
location information [30]. The GPS information is used to grant or deny access to
system services, but one can easily imagine extending the approach to logging the
information about those accesses.
Zamboni describes how to embed small modiﬁcations into system and application
code to act as sensors that record the actions they observe [118]. The information is
logged and then analyzed to detect known intrusions. Previously unknown intrusions
that exhibit patterns similar to the known intrusions can be detected that way, as
well.
A more thorough analysis of audit data on systems is provided by Kuperman [60].
His work classiﬁes audit sources into categories of how they may be utilized, such as
intrusion detection and computer forensics. The problem of how events logged by
diﬀerent sources on a system correlate, and how this may not be captured by the
individual audit logs is not discussed, however.8
Apart from their vulnerability to tampering, log ﬁles are recorded at the time
when the event occurred, but it might be unclear at that point how certain events
relate to each other. To receive a more accurate picture of past events, log ﬁle entries
have to be correlated, which is a tedious and complex undertaking. Furthermore,
sometimes correlation is impossible because it may not be decidable which event(s)
might have caused other events to take place. This might be because insuﬃcient
information is recorded, but also because information gathered by one program can-
not be accessed or interpreted by a diﬀerent one. Having the information of both
sources available together to describe an event would yield more precise conclusions.
For example, tcpwrappers might record the information about a session from a re-
mote location while Tripwire detects an access violation of one of its policies in the
system during the same time interval. When analyzing the log entries it remains
unclear whether the access violation was caused as a result of the remote session.
2.1.2 File System Metadata
A valuable source of information about past events on a system is the long-term
storage of the system. In many cases, additional data is associated with long-term
objects, from which conclusions of past system events may be derived.
Most computing systems have some type of long-lived data storage that may be
examined for evidence. The usual organization of this storage is comprised of ﬁles,
directories, and metadata. For the remainder of this document we will assume such
an organization. We deﬁne metadata as all the data in the ﬁle system that describes
the layout and attributes of the regular ﬁles and directories. This includes attributes
such as timestamps, access control information, and ﬁle size, and also information
on how to locate and assemble a ﬁle or directory in the ﬁle system. This latter
information contains pointers to data blocks, or even entire blocks used as internal
nodes of lookup data structures such as B-trees.9
File system metadata was not originally designed to be used for the purpose of
reconstructing events that occurred on the system. Anderson [3] was the ﬁrst to
utilize such data for threat monitoring. He proposed to utilize System Management
Facilities (SMF) records. These records were commonly used by mainframe server
operating systems, such as IBM’s OS/360.
In the 1960s most computing tasks were performed on mainframe computers, with
OS/360 one of the dominating operating systems. Information stored on the servers’
disks described the entire batch job of a user. The data for the jobs came from punch
cards or tape media. The batch job information was kept in records, which described
diﬀerent aspects about the job, some describing the user data (which can be seen as
a ﬁle). This included ﬁle type, minimum and maximum size, creation, access, and
modiﬁcation times, but also information about the job itself such as running times,
duration and resources utilized. Compared to the metadata of current systems, there
was more information available for the purpose of analyzing system events. This
information is still maintained on systems at this date, but usually not recorded or
only in a temporary fashion such as the proc ﬁle system for UNIX.
Multics was the ﬁrst operating system that supplied a hierarchical ﬁle system,
which is generally considered as the ancestor of most common ﬁle systems. Daley
and Neumann describe in the Multics ﬁle system design paper [23] the need for users
to store their data within the computing environment itself as opposed to storage
media such as cards and tape. The user would have complete control and ownership
of his data as well as the metadata. They formulated the following design objec-
tives: “Little-used information must percolate to devices with longer access times,
to allow ample space on faster devices for more frequently used ﬁles. Furthermore,
information must be easy to access when required, it must be safe from accidents
and maliciousness, and it should be accessible to other users on an easily control-
lable basis when desired.” [23] To determine how frequently information was used,
they proposed an access timestamp. The need for modiﬁcation and creation times
came from the ﬁle system’s backup system, which would commit newly created and10
modiﬁed ﬁles to tape backup. This is the original motivation for the use of the MAC
(“Modiﬁed, Accessed, Changed”) times. To be able to allow other users to access
ﬁles, they proposed the inclusion of an access control list plus permissions (modes)
for each ﬁle. All remaining metadata had to do with the actual on-disk layout of a
ﬁle.
UNIX was introduced in the early 1970s [85] and its ﬁle system was strongly
inﬂuenced by Multics. The metadata for a ﬁle was stored in an inode and it contained
the ﬁle’s location and size, its type (directory or ﬁle), the three timestamps, and the
access control information. The latter was comprised of the user and group identiﬁer
and protection bits as all modern UNIX variants and derivatives use them.
MS-DOS emerged in the early 1980s. Its ﬁle system, FAT [69], keeps track of
the ﬁle type, size, location, and the timestamps. The space reserved for timestamps
varies between 2 and 4 bytes, which results in diﬀerences in granularity. For example,
the access time is only measured in days. Because DOS did not have any notion
of a user, no user or permissions information is stored with FAT. The Windows
operating system at ﬁrst inherited the FAT ﬁle system, but when the limitations of
FAT became too much of a problem, NTFS was introduced. NTFS carries detailed
user and permission information as well as modiﬁed, accessed, created, and changed
timestamps.
Much previous work has been done in the area of versioning ﬁle systems. Version-
ing ﬁle systems store past versions of ﬁles in the ﬁle system and also the metadata
associated with those versions. However, the primary focus here lies in data recovery
and undoing of write operations. Systems including AFS, Plan-9 [80], and WAFL al-
low for setting of checkpoints for ﬁles on a periodic basis. The Cedar ﬁle system [44]
as well as the RSX, VMS, and TOPS-20 operating systems create new versions of a
ﬁle for each modiﬁcation, but have limitations as to how many copies of a ﬁle may
exist and simple heuristics to decide what versions to delete after that. The Elephant
ﬁle system [90] also provides the ability to keep a long-term or even complete history
of a ﬁle. However, the long-term history is only achieved by retaining user-deﬁned11
landmark versions and space considerations are not discussed for the complete his-
tory option. Furthermore, the versions kept of the ﬁles are focused on content only,
ignoring metadata such as times of access and modiﬁcation.
2.1.3 Digital Forensics
The area of digital forensics is concerned with the investigation of an incident
after it has happened. For this purpose, digital evidence is gathered from the system
and used to support hypotheses a forensic investigator may have about the incident.
Such an investigation may be as simple as locating incriminating material, but in
its most complex case, a reconstruction of all the past events on the system may be
desired. In this section, we present the current state of digital forensics and discuss
where shortcomings are, before we go into more detail about desired information for
forensic investigations in Chapter 3.
Casey and Palmer deﬁne forensic as “... a characteristic of evidence that satisﬁes
its suitability for admission as fact and its ability to persuade based upon proof (or
high statistical conﬁdence).” [20]. When applying this deﬁnition to digital forensics,
one can see that the area consists of contributors from a wide spectrum of disci-
plines and backgrounds. Apart from computer science, digital forensics is relevant
to practitioners of disciplines such as law, law enforcement, politics, or standardiza-
tion bodies. Literature in the ﬁeld of digital forensics thus has much material to cover
and needs to address a diverse audience including digital crime scene technicians,
digital evidence examiners, digital investigators [20], as well as lawyers, attorneys,
judges, politicians, developers, and researchers.
Much of the current literature and guidelines for digital forensics focuses primarily
on data retrieval and availability of information on existing systems. Given the
diverse target audience and the diﬀerent levels of expertise in computing, one of the
main objectives is to teach practitioners the basic procedures of evidence retrieval
and analysis on computing systems. Naturally, future research in the ﬁeld of digital12
forensics cannot be addressed in as much detail as desired by the research community,
although more recent publications also discuss research. Most of the current work
explains how to recover data from a system in one form or the other. In respect
to data about system events, some of the work also discusses the forensic value
and/or quality of the information that is found. By forensic value we understand
the possibility to draw conclusions about events on the system from the data. For
example, timestamps have a high value from an event reconstruction perspective
because they allow an ordering of ﬁle operations into a timeline. This is provided
that the timestamps have not been tampered with and that the system’s clock is
correct. Access control information on its own, however, holds less value from an
event reconstruction point of view, because it generally only reﬂects static system
policies, and does not provide information about individual events. The information
that can be derived from access control information leads to a (group of) user(s)
that may have had access to an object on the system. At this point further evidence
(e.g. in the form of timestamps or login data) is needed to draw any conclusions.
Under forensic quality we understand how trustworthy the information is. Is it easy
to tamper with the information on the system? For example, on some operating
systems a ﬁle’s access and modiﬁcation timestamps can be arbitrarily set by its
owner.
For some instances of forensic literature, the discussion of evidence retrieval is
limited to a description of where important system ﬁles are located and how to use
tools that recover deleted ﬁles [22,113]. Metadata is not discussed at all or only
in the form of timestamps [113], and no critical discussion is given about the value
of the forensic information. Other publications focus in great detail on the issue of
information hiding and retrieval without mentioning ﬁle system metadata or issues
such as how to obtain time, user, or location information [15].
Some of the current forensics literature actually addresses the value of ﬁle sys-
tem metadata in the form of MAC times and user information [19,59]. However, a
critical discussion about the quality of the information is lacking. At some part of13
the discussion timestamps are presented as a powerful means to reconstruct events.
However, either no critical discussion is given [19], or the whole value of timestamp
information is undermined by statements such as: “Altering the modify and access
times in an inode is simple, but not every suspect knows how to do it” [59]. The
notion of an “owner” of a ﬁle is mentioned [59] but the term “owner” is not explained
and may lead to incorrect assumptions about the relationship between a user and a
ﬁle. A more thorough discussion about event reconstruction is given by Casey [20].
The actual techniques in terms of functional, relational, and temporal analysis are
described on a higher level than what information a system may (reliably) provide.
However, the author makes it clear that timestamps may be altered and discusses
techniques to detect the tampering or deduce the correct times of events. Carrier
and Spaﬀord [18] use the term characteristics of a digital object, the set of data
and metadata associated with the object, in their event reconstruction model. This
reﬂects the need for reliable metadata information for event reconstruction. They
do not, however, discuss what the nature of these characteristics could or should
be. Mohay et al. dedicate an entire chapter to research directions and future devel-
opment [70]. Topics such as data mining, text categorization, authorship analysis,
steganography, and cryptography are covered. In their section on evidence extrac-
tion they address the diﬃculty associating collected data from various sources with
events on the system. They give a framework to correlate existing data on a system,
whereas the purpose of our work is to analyze what data can be added and how its
forensic quality can be maintained.
All of the surveyed literature only describes the information that can be obtained
from existing systems and this is their intended purpose. File recovery is the main
focus, but a few documents elaborate on the value of timestamps or user informa-
tion. In our survey of literature in the ﬁeld we encountered no discussion about the
requirements of future systems with respect to digital forensics and what type of
meta information beyond MAC times and user information is desired. The discus-
sion shows that the digital forensics community is aware of what tasks need to be14
performed and also aware of the fragility of digital evidence. What is lacking is an
analysis of what information is necessary to perform those tasks or make them easier
to perform, and further what kind of desired information can actually be obtained
from a computing system.
2.2 Information Flow Analysis
Keeping track of extra information in a computing system about events at the
location where they occur is typically merely a problem of allocating storage for the
information, when recording it. Recording the event or the nature of the event at
its source is not a problem (e.g., a user modifying a ﬁle or a process receiving data
from a speciﬁc remote location). However, events may inﬂuence other events and as
processing of data potentially results in new events, the roles of the earlier events
get lost because the information is no longer available to the entities observing the
new events. If we want to keep track of which events inﬂuenced others, we need to
examine how information ﬂows within the system.
The area of information ﬂow analysis is concerned with determining how infor-
mation is propagated within a system. The paths of how information ﬂows describe
a causal relationship: if information ﬂows from A to C via B, then A has caused B
to communicate with C. Some research in information ﬂow analysis is concerned in
how to restrict information ﬂow between subjects and objects, while other research
tries to determine how the information actually does (or will) ﬂow.
2.2.1 Information Flow Policies
Information ﬂow policies describe how information is supposed to be accessed or
modiﬁed on a system. This usually implies a partitioning of the resources and sub-
jects of a system into diﬀerent classes, that form a hierarchy or lattice. Information
ﬂow policies are concerned with describing how access to and propagation of data
on the system is allowed. Usually, the enforcement of the policies are left to access15
control mechanisms and the analysis of the actual information ﬂow of the system is
left to be performed by other techniques.
The Bell-LaPadula Model
The Bell-LaPadula Model [4] is based on military classiﬁcation of data. The
model has subjects, objects and security classes, the last having some sort of or-
dering associated with it. Subjects possess security clearances and objects security
classiﬁcations.
The following two properties deﬁne secure ﬂow of information in the model: a
subject can only read an object’s content if the subject’s security class is at least
as high as the object’s, and contents of objects may be written only to objects
of at least as high a security class. The ﬁrst property, called the Simple Security
Condition, makes sure that subjects cannot directly access objects for which they
are not cleared. The second property, called Star Property, further makes sure that
a subject with clearance to access an object, that is classiﬁed at a particular class,
does not generate a new object with the same contents as the original object but
with a lower classiﬁcation.
The Bell-LaPadula Model ensures that no unauthorized access of the objects of
a system takes place. It thus protects the conﬁdentiality of data on a system.
The lattice model introduced by Denning [27] is an extension of the Bell-LaPadula
model. Here, security classes together with a class combining operator ⊕, a greatest
lower bound operator ⊗ and a ﬂow relation between classes form a lattice, which is
used for access control between processes and objects.
The Biba Model
The information ﬂow model deﬁned by Biba [7] focuses on data integrity rather
than conﬁdentiality. The model consists of subjects, objects, and ordered integrity
levels.16
The following rules maintain the integrity (trustworthiness) of objects: a subject
can read an object only if the subject possesses the same or a lower integrity level as
the object; a subject can write to an object only if it possesses the same or a higher
integrity level as the object; a subject may execute another subject (program) only
if it possesses the same or a higher integrity level as the subject (program) being
executed. The ﬁrst rule makes sure a subject can only access information that is at
least as trustworthy as the subject itself. The second rule ensures that the subject
can only modify objects that are not more trustworthy than the subject itself. The
third rule ensures that a subject may not make other subjects, that possess a greater
integrity level, act on its behalf.
The Chinese Wall Model
The Chinese Wall Model [8] addresses both conﬁdentiality and integrity on a
system. While the model was developed to guide information ﬂow within a business
environment, it may also be applied to other systems. In the model resources on a
system a grouped into both company datasets, (CDs) and conﬂict of interest classes
(COIs). A CD contains all the data in the system that belongs together, e.g. objects
belonging to the same company or project. A COI is a collection of datasets whose
information must not be shared with other members in the class. Under the Chinese
Wall Model, a subject S may access an object only if the only other objects that S
had previously accessed are in the same CD as the object, or if none of the objects S
had previously accessed is in the same COI as the object. A subject may also access
an object if the object is sanitized. A subject S may modify an object if the subject
has read access to the object, and if the object is in the same CD as all the objects
S can access.
For the Chinese Wall Model to work, a set needs to be maintained for each
subject, that contains all the objects that were ever accessed by the subject. There17
is a concept sanitizing of an object, after which the object may be removed from the
subject’s access set.
Denning’s Information Flow Model
Denning formally deﬁnes an information ﬂow model FM = (N,P,SC,⊕,→),
where N is the set of objects on a system, P the set of processes, and SC a set of
security classes. The ⊕ operation is a binary class-combining operation that deﬁnes
the class of the result of (binary) operations between members of the security classes.
E.g. if a ∈ A and b ∈ B then the result of any binary function on a and b belongs to
security class A⊕B. The → operation is a ﬂow relation between security classes. It
deﬁnes the permitted information ﬂow. If information is allowed to ﬂow from class
A to class B, then A → B.
An information ﬂow FM is secure if none of the sequences of operations on a
system violates the → relation. Furthermore, SC, →, and ⊕ form a universally
bounded lattice of security classes.
Summary
The models we have discussed above merely formalize the system policy in regard
to how information is supposed to ﬂow. It is up to individual systems to make sure
they adhere to the model. This may be a diﬃcult task when considering the trade-
oﬀ between security and usability on a system. In particular, to make a system
practical, concessions have to be made in terms of conﬁdentiality and integrity. In a
practical environment subjects need to have more rights than they are allowed under
the Bell-LaPadula and Biba models. Nevertheless an observer might be interested
in how actual information ﬂow has taken place to deduce if undesired accesses or
modiﬁcations have occurred. Information ﬂow analysis addresses this problem. Here,
either the possible or actual information ﬂow of programs is analyzed to either enforce18
information ﬂow according to the model or to detect violations of the information
ﬂow policy. In the following, we will discuss a number of such approaches.
2.2.2 Static Information Flow Analysis
A substantial amount of research has been done in the area of static informa-
tion ﬂow analysis [89]. The primary focus lies in assuring data conﬁdentiality and
integrity when using certain programs on a system. One approach is to use tech-
niques from type systems for controlling information ﬂow. Security identiﬁers are
attached to variables and expressions and used to verify the information ﬂow at
compile time [45,46,75,93,108]. Other approaches use semantic-based security mod-
els [52,107], analyzing end-to-end program behavior, often related to some sort of
noninterference [43,66] policy.
Denning [28] and Denning and Denning [29] discuss compiler-based mechanisms
that verify information ﬂow against a security policy. With this, one is able to certify
that given programs do not violate the security policy.
Static information ﬂow analysis is a powerful method to determine how infor-
mation is propagated by which principals. However, all the programs running on a
system need to be analyzed to verify that they adhere to the information ﬂow policy.
Even though advances are made in the automation of the tedious work, analyzing
programs is still a time-consuming and expensive task that increases with a pro-
gram’s complexity. Furthermore, one can only be certain about those programs on
a system that have been analyzed, which takes away the ability to execute general-
purpose programs. This limitation is acceptable in many scenarios where knowledge
of the exact information dissemination in a system is crucial.
2.2.3 Dynamic Analysis
Some work exists that is intended to track runtime information ﬂow of pro-
grams [110]. Here it is proposed to incorporate Denning’s compiler-based informa-19
tion ﬂow concepts [28,29] into the Java virtual machine to keep track of every user
identiﬁer associated with the running program and then enforcing access control at
the time when system calls need to be made. A weakness of this approach is that
the user identiﬁers are vulnerable to tampering when kept in user space. Also, no
implementation or results have yet been published.
The Data Mark Machine developed by Fenton [37] associates a security class label
with every variable on the system and is able to analyze information ﬂow at execution
time. However, it is a highly abstracted machine not suitable to monitor information
ﬂow on a more complex system with the types of channels we will describe in this
document.
Other work utilizes virtual machines that record certain checkpoints of the system
state they are emulating, thus allowing a post-event analysis of how information
has disseminated through the system. This work is either motivated by intrusion
analysis [34,42,57] or operating system and program debugging [58,111,112].
The information ﬂow analysis techniques we discuss here ﬁnd their application
in specialized environments. To have a complete understanding of how information
ﬂows, all the programs running on the system need to be analyzed. The alternative to
this is to limit the execution of programs to an environment where their actions can
be monitored. Thus far, research in dynamic information ﬂow analysis has utilized
program interpreters of virtual machines for that purpose, which comes at a high
performance cost. In this document we will present an alternative that allows us
to track information across a system dynamically without the performance penalty
incurred by virtual machines or interpreted programs.
2.3 Network Traceback
A special case of tracking information through computing systems is network
traceback. The research area of network traceback is concerned with locating the
true location (in a network sense) of an attacker. This may be hosts that perform20
denial-of-service attacks, or it may be a host from where a user is logged in directly
and performs malicious actions, either within that host or to other hosts through
the network. Within network traceback, there are currently two major areas with
diﬀerent objectives and approaches for solutions. One area tries to determine the
source of individual datagrams that take their paths through the network. The
other area attempts to correlate streams of network traﬃc, which are observed at
diﬀerent locations within the network. The following gives an overview of past
research performed in both areas.
2.3.1 Packet Source Determination
The Internet Protocol Suite (TCP/IPv4) [81], which is used throughout the Inter-
net and various intranets does not provide a mechanism to authenticate datagrams.
The only ﬁeld within the IP datagram header that gives an indication about the
origin of a datagram is the source address ﬁeld, which is a 32-bit long Internet ad-
dress. However, routing of IP datagrams is typically only performed based on the
destination ﬁeld within the datagram, and the source ﬁeld is rarely inspected by a
router. Both IPv6 [26] and IPSEC [55] provide source authentication, but are not
widely used in TCP/IP networking.
In normal operation, a host receiving packets can determine their source by di-
rect examination of the source address ﬁeld in the IP packet header. Unfortunately,
this address is easy to falsify, making it simple for attackers to send packets that
have their source eﬀectively hidden. This is more common for one-way communica-
tion, such as the UDP and ICMP packets used in denial-of-service attacks, but has
been used in attacks using TCP streams in which the TCP sequence numbers are
guessable [6,72]. There has been signiﬁcant research in how to locate the source of
such packets, primarily motivated by distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks in
early February of 2000.21
Generally, DoS attacks work by consuming a limited amount of a certain resource
at the victim. This could be bandwidth, CPU time, or memory. The objective is to
consume as much of that particular resource so that normal operation is no longer
possible. A DDoS attack usually focuses on consuming network bandwidth and
uses multiple clients distributed over the network to perform DoS attacks. The
software and tools to perform DDoS attacks are widely available and easy to use.
The attack involves a series of master and client programs running on compromised
hosts throughout the network. A client program is used to generate as much network
traﬃc as possible and send it to the host. The master program is used to coordinate
the clients so that all of them start and end their attacks roughly at the same time.
Once the masters and clients have been set up, a master then can be used to direct
the client to send large amounts of network traﬃc to a single host on the network,
resulting in that single host to be overburdened with the amount of traﬃc it receives.
Sometimes, there are multiple master machines, which, in return, are controlled by
a controlling host. This hierarchical approach allows for an easy conﬁguration and
synchronized execution of an attack from a multitude of compromised hosts from a
single machine. Figure 2.1 shows a simple DDoS model.
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Figure 2.1. Distributed denial of service model22
IP source address spooﬁng is not necessarily a requirement for a DoS or DDoS
attack, but usually spooﬁng is used to hide real addresses of the hosts used for the
attack. This could be because the attacker is a user on that host, or because the
attacker does not want to risk losing a compromised host that he could use for later
attacks.
While it is generally recommended that routers be conﬁgured to perform ingress
or egress routing [38], it is clear from continuing denial-of-service attacks [71] that
this is not widely done. There have been other methods proposed to perform ﬁltering
to limit the eﬀect of such attacks [50,78,116].
Router Approaches
Some methods add or collect information at routers to allow traceback of DoS
traﬃc. Rowe et al. developed the Intrusion Detection and Isolation Protocol (IDIP)
[88], where an IDS that recognizes an attack queries IDIP enabled devices (including
the router) about the source of the attack. The queries then cascade up until the
origin of the attack is located.
CenterTrack [100] proposes the use of special tracking routers within an au-
tonomous system that receive “interesting” datagrams directly from the edge routers.
At the tracking router, those datagrams may then be examined and handled accord-
ingly.
Cisco provides a public guideline as to how to perform tracing of DoS traﬃc by
analyzing router traces at each hop [21]. They propose compiling access list entries
that match the attack traﬃc to produce log output for manual inspection. Naturally,
this will only work while the attack is in progress.
Snoeren et al. have developed a Source Path Isolation Engine (SPIE) [94], which
enables traceback of individual packets. This is accomplished by a router that com-
putes and stores digests of the packets it forwards. Starting from the target of a23
network attack, one can then create an attack graph by querying the data collected
at each router.
An approach that proposes the deployment of hardened networks across the In-
ternet was introduced by Zhang and Dasgupta [119]. Here, the border routers and
subsequent routers within an autonomous system (AS) mark the traﬃc they receive
by digitally signing them. Thus a DoS victim within the AS may reconstruct the
path the traﬃc took within the system and it is possible to ﬁlter the traﬃc at the
border router. Also, a cooperation between diﬀerent ASs can lead to even further
tracking of the immediate source of the attack and contain it at that point.
Packet Marking
Other methods to determine the source of a DDoS attack add markings to the
packets to probabilistically allow determination of the source given suﬃcient packets.
Savage et al. propose a marking scheme for IP datagrams [91]. The authors
propose two main marking schemes, node sampling and edge sampling. Here, IP
datagrams are probabilistically marked with a single router’s IP address. A router
further down the path toward the destination may overwrite an existing marking and
thus the path a datagram takes has to be derived from the distributions of markings
from the incoming datagrams.
To solve the problem of where to store the marking information, the authors
developed a reduction scheme using XORs and hashes. Instead of sending the unen-
coded edge information, unique fragments of a larger identifying number are used to
mark the datagram. This comes at the cost of a slight deprecation of speed of conver-
gence and robustness, but allows storage in the space available. This technique was
further reﬁned by Song et al., proposing an advanced marking scheme [95]. Their
work mainly focuses on improving the marking scheme so that fewer packets are
needed and overall computation time for the reconstruction path is reduced. Instead
of the router’s IP addresses, only hashes of those addresses are encoded. To address24
the problem of false positives in Savage et al.’s scheme when there is more than a
single DoS attacker, diﬀerent sets of hash functions are used at each router to keep
the probability low that two routers can compute the same hash value for the edge
information. Furthermore, an authentication scheme for the markings was added.
Dean et al. propose a diﬀerent approach to encode the packet markings [25].
They encode paths between nodes by calculating the result of a polynomial with
the IP addresses of the routers and a multiplier that is passed along in the packet
as inputs. There is a trade-oﬀ between the number of packets needed to solve the
polynomial for the routers’ IP addresses and the amount of storage space needed for
the marking for each packet.
Doeppner et al. use IP’s record route option for the purpose of “router stamping”
[32]. Here, routers record their IP address with a certain probability into a random
slot available for the record route option in the IP header. With enough attack
packets available, a path to the source may be reconstructed. Adler describes the
tradeoﬀ for general packet marking schemes between the size of the markings and
the number of attack packets needed to perform traceback [2].
Park and Lee show that there is a possibility that an attacker may inject false
markings into the network traﬃc, potentially leading an investigator to a false source
of traﬃc [77]. They show that there is a trade-oﬀ between the ability to trace back
the attack and the severity of the attack.
Control Messages
Several Internet Drafts [5,114] address the use of ICMP messages for traceback
purposes. A new type of ICMP message is proposed, called a Traceback message,
that is sent by an Internet router. The message itself contains the previous and next
hop of the datagram from the router’s perspective as well as a timestamp and part
of the datagram that caused the ICMP message to be sent.25
ICMP Traceback messages are caused by a datagram forwarded by the router
with a certain probability. The authors suggest a probability of about 1/20,000. The
message datagram is sent to the destination speciﬁed by the datagram that caused
the message to be sent with a time to live (TTL) of 255. With enough traﬃc going
to a particular destination, this scheme allows the destination host to reconstruct
the path traveled by the datagram using the TTL ﬁeld as a distance measure. The
link information about the previous and next hops make it possible to reconstruct
a complete traceback chain to the source of large traﬃc volumes. Furthermore, the
drafts explore several authentication options, to prevent an attacker from sending
out bogus Traceback messages.
Much of the work presented above allows an investigator to locate the immediate
source of a DDoS attack. In many cases, the only beneﬁt of this discovery lies
in the ability to contain the attack. Important questions, such as from where the
DDoS zombie was controlled and by whom remain unanswered. Even when fully
investigating the host that is running the DDoS zombie it is unlikely that an answer
can be found, as we discuss in Chapter 3
2.3.2 Correlating Streams
The other area of current network traceback research tries to correlate streams
of TCP connections observed at diﬀerent points in the network architecture. The
motivation behind this work is that attackers often log in through a chain of compro-
mised hosts to launch an attack from the end of that connection chain. This chain
of hosts will hide the actual location of the attacker, as the victim sees only the last
hop in the chain. Law enforcement agencies investigating a break-in might be forced
to cancel their eﬀorts when the trace points to a host out of the jurisdiction of that
agency.
The chain of TCP connections often consists of a series of interactive sessions
on the hosts utilizing remote login protocols such as telnet ssh, or rlogin. From26
each remotely accessed host, the chain is extended by logging in to the next one.
Figure 2.2 shows an example of a connection chain.
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Figure 2.2. A sample chain of remote connections
While early attempts by Jung et al. [53] have proven diﬃcult to implement and
not practical (for a discussion on this, see Buchholz et al. [10]), recent research
focuses on what can be be deduced from information obtained from various ﬁxed
checkpoints in the network.
Up to now, research addressing determination of the source of a connection chain
has mainly focused on correlating streams of TCP connections observed at diﬀerent
points in the network. The initial work in matching streams constructed thumbprints
of each stream based on content [96]. While this technique could eﬀectively match
streams, it would be ineﬀective in compressed or encrypted streams that are com-
monly used. Other work compared the rate of sequence number increase in TCP
streams as a matching mechanism, which can work as long as the data is not com-
pressed at diﬀerent hops and does not see excessive network delay [117]. Another
technique, which relies solely on the timing of packets in a stream, is eﬀective against
encrypted or compressed streams of interactive user data [120]. This work was orig-
inally intended for intrusion detection purposes but was also proposed as an eﬀec-
tive method for ﬁnding the source of connection chains. While performing stream
matching might be eﬀective in some cases, such methods rely on examining network
information, and might be vulnerable to the same methods that can be used to de-
feat network intrusion detection systems [82]. More recent work has examined the
eﬀectiveness of attackers attempting to defeat stream matching by adding delay or27
additional packets to the data stream, but did not propose a method of directly
matching streams [33].
Daniels describes a general reference model for origin concealment of network data
elements regardless of whether the motivation lies in packet source authentication
or stream correlation [24]. He deﬁnes internal and external monitors with respect
to a node (a host in the network) and describes algorithms for a passive origin
identiﬁcation based on what the monitors observe. It is assumed that the internal
monitor possesses the capability to observe the relation between inputs and outputs
without specifying how this might be accomplished. The work we present in this
document will aid in addressing this problem.
Any attempt to correlate data streams entering and leaving a host strictly from a
network perspective can potentially be foiled by measures on the host to obfuscate
any relations between such streams. Through a sequence of arbitrary transforma-
tions regarding the properties of the data streams, a stream of incoming data can
be modiﬁed in such a manner that when data leaves the host, it is impossible in
the general case to say if there was a causal relationship between the two. Such
transformations include modiﬁcation to the data itself, but also alterations in size
and timing information. Figure 2.3 illustrates those transformations.
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Figure 2.3. Incoming and outgoing network traﬃc can no longer be
related because data is transformed.28
3 ADDING AUDIT INFORMATION
In this chapter we will discuss what kind of information is desired when performing
forensic investigations and event reconstruction [13]. In some of the cases we will
merely give suggestions as how to collect and store the information as it is readily
available but usually not recorded. We will also address the need for two types of
information currently not available with any operating system – user inﬂuence and
location information – and thus motivate the work described in the remainder of this
dissertation.
3.1 Types of Information
A recent gap analysis study for computer forensics tools by the Institute for
Security Technology Studies [49] shows that for Category 1 of the National Needs
Assessment – Preliminary Investigation and Data Collection – the section for oper-
ating systems is well-covered with existing tools that address the needs [48]. This
could lead to the conclusion that data collection for operating systems is a solved
problem, but this is not the case. The reason for this is that all the gap analysis
as well as other studies [48,74,86] are only addressing the retrieval of information
that is currently recorded explicitly for those operating systems. Apparently, the
question: “What information would you like to have available as a forensic inves-
tigator?” has not been suﬃciently addressed in the forensic research community.
Part of the problem has been addressed by Kuperman [60], but the actual quality of
the information retrieved on current systems and its usefulness for forensic purposes
has not been addressed, nor has the feasibility of obtaining and storing the desired
information been examined.
We can categorize desired information into the following groups:29
1. Information that is available to the system and recorded on non-volatile media.
2. Information that is available to the system but is not recorded.
3. Information that is not currently available to the system but could be made
available.
4. Information that is impossible to be obtained by a computing system.
A forensic investigator will normally only have access to the ﬁrst kind of infor-
mation, or, if a live system analysis is performed, to the second kind. Most of the
literature and development in the ﬁeld is only concerned with the information that
is actually present in the ﬁrst category. We hold the opinion that it is the duty of
future research to explore in what manner more forensically relevant information can
be provided to an examiner in a feasible fashion. Considering the design of future
systems, it is useful to ﬁrst evaluate what the desired information is, whether and
how it can be obtained by a computing system, and if it can be stored in a reasonable
fashion. This way, some or all information from the second and third categories could
be moved to the ﬁrst one, plus we will gain an understanding of what is possible.
The exact kind of information and the scope of its storage we are discussing in this
dissertation will diﬀer from system to system. One can hardly require all operating
system vendors to start modifying their products to record more data for forensics,
or force users to enable such logging. However, there are many cases where extra
information is desirable, be it to be able to show due diligence, or to more quickly
discover if a system was compromised or accessed in an unauthorized fashion.
In the following, we shall examine which extra information is desirable from a
forensics point of view, analyze how the currently existing information satisﬁes those
wishes and how feasible it is to obtain and store information that is currently not
collected on a system.30
3.1.1 The Relevance of Metadata for Forensics
If it were possible to record a system’s state – register values, memory, timers,
network events, interrupt information, etc. – for every single clock step, one could use
that information to deterministically replay all events that took place on the system.
The answers to most questions an investigator might have could be answered, albeit
in a tedious and time-consuming fashion. Even if it were possible to record all
that information it still would not be feasible as the amount of time necessary to
record the information on a storage device slows the system down several orders of
magnitude [35]. As this approach is not feasible, we have to utilize snapshots of
the system’s state instead. A snapshot reﬂects the system state at a given discrete
point in time. In addition to knowing the actual state of the system for those
points in time, one might be able to draw conclusions about the state changes that
occurred between two given snapshots. Such an approach using external logging of
processes, ﬁles, ﬁlenames, and system calls, was implemented by King and Chen [57].
That approach was further reﬁned to allow a virtual machine layer between the
operating system and the user space to record select snapshots of the system state
that can be used to replay events on the system [58]. That approach was designed
for debugging operating systems as the penalty for utilizing a virtual machine and
the space overhead might not be suitable for production type systems.
Taking a snapshot of the entire system’s state or large parts thereof on a frequent
basis might be feasible for critical systems or debugging. In the general case, limited
storage capacity and performance considerations prohibit this practice. For this
reason we need to consider a further reduction of information quantity and frequency
of recording, preferably through an already existing mechanism on the system. The
hope is that through an audit trail of individual changes to parts of the system
(small deltas in the system state) we obtain suﬃcient information to understand the
changes in the system’s state leading up to the current one.31
Files play an important role in the operation of most computing systems. Usually
the operating system itself as well as the boot mechanism are comprised of ﬁles.
Program executables, conﬁguration data and startup scripts, user information, as
well as application data are stored in ﬁles. Therefore looking at ﬁles gives a rough
view of information ﬂow, ﬁle accesses can show what programs were executed when,
and ﬁle modiﬁcations show what was altered on a system. The operations on the
system’s ﬁles are only a subset of the system state. However, for the reasons discussed
above, they can yield answers to many questions of interest to a forensic examiner.
Furthermore, recording meta information about a ﬁle’s operations as they occur is
a mechanism that introduces little computational overhead. Thus a ﬁle’s metadata
seems a logical place to record our subset of the system’s state. The metadata
associated with a ﬁle can be seen as the characteristics of a digital object as discussed
by Carrier and Spaﬀord [18].
Information recorded by system or user programs may aid the forensics investi-
gator during the analysis. System logging facilities such as syslog or shell history
ﬁles and third party programs such as Tripwire [56] or tcpwrappers [106] provide
valuable data for a forensic investigation. However, programs running outside of the
system’s kernel space may not have access to the necessary information. Plus, all
the information is stored in ﬁles, which are subject to deletion or tampering. Other
approaches that modify the kernel [11,17] either do not store the added information
on a permanent basis, or do so in log ﬁles, as well. Other approaches, such as Sun’s
Basic Security Module for Solaris [101] store extensive audit information in sequen-
tial log ﬁles using an audit token to relate records to each other. The audit records
can become quite complicated and large in size, and space management can become
complex [39]. Furthermore, the information is not stored directly at the object of
interest (i.e. the ﬁle) but rather operations on ﬁles have to be reconstructed from
all of the audit records on the system. By storing the desired information directly
as ﬁle system metadata we gain the following beneﬁts:32
• The information is automatically collected and stored by the system: all the
information that is available to the system is available to be recorded.
• The information is automatically collected without the penalty for setting up
external logging mechanisms.
• The information is directly stored with the object of interest. It is not necessary
to correlate various system logs to obtain the desired information.
• Tampering with the information is not as simple as tampering with a ﬁle. If raw
disk access is not allowed by the operating system, the recorded information
is protected from all users. Even if raw disk access is allowed a malicious user
still has to navigate the ﬁle system to get to the information. When modifying
or deleting it he needs to be careful not to destroy any data that is crucial to
the successful operation of the system.1
3.2 Desired Information
As can be seen from the overview given in Chapter 2, current operating systems
and ﬁle systems were generally not designed with digital forensics in mind. On most
Unix-like systems, the metadata associated with a ﬁle that holds forensically usable
information is only 22 bytes, of which 16 are timestamps. In this section we will
discuss the types of information that is desired from a forensics point of view.
When performing a forensic investigation on a computing system an investigator
needs to reconstruct as many events and actions that took place on the system as
are necessary to draw unambiguous conclusions. This may be as basic as locating
contraband material on a system and determining when and how it got there, but
even that is not a simple task. In its most complex form such an investigation will
attempt to reconstruct all events that took place on a system. This could be to
1This may easily occur due to race conditions on an active system.33
investigate a break-in or crimes committed by an insider. The main questions a
forensic investigator has to ask are: who, what, when, how, where and why.
The who question is concerned with what user is (or which users are) responsi-
ble for certain actions on the system. What addresses what actions actually were
performed on the system, when over which time interval they took place, and how
in what manner those actions were executed. The where question is to determine
both where the responsible users were located when they initiated the actions as well
as where the data on the system, i. e. ﬁles, came from. Finally, the why question
is concerned with the motives that lie behind the actions. As a computing system
cannot know the intentions of its users the answer to this question is one that the
investigator must infer from the answers to all the other ones.
3.2.1 Who Did It?
The question of who is responsible for certain actions or the existence of data can
be important in the course of an investigation. This holds especially true for systems
with a large number of active users, such as a server in a thin-client environment
or systems that oﬀer network portal services. Most systems utilize some sort of
authentication mechanism – usually a login procedure requiring a user name and a
password – to bind a user identiﬁer and often a group identiﬁer to a process or a
session.
The user and group identiﬁers for processes and ﬁles are also commonly referred
to as the “owners” of those instances. It is thus tempting to classify everything that
bears such an identiﬁer as the result of that particular user’s action. However, the
original purpose of those identiﬁers in operating systems lies in access control, not
true ownership. The only thing that may be deduced by looking at the identiﬁers
is that a process bearing a particular identiﬁer has been granted the permissions to
an object that is associated with that identiﬁer. Thus, in most of the computing
systems known to this date it is diﬃcult or even impossible to determine the user id34
of the subject that is truly responsible for actions. The information might be gained
by correlating other information, such as login times or typical user activities, with
the times at which the ﬁle operations occurred, but this process is tedious and may
not lead to the correct conclusions as we discuss below. If the correct information is
stored directly with the ﬁle, no correlation work will be necessary.
From a digital forensics perspective the question of who “owns” a ﬁle is irrelevant.
We want to know who created, modiﬁed, accessed, and deleted it. So who performed
those operations on a ﬁle? In many cases the user id of the ﬁle will be equivalent
with the identity of the user responsible. There are exceptions, though. For example,
a ﬁle may be created by User A who then changes the user id of the ﬁle to User B.
In Unix, this may be done with the chown command. Such commands are used to
transfer permission rights for an object from one user to the next, but once executed
any notion of the creator of a ﬁle is lost to the system. For the remaining operations
(modify, access, delete) it would make sense to look for the responsible users within
the set of users that hold the proper permissions for that ﬁle. This set may be quite
large (up to any user on the system), and also when the permissions or user and
group identiﬁers change, the information deduced would be incorrect.
Simply introducing new ﬁelds that associate user and group identiﬁers with the
various timestamps (MAC times) can solve the problems addressed above. However,
this will not be enough to solve other ones where a user’s actions aﬀect a ﬁle. For
example consider two processes, one controlled by User A and the other controlled
by User B as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Process A reads data from File 1. The two
processes communicate using interprocess communication (IPC) and User A supplies
the data it read from the ﬁle to B’s process, which writes the data into File 2. The
creator of the ﬁle clearly is User B. However, User A also played an important role in
its creation and content. Current systems do not have the ability to detect User A’s
eﬀect on the ﬁle.35
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Figure 3.1. The contents of File 2 are inﬂuenced by User A
If we extend the example to more processes and users that play a role in the
creation of the ﬁle we can observe that a ﬁxed size ﬁeld to hold user information
for a ﬁle is not suﬃcient (unless it is large enough to hold information about all
users). Also, if multiple users’ processes communicate with each other, how can the
system tell which ones played a role in a ﬁle operation and which ones did not?
It turns out that this problem is actually undecidable for the general case. As the
system is generally unaware of the information ﬂow within a process, the only thing
that can be done is observe its inputs (interprocess communication in this case) and
outputs (the creation of the ﬁle). Deciding which input caused an output to occur
is equivalent to solving the Halting problem. The Halting problem [102,103] states
that, given a Turing machine M and its input x, it is undecidable in the general case
to determine whether M halts on x.
While this problem cannot be solved, there are two ways to manage it. The ﬁrst
is to only allow programs to run on the system whose information ﬂow has been
determined through methods such as static analysis. In this case it is known what
data from which input aﬀects the output and the system has this information readily
available. But while we obtain the correct desired information, we lose the ability
to run any general program because of the requirement to perform information ﬂow
analysis for each program we allow to run. In addition to the fact that information
ﬂow analysis can be time-consuming, for some programs such an analysis might not36
be possible because of randomness or race conditions. The second way to avoid the
problem is using an approximation. Because we cannot tell which exact inputs aﬀect
the output, we can simply assume that all of them had an eﬀect. This approach will
result in some incorrect extra information being kept, but it also assures that no
correct information is discarded. From a digital forensics perspective, this is a good
approach for two reasons: if information about a particular user is not associated
with a ﬁle, we can be sure that that user did not have anything to do with the
ﬁle’s operation; also, information that is present and might be false is better than
no information being present at all, especially if the amount of false information is
kept small. We will focus on obtaining this kind of information in the second part
of this dissertation.
By the discussion above we can see that the “who” information actually falls into
Category 4 of our classiﬁcation: it is impossible in the general case to obtain the
correct information. We do believe, however, that the approximations mentioned
in this section are good enough in most cases and thus justify the recording of this
information.
3.2.2 Where Did That Come From?
There are many cases where it is desirable to know from where a particular ﬁle on
a system originated. The problem of deﬁning location is not trivial, however. Apart
from the TCP/IP based network location information we used as origin information
in previous work [11,12], location information may take on many diﬀerent forms.
The GPS location information proposed by Denning and MacDoran [30] may be
used as a location identiﬁer. Location information may also be as simple as “local vs.
remote”, where “local” means information coming from a source or device physically
connected to a system, such as a keyboard, mouse, or scanner. Information entering
the system from a network through system services, such as ssh, telnet, ftp, http,
or rpc would then be classiﬁed as “remote”. Another example of location information37
could be the structure of an organization. The organization may be split into diﬀerent
oﬃces, the oﬃces into departments and departments into smaller divisions. This
forms a location hierarchy that also may be used to form location identiﬁers and
groups. An Internet draft proposed by Leach and Salz [63] discusses Globally Unique
Identiﬁers (GUIDs). A GUID has a ﬁxed size of 128 bits and contains time and node
(network location) information. The generation algorithms speciﬁed in the draft
ensure that collisions among GUIDs occur only with a low probability.
Location information on a system regarding from where processes or ﬁles orig-
inated or were inﬂuenced is desirable because it can be used for system analysis
(forensics, intrusion detection), access control (enabling policies based on location
information), and the network traceback research discussed in Section 2.3
When locating contraband material, location information may lead further down
the chain of distribution, which may result in follow-up investigations. When un-
known ﬁles are found on a system, information about where the ﬁle came from may
give clues as to what kind of ﬁle it could be, plus – if the ﬁle is malicious code – the
information could be used trying to locate the author. Furthermore, some ﬁles may
immediately be classiﬁed as benign on a system if their origin is from a trustworthy
source. For example, this might be the operating system vendor’s installation media
for system binaries. With current systems, no such origin information is available.
In some cases the origin of ﬁles may be deduced by correlating log information –
such as mount times or web logs – with ﬁle timestamps. This information will only
be available for origins that are logged on the system, plus some ﬁle systems do not
have reliable creation timestamps and the information may be lost.
Where do ﬁles on a system come from? A user can create one by typing on the
console, they can be read from storage media such as CD-ROMs or ﬂoppy disks,
they can be downloaded from a network, they can be transfered from devices such
as digital cameras or scanners, etc. Current computing systems have no notion of
the origin of their ﬁles (or processes). The reason for this might lie in the fact that
the systems from which the more recent ones descended were mostly self-contained38
and isolated units with their only inputs coming from a console or card readers.
However, the problem of determining a ﬁle’s origin is not as simple as the above
examples might suggest. By deﬁnition a computer computes data from other data.
The fact that a system produces new data makes what we mean by origin of a ﬁle
(or data in general) more complicated.
Consider the following example: A user had typed and saved a C-source-code
ﬁle on the console. He later logs in from a remote location and compiles it with
a compiler that was installed from the operating system vendor’s distribution CD.
He also links in a library that was downloaded from an open source web site (see
Figure 3.2). Taking into account the origins of the ﬁles and processes that played a
role in the creation of the resulting executable, what should its origin be? Ideally
we want to capture the origin of all data involved in the generation of the new data.
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Figure 3.2. Given the origin of the involved entities, what is the
origin of the new ﬁle?
A specialized compiler that can take origin into account and knows which sources
are used in the creation of a ﬁle could correctly keep track of all origin information.39
For general unknown programs that produce ﬁles, the same problem as with user
inﬂuence applies: It is an undecidable problem. However, the same approximate
solutions that can be used for the user inﬂuence problem can also be applied here.
As with the “who” information, the answer to the “where” question also falls
into Category 4 of our classiﬁcation. Maintaining origin information is similar to the
problem of keeping track of who inﬂuenced whose actions on a system and the work
in the second half of this document will also apply to origin information. Given that
there is no location or origin information kept at all in existing systems, we believe
that adding support for keeping and recording it will add substantial support for
forensic investigations, especially in those cases where tracing back to an author of
code or creator of contraband material is of importance.
3.2.3 When Did What Happen?
All commonly used ﬁle systems associate certain timestamps with their ﬁles and
directories. The original purpose of timestamps lie in archiving and backup of ﬁles,
but many tools serving diﬀerent purposes, such as ﬁnd [104] or make [105], utilize
them.
The timestamps available for the ext2 ﬁle system [16] are modiﬁcation, access,
change, and deletion times. The ﬁrst three are commonly referred to as MAC times.
NTFS has an altered (A), read (R), MFT changed (M), and creation time (C).
As can be seen, diﬀerent ﬁle systems have diﬀerent kinds of timestamps available.
Furthermore, confusion may arise from the diﬀerent naming of the metadata ﬁelds.
What is MAC in ext2 would be ARM in NTFS when using the Windows terminology.
There is no deletion time in NTFS and there is no explicit creation time in ext2.
This latter fact is a common misunderstanding about the ﬁle system that emerged
from UFS: the “C” in MAC time is often thought of as the creation time. Even
the Linux source code refers to the ctime ﬁeld in ext2 as “creation time.” This is
incorrect, as the original term is change time. This timestamp ﬁeld is updated every40
time there is a change in the inode information (a change in the metadata itself).
When a ﬁle is created, the ctime is set to the time of creation because in a sense
the metadata has been changed. If the ﬁle’s metadata changes after that the ctime
is updated again. A simple change in permissions via chmod, or user or group via
chown or chgrp is suﬃcient for updating the ctime ﬁeld. In most cases the ctime will
be equivalent to the creation time, but there is no guarantee for that and a forensics
investigator needs to be aware of that fact [41].
For the Unix and Unix-like operating systems the POSIX standard [47] deﬁnes
the timestamps, their meaning and when they are updated. The required timestamp
ﬁelds under POSIX are modiﬁcation, access, and change times. An overview of which
Unix system calls change what timestamps can be found throughout the literature
(e.g., see Stevens [97]). The speciﬁc time when an update has to occur is ambiguous,
however. The standard speciﬁes that the timestamp ﬁelds need to be marked for an
update and that “[a]n implementation may update ﬁelds that are marked for update
immediately, or it may update such ﬁelds periodically.”
While some of the names for timestamp ﬁelds are unambiguous, others have
room for interpretation. A creation and a deletion time are straightforward in their
meaning, but what exactly is meant by access, read, modiﬁcation, and alteration
time? Simply because a metadata ﬁeld is named a certain way does not mean that
it really conveys the information suggested by that name. When is a ﬁle considered
accessed or read?
As the semantics of the timestamps are not speciﬁed by any standard they are
open to interpretation and diﬀerent operating systems’ implementations can show
diﬀerent behavior as to when the timestamps are updated. This may be suﬃcient
for using timestamps with tools such as make and ﬁnd or for backup purposes. From
a forensics point of view a clear deﬁnition of what the timestamps mean is of much
greater importance. Furthermore, diﬀerent operating systems or ﬁle systems may
keep diﬀerent kinds of timestamps. As we have shown above, Unix-like operating41
systems usually do not keep a real creation time, whereas Windows using NTFS
does.
The above examples of using chmod or chown to update a ﬁle’s ctime show a
side-eﬀect of how timestamps may be tampered with using access control operations
that aﬀect the ﬁle’s metadata. There are other commands, such as touch in the
Unix world that allow a user to arbitrarily modify the timestamps. To obtain audit
data of good quality in the sense we deﬁned earlier, creation, modiﬁcation, and
access timestamps should not be subject to alteration by any user. If modiﬁable
timestamps are needed for certain tools or procedures such as backups, then they
should be separate from the timestamps we use for forensics.
All current ﬁle systems have in common that only the latest respective time is
kept. This is understandable for reasons of space constraints, but not satisfying from
a forensics perspective. Modern journaling ﬁle systems, such as etx3 and the Reiser
ﬁle system [83] record more timestamps as part of the journal. However, one cannot
choose which timestamps are kept – only the metadata of the latest operations are
preserved. Ideally, all operations on a ﬁle should be recorded. A creation and a
deletion time will only require one ﬁeld, as the operation is only performed once per
ﬁle. Operations that modify or access a ﬁle occur quite frequently, however, and
there is no upper limit in the amount of space required to record these occurrences.
The GUIDs mentioned in the previous section also contain time information.
Depending on what kind of location information one is interested in the GUID could
replace time and location metadata ﬁelds. In this case the GUID is not bound to
the ﬁle itself but rather to the individual actions to the ﬁle. However, as the above
discussion shows, ﬁles may have many individual sources and events from the same
sources may occur at diﬀerent times. In these cases a coupling of location and time
may not be desired. If the system does support GUIDs, though, the ﬁle metadata
would be a good place to store it and use it for propagation purposes.
The “when” information falls into Categories 1 and 2 of our classiﬁcation: some
of it is recorded already, whereas the rest is available to the system but not recorded.42
For a forensic investigator it would be beneﬁcial not having to worry about what
timestamp means what on a particular system and which timestamps are available.
For this, standardized semantics of timestamps as well as a standard set of times-
tamps available are needed. The necessary information is present on all systems.
While recording all of it might be infeasible, currently it is not possible to record the
information at all, even if desired. A more ﬁne-grained set of recording options as
discussed below may help to adjust any particular system’s requirements.
3.2.4 How Did It Happen?
The manner how an operation was performed on a ﬁle can be of importance to
an investigator. By “how” we mean what controlling agent or executable program
was used to perform the operations. It should make a diﬀerence for the course of
an investigation whether a program named explorer.exe was used in the creation of
contraband material on a system, or if the program was backdoor.exe instead. These
programs can be seen as agents of the process’s user to perform tasks on the system.
The role of user agent may be further delegated to other programs, creating a chain
of agents. For example, command.exe may invoke explorer.exe, which in turn may
invoke winamp.exe to access an MP3 ﬁle on the system.
Having access to the entire chain of user agents for an operation on a ﬁle obviously
can be valuable information in an investigation to reconstruct events on a system.
Apart from scenarios described in the above example it also enables an investigator
to identify automated system service routines that manipulate ﬁles such as system
cleanup, log rotations, ﬁle indexing, etc.
It is necessary to record the chain of user agents because there are cases where
ambiguities occur even with complete access and modiﬁcation information available
for a ﬁle and all executables on the system. This may happen, when several exe-
cutables are accessed by the same process prior to performing the ﬁle operation.43
In addition to simply referencing the name of (or a pointer to) an executable in
the chain, it may also be desirable to know what the executable’s version or patch-
level is. For this purpose, a cryptographic checksum could be included in the chain
information so that the value can later be veriﬁed against a white-list of known
executables.
This kind of “how” information is currently not available on the common com-
puting systems, but could easily be made accessible by keeping a stack of agent
information, given that there is suﬃcient space available to keep the information.2
Each time a user agent invokes another one, the information is pushed onto the stack
and each time it ﬁnishes the information is removed. Thus, this information falls
into Category 3 of our classiﬁcation.
3.2.5 What Was Done to the File?
In addition to the metadata described in the previous sections the actual nature of
the modiﬁcation to a ﬁle is also important. Ideally, the entire chain of modiﬁcations
from a ﬁle’s creation through its current state should be available.
Alternatively to storing the actual modiﬁcations of a ﬁle, only the hash values
of the diﬀerent versions can be kept. This way it is at least possible to identify
version changes for well known ﬁles, such as kernel versions and upgrades or patches
to program binaries.
The “what” information is readily available on current systems but changes in
ﬁles usually are not recorded. This falls into Category 2 of our classiﬁcation. In
general, for this type of information the same considerations are true as for the
“when” data: it is probably infeasible to record everything, but even if desired the
information can currently not be recorded at all.
2This is similar to the space management issues we address in Chapter 4 for labels.44
3.2.6 User Inﬂuence and Location Information
The types of information we discuss in the previous section are, for the most
part, readily available on the system and only need to be stored appropriately. This
is most certainly true for the when and what information. The information required
to answer the how question can be gathered by keeping track of an program-calling
hierarchy and recording the agent chains accordingly. It should not be diﬃcult to
amend a system to include this behavior.
As we have shown, the who and where questions are more diﬃcult to answer.
The information that we require is not available on current computing systems. For
the remainder of our work we will discuss an approach that can help obtaining the
desired information: user inﬂuence and location/origin information. We will not
discuss any further the problem of storing all the data we discuss in this chapter as
part of ﬁle system metadata, as this is well beyond the scope of this document.45
4 A MODEL FOR LABEL PROPAGATION BASED ON CAUSALITY
Motivated by the lack of ability to track user inﬂuence and location information
through a computing system, in this chapter we introduce a model that allows the
propagation of arbitrary labels based on how information ﬂows on the system. This is
a generalization, moving from user and location information to general purpose labels
as the propagation mechanism works for arbitrary information that we associate
with entities on a system [14]. First we deﬁne the term causality with respect to
information ﬂow on a system, then we introduce the general model, address space
management issues, discuss properties of our model and then present case studies.
4.1 Causality
Consider a system that is comprised of active principals and passive objects.
We deﬁne a principal as the active agent on a system that performs actions and
interacts with other principals. A principal may act as an agent of a human being, on
behalf of other principals, or the system itself. Principals can create other principals;
create, access, and modify passive objects; and exchange information with other
principals through communication channels. We use the term subject to denote
either a principal or an object.
Principals have inputs and outputs for the purpose of interacting with other
principals and accessing passive objects. Observable changes in a principal’s state
are deﬁned by its outputs. Such a change can be caused by many factors: implicit
measures within the principal itself, input from the system, input from another
principal, input from an object, or any combination of the above. There might be
other changes of state for a principal. These may include hardware failure, electrical
surges, or cosmic radiation. As these are non-deterministic, unpredictable events,46
those types of change of a principal’s state will be ignored by our model. In the
case that such an event triggers an output, the model will incorrectly blame one of
the principal’s inputs for the output (or none if there had not been any observable
inputs).
We deﬁne a given input to be a cause for an observable change in state of a
principal (and thus the cause for an output), if a change in state observed in the
output is diﬀerent based on whether or not the input is provided. This is consistent
with the principle of non-interference [43,66].
When all the internals of a principal are known and deterministic, it is possible
to analyze exactly which inputs cause what outputs as we mentioned in Section 2.2
However, generally this is not the case. If we view a principal as a black box and
only observe its inputs and outputs, even in the simple case when there are only
two inputs and one output, it is undecidable [102,103] to determine which input (if
any) caused the output, for the general case. This can easily be proven by reducing
the following well-known undecidable problem to our case: given a Turing machine
M as well as the two strings x and y, determining if M(x) = y is undecidable [76].
Also, Rice’s theorem [84], which states that, for any non-trivial property of partial
functions, the question of whether a given algorithm computes a partial function
with this property is undecidable, can be applied to this.
To avoid the undecidability issue, we utilize a pessimistic heuristic: if an output
can be observed for a principal at time t, we consider all previous inputs of time
ti ≤ t as potentially having caused the output. Thus any information exchange
between principals – direct or indirect – has a potential eﬀect on successive outputs
of a principal. This approach will yield false positives as certain inputs may not have
been the cause of an output. However, this ensures that any input that did cause
an output will be considered.47
4.1.1 Labels
In the following, we will present a model to follow information ﬂow between prin-
cipals based on causality. For this purpose we introduce an operation that binds a
label to a principal. By label we mean an arbitrary string of bytes whose interpre-
tation depends on the given application of the model. Labels are bounded in size
and may either be ordered or unordered. Labels are then propagated to principals
and objects based on causality: if an input causes an output, the label of the input’s
source needs to be propagated to the input’s target. By propagation we mean some
function of the label and any existing labels of the target (the target’s label set),
resulting in a new label set for the target.
This approach diﬀers from the information ﬂow analysis methods we discussed
in Section 2.2. It is a dynamic solution without the overhead incurred with the
techniques previously discussed. We achieve this at the penalty of being imprecise,
meaning we do not track the exact information ﬂow but rather all possible ones.
The dynamic approach gives us the advantage of being able to execute arbitrary
programs on a system without having to analyze their information ﬂow ﬁrst. There
is no need for an interpreter-based runtime environment or virtual machines, which
incur a performance penalty. Also, no special hardware is needed to track information
ﬂow. Using labels and propagating them dynamically at run time means that we
perform a forward propagation of meta-information. As a result, we can observe the
information immediately with the principals and objects on a system, without having
to perform any reconstruction steps as required in other work, where the operations
of a system are recorded and later analyzed [57]. With our approach it is possible
to not only determine labels sets of any given principals and objects, but also to
determine if a given label is present at what entities without having to reconstruct
the information ﬂow explicitly for all entities on the system.
The ability to bind arbitrary labels to principals allows us to address a variety
of scenarios where it is important to track not only how information propagates on48
a system but also what kind of information. It further allows us to focus on only
the information that is relevant for the scenario. Such use of labels allows us to help
solve the problems described in Chapters 2 and 3 as we will demonstrate in the case
studies in Section 4.5.
4.2 A General Model of Label Propagation Between Principals Based on Causality
The model described below is used to propagate labels according to information
exchange between active subjects (principals) in a system. A label needs to be
propagated from one principal to another if information is exchanged between the
two of them. The idea is that if one principal causes the information ﬂow of another
principal, then the former’s labels should be propagated to the latter.
A single bit of exchanged information may be suﬃcient to control further in-
formation ﬂow for a principal. Therefore, not only transfer of data itself, but also
success or failure of certain operations between principals must be considered as
information exchange, as they count as inputs for the principals.
Information exchange between principals is performed through communication
channels that are established between the two participants. As the communication
between principals does not necessarily have to be synchronized there may be an
arbitrary time delay between one participant’s write and the other’s read operation.
In a sense, channels are abstract passive objects that act like FIFO queues from which
principals read and write. Channels in this model are uni-directional, meaning that
only one principal may write to the channel and the other can only read from the
channel.
Information between subjects may also be exchanged indirectly through storage
objects (objects). By storage objects we mean shared objects on a system that are
used to store data either temporarily or on a long-term basis. As objects may be
used to transfer information, labels from principals also need to be associated with
storage objects that are modiﬁed or created by them, and be propagated to principals49
accessing those objects. Here, the concept of information exchange is less restrictive
than above, as only a modiﬁcation of the object or actual data transfer from the
object needs to be considered. The mere existence of an object may also be used to
exchange information between principals one bit at a time: one principal can create
or destroy an object while a second principal tests for the object’s existence. If the
two principals synchronize their operations, they can exchange information this way.
This is the type of channel Lampson deﬁnes as a storage channel [61,62]. Therefore,
a successful open operation to an object for read or write operations must also be
considered information exchange. However, it is not necessary to propagate all labels
associated with the object, rather, it is suﬃcient to propagate the label set of the
object’s creator at the time the object was created. This is because only the creator
of the object can control the storage channel described above.
We deﬁne the following sets, which are all countable and unbounded1:
L: set of labels
P: set of principals
O: set of storage objects
C ⊆ {P × {P ∪ O}} ∪ {{P ∪ O} × P}: set of ordered pairs  i,j  ∈ C if and only if
a communication channels exists between i ∈ P and j ∈ {P∪O} or i ∈ {P∪O}
and j ∈ P.
label(): O∪P → 2L, a function that given a principal or an object returns a subset
of L that is called the label set of the principal or object. The function label(φ)
will always return the empty set ∅.
clabel(): O → 2L, a function that given an object returns a subset of L that is
called the creator label set of the object. This function denotes the label set of
the object’s creating principal at the time of creation.
1Subsequent sub-models may have bounded label sets50
Channels between two principals are uni-directional and function according to
the consumer-producer model as a FIFO queue. Instead of actual data items, it is
suﬃcient for this model to require only that the label set associated with the data
is contained in the channel. For this purpose, we deﬁne two operations on channels:
enqueue(c,l) adds a label set l ∈ 2L to the FIFO queue of channel c ∈ C.
dequeue(c) returns and removes the next label set l ∈ 2L from the FIFO queue for
c ∈ C. If the queue is empty, the empty set is returned.
Each channel c ∈ C possesses a capacity cap(c), which denotes the number of
items the channel can hold. The enqueue operation for a channel will fail if its
capacity has been reached. This in return will cause the operation that caused the
enqueue operation to fail as well. For channels between a principal and an object
the data transfer is simpler and can be viewed as atomic and instantaneous.
P, O, and C are unordered sets, whereas L, and the sets returned by label(), and
clabel() may be ordered. The latter sets are ordered iﬀ L is ordered. In the latter
case label and clabel’s ranges are no longer 2L, but rather the set of sorted subsets
of L.
We further have a mapping on label sets, update : 2L × 2L → 2L. The mapping
determines how label sets are updated as two processes exchange information. This
function must be deﬁned for sub-models derived from this model.
Below we deﬁne the operations on the sets described above (P, O, C, and L). An
operation consists of two parts: an optional precondition and an action part. If there
is a precondition associated with an operation, it must be fulﬁlled for the operation
to succeed. Otherwise, the operation fails. Operations without a precondition will
always succeed. Only a principal may perform an operation. To avoid a cumbersome
notation the principal that performs the operation can either be implied from the
operation itself, or, if necessary, is explicitly mentioned.51
create(p1,p2) Principal p1 creates principal p2. The label set of p1 needs to be
inherited by p2:
P := P ∪ {p2}
label(p2) := label(p1)
create(p,o) Principal p creates object o. The object’s label set as well as the creator
labels set need to be inherited from p:
O := O ∪ {o}
clabel(o) := label(o) := label(p)
open(p1,p2) The channel  p1,p2  is opened between principals p1 and p2. The
channel has the direction from p1 to p2, meaning that p1 can perform write
operations and p2 can perform read operations on the channel. Whether the
operation of opening the channel succeeded or not can already be viewed as
the exchange of 1 bit of information: success or failure. Therefore, the label
sets of both principals need to be updated at this point:
C := C ∪ { p1,p2 }
label(p1) := label(p2) := update(label(p1),label(p2))
open(p,o) The channel  p,o  is opened between principal p and object o. P can
write to the object. A successful open indicates that o actually exists, so the
object’s creator label set needs to be updated with the principal’s:
C := C ∪ { p,o }
label(p) := update(label(p),clabel(o))
open(o,p) This is analogous to the previous operation, using channel  o,p  and p
having read access instead.52
write(p1,p2,n) Principal p1 writes n data items to the channel  p1,p2 , i.e. it con-
sists of n enqueue operations. In this case the channel  p1,p2  needs to be
open.
Precondition:  p1,p2  ∈ C
repeat n times:
enqueue( p1,p2 ,label(p1))
write(p,o) Principal p writes data to object o. In this case the channel  p,o  needs
to be open. Because o is receiving information, o’s label set needs to be updated
with p’s:
Precondition:  p,o  ∈ C
label(o) := update(label(p),label(o))
read(p2,p1,n) Principal p1 reads and removes n data items from channel  p2,p1 ,
i.e. it performs n successive dequeue operations.. In this case the channel
 p2,p1  needs to be open. Because p1 is receiving information, p1’s label set
needs to be updated with the ones read from the channel:
Precondition:  p2,p1  ∈ C
repeat n times:
label(p1) := update(label(p1),dequeue( p2,p1 )
read(o,p) Principal p reads data from object o. In this case the channel  o,p 
needs to be open. Because p is receiving information, p’s label set needs to be
updated with o’s:
Precondition:  o,p  ∈ C
label(p) := update(label(p),label(o))53
close(p1,p2) The channel  p1,p2  between principals p1 and p2 is closed. Both prin-
cipals may interpret this event, so this can be seen as a 1-bit information
exchange. Both principals’ label sets need to be updated with each other’s
label sets:
Precondition:  p1,p2  ∈ C
C := C −  p1,p2 
label(p1) := label(p2) := update(label(p1),label(p2))
close(p,o) The channel  p,o  between principal p and object o is closed. No infor-
mation is exchanged.
Precondition:  p,o  ∈ C
C := C −  p,o 
close(o,p) This is analogous to the previous operation, using channel  o,p  instead.
addlabel(p,l) Label l is bound to principal p. L needs to be added to any existing
labels in p’s label set:
label(p) := label(p) ∪ {l}
destroy(p) Principal p is destroyed. All open channels involving p are closed.
P := P − p
{ x,y  ∈ C|x = p ∨ y = p} : close(x,y)
destroy(o) Object o is destroyed. All open channels involving o are closed.
O := O − o
{ x,y  ∈ C|x = o ∨ y = o} : close(x,y)54
A sequence of operations is an ordered list of operations, in the order they oc-
cur. At any given discrete time interval ti exactly one operation is allowed and
that operation is considered atomic. To extend the model, it may be necessary to
deﬁne composite operations from the basic operations given above. For example,
the opening of a bi-directional channel between principals p1 and p2 may be de-
ﬁned as {open(p1,p2),open(p2,p1)}. This new operation is also atomic. There is
also an initial state of the system, which at a minimum consists of P = {p0} and
label(p0) = {}.
Example:
Let P = {p1,p2,p3,p4}, with label(p1) = {A} and label(p3) = {B}, O = {o1},
clabel(o1) = label(o1) = {C}, and update = ∪. The following shows a sequence of
operations and its eﬀect on the label sets:
op1: create(p1,o2) clabel(o2) = {A}
op2: open(p1,o2)
op3: write(p1,o2) clabel(o2) = {A}
op4: close(p1,o2)
op5: open(o2,p2) label(p2) = {A}
op6: read(o2,p2)
op7: close(o2,p2)
op8: destroy(p1,o2)
op9: create(p2,p5) label(p5) = {A}
op10: open(o1,p5) label(p5) = {A,C}
op11: read(o1,p5)
op12: close(o1,p5)
op13: open(p3,p5) label(p5) = {A,B,C}
op14: write(p3,p5,n)55
op15: read(p3,p5,n)
op16: close(p3,p5)
op17: open(p5,p4) label(p4) = {A,B,C}
op18: write(p5,p4,n′)
op19: read(p5,p4,n′)
Principal p1 creates object o2, and writes some data to it. Principal p2 then reads
data from o2, after which o2 is destroyed by p1. P2 subsequently creates principal
p5, who then reads data from o1. A communication channel to write data from
principal p3 to p5 is then opened and data is being transmitted. After that, another
communication channel is opened, this time between p5 and p4, and p4 is receiving
data from p5. At the end of these operations, both p4 and p5 carry labels from p1
(A), p3 (B), and o1 (C). P2 carries the label from p1. Figure 4.1 illustrates how
information ﬂows in this example.
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Figure 4.1. Information ﬂow for each operation and the ﬁnal label sets
On a computing system, the above example could illustrate the following scenario:
The labels A, B, and C are location information and p1 is the process of a malicious56
user logged in from location A and p2 is the process of a local user on the system who
has privileged access rights. In operations op1 through op4 the user creates a script
that when executed will create a new process and start the program stored in object
o1, which was created earlier by a user from location C. The user then dupes p2 into
executing this script (let’s say the path of the superuser contains “.” as its ﬁrst
entry and the script has a name of a common command and the superuser executed
the command while in the directory that contains the script). The access of the
script by the superuser is shown in operations op5 through op7 and the spawning of
a new process with the access rights of the superuser and execution of the program
in operations op9 through op12. In the meantime the user for p1 gets rid of the script
with op8.
During operations op13 through op16, another process, p3, that earlier received
some network traﬃc from location B sends some control information to the new
process p5, who in return (in op17 and op18) opens a communication channel to p4
(lets assume p4 actually lies outside the computing system) to perform some sort
of attack that required privileged access rights (sending bad routing information for
example).
When the attack is detected and investigated the labels associated with p5 list
all the locations that played a role in the attack and can be investigated further.
It could be possible that p5 is terminated after the completion of the attack, but
system logging policies such as “log all network traﬃc and process information from
privileged ports from processes that have a non-empty label set” can record the
necessary information for post-incident analysis. Note that anything that p2 does
after being duped into executing the script is now “tainted” with a label A from p1
and and the system can be considered compromised after operations op5 through op7.
Any child processes and objects created as a result of that need to be investigated
as well.57
4.2.1 Covert Channels
Principals may exchange information via the use of covert channels. Covert
channels have been largely discussed in previous research. They can be divided into
storage and timing channels as discussed by Lampson [62] and Kemmerer [54]. For
communication taking place between a sender and a receiver through a covert chan-
nel, both must have access to an attribute of a shared resource and the sender either
the ability to cause a change in the attribute (storage) or the capability of modu-
lating the receiver’s response time for detecting a change in the attribute (timing).
Covert channels can be identiﬁed through the shared resource matrix as deﬁned by
Kemmerer [54] or via source code information ﬂow analysis techniques discussed in
Section 2.2.2.
Most of the research in covert channels focuses on systems with diﬀerent security
levels (e.g. low and high). The goal is to detect and restrict information ﬂow between
security levels (from high to low) through the covert channel. For such purposes
covert channels between subjects that also have legitimate channels available to
communicate can be declared not harmful and thus be ignored. Also, Moskowitz
and Kang [73] propose a mechanism called the “pump” that limits the bandwidth
of possible covert channels that exist in low-to-high communication. For our model
the bandwidth of a covert channel is of no interest because a single bit of exchanged
information between two principals may cause further information exchanges to other
subjects and thus labels need to be propagated.
The model we describe above takes into account some possible covert channels,
other forms have to be excluded from our model as a system cannot reliably decide
whether or not communication actually takes place. Covert channels that use the
success or failure of establishing a communication channel, use lock availability,
existence of ﬁles, or encoded information in the actual data exchange are handled
by the model. Also, probabilistic covert channels [89] that convey information by
changing the probability distribution of observable data are handled because it does58
not matter if there is more information encoded in information ﬂow we already
detect. However, covert channels that use a system’s availability of resources, such
as CPU, total memory, power, or bandwidth to encode messages for information
exchange cannot be detected by this model. Such covert channels lie outside of the
scope of this work and will not be considered further.
4.3 Space Analysis
The general model from the previous section is not concerned with any space lim-
itations a system might have regarding labels associated with principals and storage
objects. There is suﬃcient space to store inﬁnitely many labels with principals and
objects, and channels have unlimited capacity. This is not a practical assumption.
The need for space restrictions for derived sub-models depends on two factors: the
nature of the label set L and the deﬁnition of the label-updating function update.
A ﬁxed or bounded number of elements for L automatically implies a bound for
the maximum space requirements for each principal and object. Let |l| be the size
of label l in bits. Then we can deﬁne |L| :=
!
l∈L |l| for any label set L. If L is
bounded, the maximum space needed for each principal and object is potentially |L|.
For example, if one wants to determine if information ﬂow was caused locally or re-
mote, or from both possibilities (in whatever sense), then we have L = local,remote,
update = ∪, and |L| = 2. Only two bits are needed to store the labels at each
principal and object. Another example of this kind would be user ids on a comput-
ing system, whose number is usually bounded by system limitations. However, even
when L is bounded, the set might be so large that allocating |L| amount of space for
every principal and object is infeasible. We can extend the previous example and
instead of simply specifying “remote” we want to record a TCP connection consist-
ing of foreign IP address and port. The label set L is still bounded, as it consists
of the cross product of possible IP addresses and TCP ports. However, there are59
232 ×216 = 248 possible labels, which is too large an amount of space to be allocated
for each and every subject.
Sometimes, even though the label set may be large, it might still be possible to
allocate space for all the labels each subject may have to hold. This happens if the
label-updating function update is not an increasing function. For example, assume
we are binding color labels to our principals. If, instead of unioning the label sets,
update computes the color that is a result of mixing the colors involved, only one
single label needs to be stored with each subject. So even for 32-bit colors, resulting
in 232 possible labels, only 32 bits of space are needed.
If L is an ordered set, then the label-updating function may also consist of op-
erations such as min and max, which may further reduce the space requirements for
the subjects.
In the general case, however, we cannot assume that space requirements are
(reasonably) bounded and we therefore need to have a mechanism to manage the
available space. There are two factors to consider for space management: how
to distribute the available space and what to do if no further space is available.
Note that for channels there is an implicit space limitation caused by their inherent
capacity. An operation will fail if the operation on the channel fails because of
insuﬃcient capacity.
For the actual space management we can combine subjects together into groups
and then allocate a ﬁxed amount of space for each group. It is possible to imagine ev-
ery combination of principals and objects grouped together and this is equivalent to
partitioning a set of size n, where n = |P∪O|. There are Bn number of ways to parti-
tion such a set, where Bn is the n-th Bell number [87,109] and Bn = ⌈e−1 !2n
m=1
mn
m! ⌉.
In the following we will describe how to adapt the above model to take space con-
siderations into account. In general, space limitations only aﬀect the preconditions
of our operations, so we will not repeat all the operations but rather concentrate
on the relevant parts. Let S ∈ N be the total amount of space available for la-
bels and ℘(P ∪ O) be the set of all possible partitions of P ∪ O. For a speciﬁc60
partition parti ∈ ℘(P ∪ O), where 0 ≤ i < B|P∪O|, we can assume without loss of
generality that parti contains k > 0 subsets g1,...,gk of {P ∪ O}. We call these
subsets resource groups. Let S1,...,Sk ∈ N be the space available for labels allotted
to groups g1,...,gk and
!k
i=1 Si ≤ S. Furthermore, we have a mapping function
group : P ∪O → g1,...,gk, which, given an element from P ∪ O returns the resource
group it belongs to. Finally, there is a function util : g1,...,gk → N, which returns
the utilized space for a given group. Technically, the updating of the util function
needs to be performed in the action part of our operations. We therefore assume
that it is updated implicitly so that we can still present only the preconditions and
not have to worry about cluttering up the notation. In the following we describe the
preconditions for space management for our operations:
create(pc,s): When a new principal or a new object s is created by principal pc,
one of two things may happen with regard to the space resource groups:
1. The subject s is assigned to an existing resource group gx. In this case gx
needs to have enough available label space to hold pc’s label set:
util(gx) + |label(pc)| ≤ Sx
gx := gx ∪ {s}
2. A new resource group gk+1 with available space Sk+1 is created for the
new subject s. In this case there needs to be suﬃcient space left to allow
the creation of the resource group:
|label(pc)| ≤ Sk+1 ≤ S −
k "
i=1
Si
gk+1 := {s}
open(p1, p2): As the label sets of both principals are modiﬁed, there needs to be
suﬃcient space in both p1 and p2’s resource groups to hold the space diﬀerence61
between the old and the new label sets. Let gx = group(p1) and gy = group(p2)
and x  = y:
|update(label(p1),label(p2))| − |label(p1)| ≤ Sx − util(gx)
|update(label(p1),label(p2))| − |label(p2)| ≤ Sy − util(gy)
If group(p1) = group(p2) = gz, then:
2|update(label(p1),label(p2))| − |label(p1)| − |label(p2)| ≤ Sz − util(gz)
open(p, o) and open(o, p): The object’s label set is not aﬀected by this operation.
P’s label set is updated with o’s creator label set. Let gx = group(p):
|update(label(p),clabel(o))| − |label(p)| ≤ Sx − util(gx)
write(p1, p2): No label sets are modiﬁed by this operation. Only the channel
 p1,p2 ’s capacity to hold label(p1) imposes an added precondition to this op-
eration.
write(p, o) Only o’s label set is modiﬁed and the resource group gx = group(o)
needs to have suﬃcient available space for the resulting label set:
|update(label(p),label(o))| − |label(o)| ≤ Sx − util(gx)
read(p2, p1, n) The label set of p1 is updated with the ﬁrst n label sets contained
in channel  p2,p1 . The resource group gx = group(p1) needs to have suﬃcient
available space for the resulting label set after the n updates. Let lsetj( p2,p1 )
be an auxiliary function that returns the jth label set in the channel queue
without dequeuing it, and l a label set initially set to label(p1).
for i = 1 to n :
l = update(l,lseti( p2,p1 )
|l| − |label(p1)| ≤ Sx − util(gx)62
read(o, p) Only p’s label set is modiﬁed and the resource group gx = group(p)
needs to have suﬃcient available space for the resulting label set:
|f(label(p),label(o))| − |label(p)| ≤ Sx − util(gx)
close(p1, p2) This operation has the same space preconditions as the open(p1, p2)
command.
close(p, o) and close(o, p) No label sets are modiﬁed.
addlabel(p, l) The resource group gx = group(p) needs to have suﬃcient available
space to hold the resulting label set:
|update(label(p),l)| − |label(p)| ≤ Sx − util(gx)
destroy(p) All the preconditions for closing the channels containing p must be met.
destroy(o) No label sets are modiﬁed.
The above model for space management applies to any particular partitioning of
the subject set and their resulting resource groups. Two special cases stand out as
they simplify space management considerably: having a unique resource group for
each individual subject (local model) and having one global resource group for all
subjects (global model).
Local Models:
In this group of models we have k = |{P ∪ O}|. This means that each group of
g1 ...gk contains exactly one principal or object. This means that new subjects may
only be created as long as
!k
i=1 Si ≤ S and that the space Sj belonging to group gj
is only available to the one subject.
If storage space for labels is restricted on a per principal basis, it has the ad-
vantage that only operations involving principals with many labels are aﬀected by63
whatever means are taken to deal with a restriction violation. This may result in eﬃ-
cient ways to identify and contain “misbehaving” principals that try to obscure their
label sets. However, the local restriction may unfairly penalize certain principals that
accumulate many labels in their normal course of operation. We call a model that
follows this approach a local model with respect to label space constraints.
Global Models:
In this group of models, we have k = 1, and g1 = {P ∪ O}. Furthermore it
seems logical to assume that S1 = S. All the available space is made available to all
subjects on an equal basis.
Principals that accumulate many labels during their normal course of operation
are no longer penalized more than any other principal. However, a single misbe-
having or even a normal process may now exhaust the entire resource pool for label
storage, aﬀecting all other principals’ operations as well. Depending on how the
space restrictions are enforced this could easily lead to denial-of-service attacks or
label-washing. We call a model that follows this approach a global model with respect
to label space constraints.
4.3.1 Enforcing Space Constraints
Simply deﬁning space constraints is not suﬃcient for describing a comprehensive
space management model as there are diﬀerent ways to enforce the constraints. If
an operation violates one or more space constraints, there are two ways of dealing
with it: deny the operation or make space.
Strict Models:
If an operation is denied (i.e., it will fail) when its action would result in a
violation of the label space constraints, it ensures the correct binding of labels to64
principals at all times. As labels are never dropped, or “unbound” from a principal
it follows that a principal was never bound to other labels at earlier points in time.
We call a model that follows this approach a strict model with respect to label space
constraints.
For certain applications of label propagation using a strict model is essential for
its correct behavior.
Loose Models:
To ensure that any given label set size stays below or at the size limitation, a
function is needed that reduces the label set size should an operation exceed that
limit. Taking this approach guarantees that operations will not fail because of label
size limitations. However, because the label set size will be reduced, labels, and thus
information will be lost. We call a model that follows this approach a loose model
with respect to label space constraints.
Depending on the deﬁnition of the label-updating function update and the label
set L, there might be an upper bound on the possible label set size, either for each
principal or for the entire system. If this upper bound is reasonable in size, a strict
model with that upper bound as the label space constraint can be utilized. This
will result in no labels being lost and no operations will fail because of label size
limitations.
The actual nature of the function that reduces the label set size can be manifold,
and it is beyond the scope of this document to address all cases. Possible variants
might be to delete the “oldest” labels, delete the “least important” labels, combine
speciﬁc labels into more general ones, etc.
Note that this reduction of label set size need not only involve only the resource
groups belonging to the subjects involved at the operation. It can be quite possible
that labels may be removed from “less important” resource groups and the space
sets S1,...,Sk be adjusted dynamically.65
Another measure to free up label space is to create label hierarchies: well-known
labels that occur frequently together among many subjects of the system may be
grouped together into one meta-label. After the grouping only the meta-label needs
to be propagted and the mapping of labels to the meta-label kept once in the system.
As a disadvantage, all labels associated with the meta-label are now propagated
where in some cases only individual ones would have been.
Finally, any combination of utilizing strict and loose enforcement could be uti-
lized. Operations can be denied in certain cases, where in others it might be suﬃcient
to make space even at the cost of losing information. The exact enforcement strategy
depends on the application for the label propagation.
4.4 Properties of the Propagation Model
For the remainder of this document, we require that the label-updating function
update preserves the labels. An example of this is the set union operation, i.e.,
update = ∪. In general, we need to have s = update(t,l) ⇒ l ∈ s; ∀t ∈ 2L,l ∈ L.
This allows us to address the problems from Chapters 2 and 3, because the labels
are not modiﬁed or dropped as part of the updating process. Furthermore, we deﬁne
a special set Pg ⊂ P of principals, which contains the principals that may generate
labels.
Such a group Pg of principals implies that each label is uniquely identiﬁable as
having originated from a particular principal or a group of principals from Pg. That
means there is a mapping originated : L → 2Pg that takes a label and returns the
principal that created the label or the group of principals from which the label could
have originated. For example, if we have a group of principals httpd, telnetd,
ftpd, sshd, which are responsible for communicating with principals from other
systems and they generate labels identifying those systems, then any label found
within the system that is an identiﬁer of a foreign system must have been generated
by one of those four principals.66
We shall now deﬁne what we consider information exchange between principals.
Intuitively, two principals exchange information at or after a given time when data
ﬂows from one to the other. If intermediates such as other principals or objects
have been used to exchange the information, then information is exchanged between
the source and the intermediaries as well as the intermediaries and the target. The
successful opening of channels constitutes a 1 bit information exchange. In case
of checking the existence of an object for the purpose of information exchange is
only relevant for the creator of the object and the principal who tests the existence.
Principals who may have written to the object in the meantime do not matter as
they played no role in the existence of the object. Writing data into a channel is only
relevant if that very data is also read. That means that if data is already present
in the channel prior to a write operation w, that data needs to be read from the
channel before a reading principal is aﬀected by w.
Because of our conservative approach when tracking information ﬂow, we can
not be sure that information was actually exchanged between principals. However,
information could have been exchanged. Therefore, we shall formally deﬁne a po-
tential information exchange path IEn(p1,p2) between two principals p1,p2 ∈ P as a
sequence of n ≥ 1 operations from our model
op1(p1,s1) ◦ op2(s1,s2) ◦ ... ◦ opn(sn,p2)
where the si ∈ {P ∪ O} are the subjects for the operations. If the operation is a
read or write operation between principals, then, of course, we have opi(si,si+1,q).
This means that, if we see an operation op(x,y) as having a “direction” from source
x to target y, the source of each operation is the target of the next one. For the
open operation between principals we also allow the swapping of the parameters: i.e.
the sequence ... ◦ opk(sk,sk+1) ◦ open(sk+2,sk+1) ◦ ... still results in a valid potential
information exchange path.
Furthermore, we consider the destroy operation as the sequence of close opera-
tions that are triggered by it. Let subIEn(p1,p2,k) be the subsequence of IEn(p1,p2)
consisting of the ﬁrst k ≤ n operations.67
Some operations may only be in the path if they are matched with other opera-
tions in a manner so that information is propagated from one subject to the next. A
write operation needs to be matched with suﬃcient read operations, an open oper-
ation of a channel between principals is only relevant for the information exchange
if the opening principal was created by an operation in the path, and an open oper-
ation of a channel involving an object is only relevant if the object was created by
an operation in the path. In general these operations may exist by themselves, but
without their matching operations will not contribute to the information exchange
and therefore need not be in the path. We will elaborate on the individual match-ups
in the following:
If write(x,y,wi) ∈ subIEn(p1,p2,k), then we further require that there exists a
non-empty sequence of m read operations read(x,y,rj) ∈ subIEn(p1,p2,k′),0 < j ≤
m, where k′ > k and
!m
j=1rj > ci. The number ci is the number of items already
contained in the channel
  x,y
  prior to write(x,y,wi). We require this so that at
least some of the data written to the channel by the write operation is actually read
from the channel by the read() operations contained in the path, and at least the
last read() operation occurring after the write().
Similarly, if read(x,y,ri) ∈ subIEn(p1,p2,k), then we require that the operation
write(x,y,wj) ∈ subIEn(p1,p2,k′) and furthermore that there is a sequence of read()
operations read(x,y,rq) ∈ subIEn(p1,p2,k′′), where k′ < k′′ < k and
!
rq +wi > cj.
This means that at least some data read from the channel by the read() operation
has to have been written to the channel by some prior read() operations contained
in the path.
In summary, if either a read or a write operation is contained in the information
exchange path, the sequence of operations must contain the following, where channel
  x,y
  contains c items,
!m
i=1 ri > c, and m > 0:
...◦write(x,y,w)◦...◦read(x,y,r1)◦...◦read(x,y,r2)◦...◦read(x,y,rm)◦...
If open(x,o) or open(o,x) ∈ subIEn(p1,p2,k) and o ∈ O, then we require that
create(y,o) ∈ subIEn(p1,p2,k′), where k′ < k. Even though an open operation is68
necessary for subsequent read operations the opening of a reading channel to an
object is only relevant for information exchange when the object was created by an
operation in the path. Otherwise, the open operation must not be contained in the
path. This means that the object must have been created by an operation in the
information exchange path prior to the open operation.
We say p1 and p2 potentially exchange information iﬀ there exists a potential
information exchange path between p1 and p2.
Given the deﬁnitions above, the general information ﬂow model has the following
two properties:
1. If information is exchanged between principals p1 ∈ Pg and p2 / ∈ Pg, and label
l ∈ label(p1) prior to the information exchange, then l ∈ label(p2) after the
information exchange.
2. If principal p2 / ∈ Pg and label l ∈ label(p2), then information was potentially
exchanged between p2 and a principal p1 ∈ originated(l).
We will prove the two properties using proof by induction
1. We need to show ∃IEn(p1,p2) ⇒ l ∈ label(p2). We do this by a proof of
induction over the length n > 0 of the information exchange path IEn(p1,p2)
of operations:
Base case: n = 1
A potential information exchange path IE1(p1,p2) only exists when there exists
any of the following operations:
create(p1,p2) We have l ∈ label(p1) and label(p2) = label(p1). It thus follows
that l ∈ label(p2).
open(p1,p2) and close(p1,p2) We have
l ∈ label(p1)andlabel(p2) = update(label(p1),label(p2))
By the nature of update() it follows that l ∈ label(p2).69
Read and write operations are not part of the base case, as they must occur
as write(a,b,x)/read(b,c,y) pairs/groups.
Induction hypothesis: assume ∃IEk(p1,x) ⇒ l ∈ label(x) is true ∀1 ≤
k < n. Let opk+1 be the last operation in IEk+1(p1,p2), i.e., IEk+1(p1,p2) =
IEk(p1,x) ◦ opk+1. We have the following cases:
(a) If opk+1 is of the form create(x,p2),x ∈ P, then from the induction hy-
pothesis we know that l ∈ label(x). The create() operation copies the label
set of the creator to the created principal and we have label(p2) = label(x)
from which follows that l ∈ label(p2).
(b) If opk+1 is of the form open(x,p2), open(p2,x), close(x,p2), or close(p2,x),
x ∈ P, then we have l ∈ label(x) by the induction hypothesis. Further-
more, from opk+1 we have
label(x) = label(p2) = update(label(x),label(p2))
Because of the property of update it directly follows that l ∈ label(p2).
(c) If opk+1 is of the form read(y,p2,r),y ∈ P, then by deﬁnition ∃opi =
write(y,p2,w) ∈ subIEk+1(p1,p2,k′),k′ < k + 1. This means that there
exists an information exchange path IEk′(p1,y) and by induction hypoth-
esis l ∈ label(y).
There is also possibly a sequence of read operations that read a total
number of r′ items from the channel
  y,p2
  after the write operation and
prior to opk+1. If r′ ≥ ci + w, then all the information from the write
operation has already been dequeued from the channel. This implies that
there exists a shorter information exchange path IEk′′(p1,p2),k′′ < k + 1
and from the induction hypothesis it directly follows that l ∈ label(p2).
Otherwise, we have r′ + r > w. As l ∈ label(y) prior to opi at least one
of the label sets queued in
  y,p2
  contains l. The operation read(y,p2,r)
leads to label(p2) = update(label(p2),dequeue(
  y,p2
  )) r times and thus
l ∈ label(p2).70
(d) If opk+1 is of the form read(o,p2),o ∈ O, then by deﬁnition ∃write(x,o) ∈
subIEk+1(p1,p2,k′),k′ < k + 1. This means that there exists an informa-
tion exchange path IEk′(p1,x) and by induction hypothesis l ∈ label(x).
The write operation results in label(o) = update(label(x),label(o)) and
thus l ∈ label(o). From the read operation we have
label(p2) = update(label(o),label(p2))
and it follows that l ∈ label(p2).
(e) If opk+1 is of the form open(o,p2),o ∈ O, then by deﬁnition ∃create(x,o) ∈
subIEk+1(p1,p2,k′),k′ < k + 1. This means that there exists an informa-
tion exchange path IEk′(p1,x) and by induction hypothesis l ∈ label(x).
The create operation results in clabel(o) = label(x) and thus l ∈ clabel(o).
From the open operation we have label(p2) = update(clabel(o),label(p2))
and it follows that l ∈ label(p2).
!
2. We need to show l ∈ label(p2) ⇒ ∃IEn′(p1,p2) ⊂ OPn,p1 ∈ originated(l),n′ >
0. We do this by a proof by induction over the sequence OPn of n ≥ n′ total
operations from our model from the start of the information exchange.
Base case: n = 1
A principal can obtain a label only through the addlabel(), open(), close(),
and read() operations. Because p2 / ∈ Pg the addlabel() operation was not the
cause for l ∈ label(p2). Because n = 1, a read() operation also was not the
cause as it requires a previous write(). To obtain l with one single operation,
the operation had involve a principal p1 ∈ Pg. The label l was propagated
to p2 as a result of one of the assignments label(p2) = label(p1) (create) and
label(p2) = update(label(p1),label(p2)) (open, close between principals). A
write() operation does not directly aﬀect a principal’s label set. Hence the label
must have been obtained via one of the following operations: create(p1,p2),71
open(p1,p2), or close(p1,p2). Each of these operations is a valid information
exchange path IE1(p1,p2).
Induction hypothesis: assume l ∈ label(p2) ⇒ ∃IEn′(p1,p2) ⊂ OPk,p1 ∈
originated(l) is true ∀1 ≤ k < n
As p2 / ∈ Pg, the label l must have been obtained by the latest operation
performed in the model and it must have involved p2. If l was obtained
through an earlier operation then there exists a shorter potential informa-
tion exchange path, and it directly follows from the induction hypothesis that
∃IEn′(p1,p2),p1 ∈ originated(l). We have the following cases:
(a) If the last operation opk+1 ∈ OPk+1 was one of create(x,p2), open(x,p2),
close(x,p2), or close(p2,x), and l was obtained by p2 as the result of
this operation, it follows that l ∈ label(x). By induction hypothesis
∃IEn′(p1,x) and we have IEn′+1(p1,p2) = IEn′(p1,x) ◦ opk+1.
(b) If opk+1 was of the form read(x,p2,r), and l was obtained by this oper-
ation, then l must have been part of one of the r number of label sets
contained in the channel queue. This means that there must have been
an operation opk′ = write(x,p2,w) ∈ OPk prior to opk+1, w > 0, and l ∈
label(x). Furthermore, the number of items c contained in
  x,p2
  prior to
opk′ plus w has to be greater than the number of items read from the chan-
nel from possible read operations in between opk′ and opk+1. If this is not
the case, l was propagated to p2 by some prior read operation already and
it directly follows from the induction hypothesis that ∃IEn′(p1,p2), where
p1 ∈ originated(l). Otherwise, by induction hypothesis ∃IEn′′(p1,x). The
existence of opk′ together with opk+1 fulﬁll the deﬁnition of an information
exchange path IEn′′+1(p1,p2) = IEn′′(p1,x) ◦ opk+1.
(c) If opk+1 was of the form read(o,p2), it implies that l ∈ label(o) and thus
there must have been an operation opk′ = write(x,o) ∈ OPk, at which
point we had l ∈ label(x). By induction hypothesis we have ∃IEn′(p1,x),72
where p1 ∈ originated(l) and it directly follows that IEn′(p1,x)◦...◦opk′◦
... ◦ opk+1 = IEn′′(p1,p2).
(d) If opk+1 was of the form open(o,p2), it implies that l ∈ clabel(o). This
means that there must have been an operation opk′ = create(x,o) ∈ OPk,
at which point we had l ∈ label(x). By induction hypothesis ∃IEn′(p1,x),
where p1 ∈ originated(l) and it directly follows that IEn′(p1,x)◦...◦opk′◦
... ◦ opk+1 = IEn′′(p1,p2).
!
Note that if a space management mechanism is in place and it is of the loose type
as discussed above, then labels are potentially dropped. This means that the ﬁrst
property of the model may no longer hold. The second property (if a label is present
information must have been exchanged), however, always holds. For strict models,
both properties hold.
Also note that a direct consequence of the model’s properties it follows that
l / ∈ label(p2) ⇔
 ∃IEn(p1,p2);∀n,p1 ∈ Pg
i.e. if no label is present at a principal p2, then no communication has taken place
between principal p2 and a principal from Pg.
4.5 Case Studies
In the following we present several case studies to demonstrate how to use the
general model to create a sub-model to achieve desired accumulation of information.
Most of these case studies are based on a single host computing environment because
this was the main motivation for the development of the model.
4.5.1 User Inﬂuence Labels
To accomplish user inﬂuence tracking as described in Section 3.2.1 using label
propagation, we implement our model as follows. The system processes on the sys-73
tem are our principals as they are the active subjects that initiate communication
exchanges. Passive objects are all system resources that are shared between pro-
cesses. This includes ﬁles, shared memory, devices, global variables, mutexes, and
locks. For each of those objects the system needs to manage the associated label
sets. For those objects that may be dynamically created by processes (ﬁles, shared
memory) the system also needs to keep track of their creator label (clabel) sets.
The creation of new processes is usually handled through system calls such as
fork under Unix. At this point an exact copy of the process is made but with a
new process id. The label set associated with the process may be copied for the new
process at this point as well.
Channels between principals are the types of communication exchange channels
between processes: sockets, pipes, and signals. For each of those channels the system
needs to keep track of the label sets associated with the data. As most operating
systems use data queues to store the elements in the channel that have not been read,
an implementation should not cause much overhead. The operations on channels in
a system closely resemble those of our model and the implementation should be
straightforward. For channels that do not require an explicit open, we may simply
drop the requirement that an open channel must exist for the read/write operations.
Channels between a principal and an object are abstract in this case and it is
suﬃcient to compute the label sets of the subjects involved at each operation.
The label set for user inﬂuence consists of all the user identiﬁers on the system.
On many systems this number is typically limited by the size of the user id ﬁeld –
16 bits for Unix-like operating systems. Furthermore, there is often an upper limit
set on the number of possible users that is directly compiled into the kernel. Thus
we have a limited number of elements in the set, that, in many cases, is not large.
Because we want to track all possible inﬂuence any user might have exerted, the
label updating function update needs to preserve all labels and combine the label
sets of interacting subjects. We therefore choose update = ∪.74
Finally, the binding of a user label to a process running on the system should
occur after some sort of user authentication. On many systems there are system
calls that change the user context of a process to that of a speciﬁed user (setuid on
Linux, for example). These system calls are therefore a natural choice to perform
our addlabel operation. Depending on the system, some modiﬁcations may have
to be performed to ensure that only the process resulting from the login carries the
user label but not the system process that manages the login processes for everyone.
For example, under Linux, there are several processes running the getty program
for users to log onto the terminal. It must be ensured that the adding of the label
occurs after the forking of the process. Otherwise, the process running getty will
accumulate all user labels of subsequent logins and pass those on to to its child
processes.
As a result of the likely low number of users on the system space for labels should
not be a problem. The upper limit for the label space per subject is the product of
the size of the user id ﬁeld and the maximum number of users allowed. Therefore,
on many systems the space management discussed above will not be necessary.
4.5.2 Host Causality Labels
For host causality, we have an environment similar to that of user inﬂuence.
We have the same set of principals, objects, and channels, and the propagation
techniques are the same as well.
Also, we want to keep track of all network labels related to the processes in the
same manner as we wanted to keep track of the user label from the previous scenario.
Thus we also set update = ∪ in this case.
For the label set we need to choose labels that uniquely identify the network
connection. For TCP/IP this could be the tuple consisting of local port as well as
foreign port and IP address. Note that this label set is quite large (264 possible labels
for IPv4).75
The adding of a label to a process should occur whenever the process receives
data from a network connection. For TCP the reception of data is initiated by the
three-way handshake and from a process’ perspective whenever the listening process
accepts a connection. Thus system calls such as accept under Linux can be used to
perform the addlabel operation. Under UDP there is no concept of a connection
and data is read by the listening process directly via system calls such as recvfrom.
This binding of labels is identical to the setting of process origin in our previous
work [11].
Because the label set is large, it is infeasible to allocate suﬃcient space for all
labels per subject. Therefore, one of the space management techniques discussed
earlier is recommended. It is desired by the nature of the information we seek that
no labels be lost. Because of this, a strict model as deﬁned above is required. It is
part of future research to determine what a good balance between how much space to
make available and disturbing a system’s normal course of operation by disallowing
operations should be.
With host causality labels it is now possible to correlate incoming and outgoing
network traﬃc on the host. In particular, this may aid in the stepping stone detection
network traceback research discussed in Section 2.3.2 and a host supporting host
causality labels may be considered as an internal sensor as deﬁned by Daniels [24].
4.5.3 Network Location Traceback Labels
We can extend the above host causality scenario to a complete network traceback
environment. Principals now are all processes on all systems in the environment, and
the object are all the system resources on all systems. Obviously, objects may only
exchange information with principals on the same system. The label propagation
mechanism within each system is exactly the same as described in the ﬁrst case
study. In addition to that labels need to be propagated when principals on diﬀerent
systems communicate with each other. For this purpose, a mechanism needs to be76
devised that safely may transport labels across a network. This is part of future
research and beyond the scope of this dissertation.
The label set should contain labels that uniquely identify the location of a subject
initiating a cross-system communication. This could be a network address, such as
the IP address of the system, or things such as GPS coordinates or GUIDs. We
expect the label set to be quite large for the general case. Special cases may exist
where there is a small maximum label set size, such as network traceback within
intra-networks that contain only a small number of hosts.
The actual binding of the label via the addlabel operation is not as clear as in
the above examples, though. The binding could occur automatically for data leaving
a system. E.g. the network stack code of the system could add a label for the current
system if it is not already present. Alternatively, the label could be bound when a
user logs in locally to a system as described in the ﬁrst case study. Yet another way
to perform the binding would be an ISP who adds a label to incoming traﬃc on
the border routers. If the ISP’s infrastructure fully supports the label propagation,
then traﬃc leaving the ISP’s network through a border gateway may be correlated
to traﬃc entering it.
It is obvious that the modiﬁcations and requirements of this implementation are
restrictive and will ﬁnd its use only in controlled environments where complete net-
work traceback is desired and its beneﬁt outweighs the restrictions. This case study
is similar to the approach taken by Zhang and Dasgupta [119] (see Section 2.3.1) with
the added beneﬁt that hosts being used as stepping stones within an autonomous
system are now also addressed.
4.5.4 Military Classiﬁcation Labels
In many environments where conﬁdentiality is a concern, the disclosure or com-
promise of some information may result in greater loss than disclosure of less sensitive
information. Thus, to help provide graduated protection, it is helpful to partition in-77
formation into categories based on potential loss. The military model of classiﬁcation
is one such partitioning [79].
In the US military model of classiﬁcation, information is divided into unclassi-
ﬁed (minimal or no loss if disclosed), FOUO (for oﬃcial use only; unclassiﬁed, but
restricted release), conﬁdential (disclosure may cause some loss), secret (signiﬁcant
damage if disclosed), and top secret (grave damage if disclosed).
Persons (and equipment) that are to have access to information in this system
are required to be cleared to the highest level of access needed to accomplish their
tasks. It should be noted that simply because someone has a clearance at a particular
level does not mean that he/she can access all information that is classiﬁed at that
level. Instead, there needs to be a ”need to know” the information as a further
condition of disclosure. There may also be additional restrictions that are imposed
by the stewards of particular data, such as it cannot be shared with allies (even if
they have the right level of clearance), or the existence of the data itself must be
denied. It may also be the case that information from two diﬀerent sources should
never be combined in one place because the combination might lead to inference of
something sensitive not otherwise knowable from the individual parts. These classes
of information are given labels such as Umbra or Majic. Often, these labels are
themselves classiﬁed, and an unclassiﬁed abbreviation is used, such as MJ or GG.
To access data in one of these categories or compartments, an individual must be
”read in” to the special conditions of access to that category.
The combination of levels and categories forms a matrix to determine access
control. To read a piece of information, a person must be cleared to at least the
level of that information (secret or top secret), AND someone in charge of that
information must agree that the person has a need to know the information, AND
the person must be read into all of the categories that label the information. So,
for example, if a datum is Secret and in compartments A, B and X, a person with
Top Secret clearance would still not be granted access if she only had been granted
access to B and X.78
Information that is composed of other information or processes inherits all the
categories of the component parts, and it takes on the highest level of classiﬁcation
of any of the component parts. For example, combining item 1 at Secret MJ, item
2 at Top Secret AA, and item 3 at Secret XQ would result in a new item at level
Top Secret with labels MJ, AA, and XQ. Note that there might be special rules
associated with MJ, AA or XQ that would restrict (or prohibit) this combination.
We can use our model to keep track of information ﬂow violations (or, in com-
bination with access control measures, prevent them), while automatically updating
the classiﬁcation information of documents as they are modiﬁed. In this case, our
labels represent the most restrictive set of levels and categories that were actively
accessed by a principal during one “session.” A session is the duration in which a
principal is active within the system (e.g. the period of time during which a user
is logged in to a computing system). Note that the label set does not denote the
principal’s actual clearance credentials.
For reasons of simplicity, let’s assume we have three classiﬁcation levels: unclas-
siﬁed (u), secret (s), and top secret (t), and four categories: A, B, C, and D. The
label set consists of the cross product between the levels and the possible subsets of
the categories (i.e. {u,s,t}×2{A,B,C,D}). Furthermore, there is an ordering u < s < t
of the levels. We deﬁne our label-updating function as max for the level-part and as
∪ for the category part.
At the start of a session a principal’s label set is empty. Only through access to
classiﬁed documents and communication with principals that already have acquired
labels does a principal acquire labels itself. This ensures that a principal may still
communicate with other principals of lower or diﬀerent classiﬁcation prior to the
access of higher classiﬁed documents, but not thereafter. An access violation has
occurred when a principal holds a label with a higher level or diﬀerent categories
than its actual clearance.
The actual implementation may be a computing system as described in the ﬁrst
case study. The label propagation is analogous. The documents in this case are the79
objects on the system. When two principals communicate with each other, their
label sets will be modiﬁed according to the update function. This guarantees that
any documents that are created are always classiﬁed with the highest security levels
necessary and the classiﬁcation of objects that are modiﬁed is also properly updated.80
5 IMPLEMENTATION
In the following we discuss the implementation of our model as a proof-of-concept
study. The model was implemented by modifying the FreeBSD 4.12 operating system
[40]. The implementation is kernel-based, which means that the propagation method
lies in a protected space that cannot be tampered with from user mode programs.
If the kernel can be trusted, then so can the label propagation and any information
gained by it. Implementing the model for a real production operating system as
opposed to a simulated one serves multiple purposes:
• We demonstrate that utilizing the model is feasible for modern operating sys-
tems.
• We can accurately measure the computational overhead needed for label prop-
agation to work.
• We encounter and can address the diﬃculties and limitations that come with
such an implementation.
• Results obtained from this proof-of-concept implementation may be applied to
other operating systems with similar architectures.
Section 5.1 describes which subsystems would need to be addressed for a full
implementation of the model we described. Given that our implementation is merely
a proof-of-concept, we focus on the major subsystems needed for label propagation
to function. It addresses all the important aspects that need to be considered,
and most of the other subsystems can be implemented in a similar fashion. In the
subsequent sections we describe the parts that were actually implemented, namely:
the data structures and operations introduced to the kernel (Section 5.2), how to81
modify network sockets as part of interprocess communication (Section 5.3), and
how to handle label propagation for ﬁles (Section 5.4).
5.1 Subsystems Aﬀected by Label Propagation
Applying our model for a computing system means that we need to translate the
sets of principals, objects, and channels to entities of the system. Furthermore, the
operations of the model need to be implemented accordingly. The acting principals
on a computing system are its processes. Therefore, the set P maps to the set of
processes on the system. This is consistent with the notion that on all computing
systems, there is one initial process (such as init in the UNIX world), from which
subsequently all other processes on the system are created (unless it is not a multi-
process system, in which case there is only one initial process). The set of objects
O of the model are all the resources that are shared on the system among processes.
Those resources that belong solely to one given process need not be considered.
Furthermore, the set of possible channels is comprised of the system’s provisions
for interprocess communication, as well as the means to access, modify, and create
shared resources. To implement label propagation for an entire operating system,
essentially three parts need to be completed:
1. The system needs to be aware of labels and be able to bind them to its prin-
cipals.
2. All interprocess communication needs to be covered by the label propagation
mechanism.
3. All objects shared among processes need to be associated with labels for the
duration of the sharing and those labels updated according to the model.82
5.1.1 Shared Resources
The resources that are shared among processes on a system are numerous. In
FreeBSD and other UNIX-type operating systems they consist of at least the follow-
ing [99]:
• Files. Files are data objects typically stored on secondary storage. Files are
generally shared between numerous processes. While there may be a limitation
to only those processes that possess the proper access credentials to perform
operations on a ﬁle, those credentials are on a user/group basis and not on
an individual process basis. Furthermore, the access credentials are subject
to change arbitrarily, which means that labels need to be kept for ﬁles even if
only one process has access to a ﬁle at a given time. Files are considered to be
permanent objects on a computing system.
• Mutexes and Condition Variables. Mutexes are used for synchronization on a
system. They are shared between entities within the same name space as the
mutex. A free mutex may be locked by one entity at which point all other
entities trying to obtain the lock have to wait until the mutex is unlocked.
Condition Variables are used in conjunction with mutexes to signal any waiting
entities that some event (usually a change in a variable) has occurred. Mutexes
typically only occur within a given process, but it may be possible to share a
dynamically allocated mutex among processes through shared memory.
• Read-write and Record Locks. Unlike mutexes, read-write locks do not block
access to an entire “critical region” protected by the lock. Read-write locks
diﬀerentiate between read and write mode: any number of processes may hold
a read mode lock as long as no process holds a write mode lock, and a write
mode lock can only be obtained when no other process holds any mode lock.
Record locks further govern read and write access to speciﬁc regions of a ﬁle.
They work like read-write locks, but one can specify if the entire ﬁle is locked83
or merely a speciﬁc byte-region. As with mutexes, read-write locks are usually
shared only by threads within a process. Record locks, however, are shared
between processes.
• Semaphores. Semaphores are explicitly used for synchronization between pro-
cesses. As with mutexes, semaphores can be locked (set to 1) and waited for
(wait for value to be 0), but the value of a semaphore may also be read without
blocking. Essentially, a semaphore is a 1-bit global variable shared among all
processes. Some semaphores (such as System V semaphores [99]) also allow
counting semaphores, whose values range between zero and some speciﬁed up-
per limit. Semaphores are temporary objects that exist in the system until
they are destroyed.
• Shared Memory. Shared memory is heap memory that is mapped to the address
space of multiple processes. Once the system has mapped the address space,
only the processes that have access to the shared memory are involved in
passing data to and from the memory space. A special case of shared memory
is the memory-mapping of a ﬁle. In this case the ﬁle data is mapped into
memory and the process(es) can directly modify the memory, aﬀecting the ﬁle
contents as well. When synchronizing the memory space with the ﬁle, the
system is again involved.
• Sockets and Message Queues. Certain parameters can be set and retrieved for
sockets and message queues as options. Thus, they qualify as shared resources
through which data may be exchanged as well. We discuss sockets and message
queues as part of interprocess communication in further detail below.
The implementation we describe in the following sections handles label propaga-
tion for a ﬁxed number of globally shared labels. That means that there is an upper
bound on the number of labels, which allows us to allocate suﬃcient space for the
processes and objects or fail during their creation. Furthermore, the update function84
will always succeed and we do not have to worry about the measures to take when
there is insuﬃcient space for labels as a result of the update (see Section 4.3.1).
As there is no system involvement when shared memory is processed, there is no
elegant solution to keep track of label propagation. One might imagine monitoring
all the system calls that involve copying of data between buﬀers and determine if
any of the addresses involved fall into a shared memory region. However, because
data may directly be assigned in chunks of up to a word length, this will not cover all
of the information ﬂow between processes. Barring the utilization of static analysis
techniques as discussed in Section 2.2.2, a monitoring device such as Fenton’s Mem-
ory Mark machine [37], or the utilization of virtual machines or special hardware, the
only reliable method to properly implement the model is once again conservative: all
processes that share memory between them need to be treated as a single principal
during the duration of the sharing. For an implementation of this, for every opera-
tion that involves a principal, further lookups will have to be made to see if it belongs
to such a group and then perform the operation for all processes involved. The uti-
lization of shared memory is a feature not common to many programs. Thus, the
inclusion of such a mechanism lies well outside of a proof-of-concept implementation,
and we will not consider shared memory any further (and as a direct consequence
we also will not have to consider mutexes, condition variables, and read-write locks).
5.1.2 Interprocess Communication
Interprocess communication mechanisms allow two processes on a system to ex-
change data. In UNIX-like operating systems there are the following mechanisms
available [65,99]:
• Pipes and FIFOs. A pipe is the original UNIX mechanism for interprocess
communication. A uni-directional pipe consists of two ﬁle descriptors, one for
writing and one for reading. Bi-directional pipes consist of two uni-directional
pipes. Pipes have no name associated with them, and can only establish com-85
munication between related processes (parent and child). This was changed
with FIFOs (also called named pipes).
• Sockets. Sockets are the systems interface for sending and receiving data over
a network. With facilities such as the loopback device and socket types for local
data transfer (UNIX domain protocols), sockets can also be used for processes
to communicate with each other.
• Message Queues. Message queues are used to deliver message records, which
may contain arbitrary data, between processes. Unlike pipes and sockets, mes-
sage queues need not be open between two processes. A process may write
data to a message queue and then terminate, and a second process can retrieve
the message record even after the termination of the writing process.
• Remote Procedure Calls. Remote procedure calls occur when a process invokes
a procedure that is not located in its own environment but rather within a
diﬀerent process on the same host (doors) or on a diﬀerent host (Sun RPC).
Within a process the doors are identiﬁed by descriptors and externally by
pathnames in the ﬁle system. Doors are not supported in FreeBSD and the
Sun RPC calls utilize the socket mechanism to transport data.
• Signals. Signals are software interrupts that allow a process to react to asyn-
chronous events. Apart from handling signals that originate from certain ex-
ternal events (such as a user aborting a program), processes can send signals
to other processes and thus count as interprocess communication [97].
5.1.3 Operations and System Calls
In FreeBSD and many other operating systems the way a process is able to
communicate with other processes or access system resources is governed through
the use of system calls. System calls are the interface from user space processes and
the operating system kernel. The shared objects are created and manipulated that86
way and all the interprocess communication mechanisms utilize system calls. In the
following we describe which FreeBSD system calls are relevant for the operations of
our model.
Create
The only way to create a new process apart from init and the page daemon is
through the fork system call [97]. The function is called once, but returns twice:
once to the calling process (parent) returning the process id of the child process, and
once to the newly created process (child) returning a value of 0. While there are the
system calls system and popen, which also create new processes in the system, they
do so by invoking fork and then one of the calls from the exec-family. Thus it is
suﬃcient to address the inheritance of label sets at the fork system call.
There is a large number of system calls available to create shared objects. Files
can be created with the open, creat, and mknod system calls. Record locks are
created by invoking the fcntl system call on an open ﬁle descriptor with a com-
mand indicating the setting of the lock and a struct flock with types F RDLCK or
F WRLOCK as parameters. Semaphores can either be named, in which case they are
created with sem open and semget, or they can be memory-based, in which case they
are created with sem init. However, the former case also requires shared memory
between processes. In all of the above cases, the system must make sure that the
newly created object’s creator label set must be set to the label set of the process
that initiated the system call.
Open
Pipes are created with the pipe system call. The call returns the two ﬁle descrip-
tors to the process. After that the process usually calls fork and the parent and child
process each will close one of the descriptors. Alternatively, the popen call combines
these steps and further executes a command for the child process. The updating of87
the label sets is already taken care of through the call to fork. A socket is created
with the socket system call, but the communication channel is not open at this
time. The socketpair system call, similar to pipe creates two connected sockets,
one of which is usually passed to a child process through fork or through another
communication channel supported by the system. This only applies to sockets of the
Unix domain protocol suite. Because sockets are considered shared resources in the
system, at the point of the creation the label set of the calling process has to be asso-
ciated with the socket. With the creation of the socket, the communication channel
is not opened, however. This is done through a series of system calls on both client
and server side (bind, listen, connect, accept) for stream sockets. For datagram
sockets no explicit opening of a channel is performed. Data is exchanged on a per
packet basis through the read and write operations. Upon a successful opening of a
stream socket the label sets of the processes involved need to be updated with each
other (if both endpoints are local).
Message queues are not explicitly opened as they do not require two endpoints
for communication. A message queue needs to be explicitly created, however. This
is done with the msgget system call. In the case when the system call is used to
create the queue (it is also used to read data from it), the label set of the creating
process should be associated with the queue, as the queue also qualiﬁes as a shared
resource whose existence may be used to exchange information. Signals are passed
on by the system instantaneously, without an explicit opening of a channel.
Opening a channel from a process to a shared object may not always occur.
Obtaining the status of a lock or reading the value of a semaphore does not require
an explicit setup of a channel. Thus the only explicit opening of a channel regarding
the shared objects occurs for ﬁles. Here, the channels are opened via the open system
call. Depending on the ﬂags that are passed to the system call, the channel is either
read-only, write-only, or bi-directional. In all the cases, the label set of the process
that invoked the open call needs to be updated with that of ﬁle’s creator label set.88
Write
Writing data to a channel is diﬀerent from storing data in an object. This is
because the data may not immediately reach its destination, but rather is stored in
the channel until it is read by the reading process. For this purpose, the channel
endpoints (descriptors) usually have send and receive buﬀers, where the data of the
writing process is put into the send buﬀer, and data is moved from the receive buﬀer
to the reading process. In some cases send and receive buﬀer are the same, and in
other cases there is some transport mechanism between the buﬀers. Labels need to
be associated with each new data instance (packet) that enters the send buﬀer. Thus,
if a packet of size n is written to the channel, the label set of the writing process
needs to be associated with that packet, and this is equivalent to the n number of
enqueue operations of our model (see Section 4.2). Figure 5.1 illustrates the way
data is propagated through channels.
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Figure 5.1. Data ﬂowing through a channel
Pipes use the write and writev system calls to write data into the channel.
Writing data to a socket is performed by one of the following system calls, depending
on the socket type: write, writev, send1, sendto, and sendmsg. For all the pipe
1send is not actually a system call but rather a library function that utilizes sendto. However it
is listed as a system call in the FreeBSD manual pages.89
and socket write calls the data that is sent to the send buﬀer needs to be tagged
with the label set of the calling process. Furthermore, for sockets the fcntl, ioctl,
and setsockopt system calls can be used to modify parameters of the socket that
the corresponding reading process may interpret. Thus, for those calls, the label set
associated with the socket needs to be updated with that of the calling process.
For message queues the send and receive buﬀers are identical and implemented
as a priority queue. Furthermore, there are no speciﬁc descriptors that each process
possesses but rather global endpoints open to all processes. Writing data to a message
queue is performed via the msgsnd system call. At this point, the label set of the
calling process needs to be associated with the message packet that is put into the
queue. Certain parameters of the queue may also be set with the msgctl call. In
this case the label set associated with the message queue itself, rather than those
associated with the messages, needs to be updated with the calling process’s label
set. Signals are sent via the kill system call. They are delivered immediately and
there is no explicit “reading” of the signal. A process is either able to handle the
signal, or the signal is ignored. Thus for the kill system call the label set of the
process receiving the signal needs to be updated with the label set of the calling
process.
Writing data to a record lock is equivalent to creating it or performing the unlock
procedure. The latter is also done via the fcntl system call, one of the F SETLK
commands and the F UNLCK type. Semaphores, with their system wide accessibility,
can be manipulated by other processes once they are created. The value of a non-
counting semaphore is changed to 1 (locked) with the sem wait and sem trywait sys-
tem calls, and set to 0 (unlocked) with the sem post call. For counting semaphores,
the value of the semaphore is manipulated with the semget, semop, and semctl sys-
tem calls. Data is written to ﬁle objects when either their data is modiﬁed or when
the metadata of the ﬁle changes. The system calls associated with altering ﬁles are
write, writev, pwrite, open (with the O TRUNC ﬂag set), fcntl, ioctl, truncate,
ftruncate, chmod, fchmod, lchmod, chflags, fchflags, chown, fchown, lchown,90
utimes, lutimes, futimes, rename, and link, symlink, and mkdir for directories.
In all these cases, the label set associated with the object needs to be updated with
the label set of the calling process.
Read
As described in the previous section, reading data from a channel usually involves
reading data from the receive buﬀer of the reading process’s channel descriptor. Pipes
use the read and readv system calls to read the data. Data is read from a socket
through the read, readv, recv2, recvfrom, and recvmsg system calls. For the read
calls for pipes and sockets, the label sets of the packets that are read from the receive
buﬀer must be used to update the label set of the process invoking the read. For
sockets, the fcntl, ioctl, and getsockopt calls can be used to retrieve parameters
from the socket. In this case the calling process’s label set needs to be updated with
the label set associated with the socket itself. Reading messages from a message
queue is done with the msgget and msgrcv calls. Certain parameters of the queue
may also be accessed through the msgctl system call. In the former case the label set
associated with the message(s) is used to update the calling process’s label set, in the
latter case the label set associated with the queue itself must be used. For signals,
there is no explicit read mechanism. Instead, the program the process executes must
be coded to handle signals (see section above).
Reading data from a record lock is equivalent to trying to obtain a lock. This
is done via the fcntl system call on an open ﬁle descriptor but this time with an
F GETLK command. The value of a non-counting semaphore can be obtained via
the sem trywait call (implicitly) or via the sem getvalue system call. The value
of counting semaphores is read with the semget, semop, and semctl system calls.
Data that can be read from ﬁles is either the ﬁle data itself, or the metadata of the
ﬁle. The system calls associated with reading data from a ﬁle are: read, readv,
2recv is not actually a system call but rather a library function that utilizes recvfrom. However
it is listed as a system call in the FreeBSD manual pages.91
pread, stat, lstat, fstat, poll, access, chdir, and fchdir, as well as readlink
for directories.
Close and Destroy
When a channel is destroyed, all the unsent and/or unread data in the send and
receive buﬀer is discarded and will not have any eﬀect on label updating. Pipes are
closed with the pclose system call. Sockets can be closed with the shutdown and
close system calls. If shutdown is used, the socket merely shuts down communica-
tions in one or both directions, but the socket can be reconnected and parameters
still be set and read. In this case the label set of the socket needs to be updated with
the label set of the calling process. If close is used and the socket is connection-
oriented (streaming), then the two label sets of the processes involved need to be
updated with each other if both endpoints are local. Message queues are destroyed
via the msgctl system call and the IPC RMID command. When a message queue is
destroyed, the label sets of any remaining processes that block for a read access need
to be updated with the label set of the calling process and vice versa. Signals do not
possess a close or destroy mechanism.
When closing an open channel to a ﬁle or removing a lock, according to our
model, no label sets need to be modiﬁed. Therefore none of the respective system
calls need to be modiﬁed. The same is true when destroying the object.
A process is destroyed in two ways: it either ends the program it is running and
returns, or it receives a SIGKILL signal. The existing open communication channels
the process possesses are closed by the system and thus no label sets need to be
updated. As with closing a channel to a shared object, destroying a shared object
has no eﬀect on any label sets.
The number of system calls we have listed above that need to be modiﬁed to
allow full label propagation according to the model we presented in Section 4.2
is extensive. Some of the implementation work may be reduced as some system92
calls share lower level functions in the kernel, where the appropriate modiﬁcations
may be performed (see the following sections). However, most of the complexity
arises from the need to address communication through storage channels. In the
general case processes will not abuse mechanisms such as the existence of ﬁles, locks,
semaphores, or message queues, changes in socket parameters, or changes in ﬁle
metadata to exchange information. With the introduction of observation techniques
such as the ones we discuss in this document, this may change, however. If all
legitimate channels on a system are eﬀectively monitored then malicious users will
ﬁnd ways to circumvent those channels. However, addressing those storage channels
in a proof-of-concept implementation is well beyond the scope of the work we present
here. Therefore, for the proof-of-concept implementation we will pick the most
relevant subsystems and focus only on implementing label propagation for the data
channels on the system. That means that we will ignore the open and close operations
of our model, and do not keep track of creator label sets. The techniques we describe
in the following should apply for most of those instances, and many of the system
calls we do not address can be modiﬁed in the same manner as we describe below.
In addition to the modiﬁcation of the systems calls, we also need to be able to map
certain information with respect to labels. Not all of the mappings are necessary, but
they may improve performance of certain operations regarding labels. The mappings
are:
• process id → label set
• object identiﬁer → label set
• label × label set → boolean
• label → 2{processes×objects}
• object identiﬁer × label → boolean
• process id × label → boolean93
The last three mappings are not required for label propagation to work. Actually,
the last two are merely combinations of the ﬁrst three. However, they may allow
testing in a more eﬃcient manner whether a given label is part of a process’s or
object’s label set and also obtaining all the processes and objects whose label sets
contain a speciﬁc label.
5.2 Data Structures and Operations
The main data structure that manages the labels in the kernel is a global table
label table, which is an array that contains the label data as well as its position
within the table.
struct label {
char data[LABEL_SIZE]; // actual label data
long pos; // position in the global array
};
extern struct label *label_table[LABEL_SET_MAX];
This allows the referencing of a label to be its entry number within the label
table. Thus, any given label set associated with a process or object can be as simple
as a bit-vector, where each bit signiﬁes whether the label at that position is contained
in the set or not. That means that any given label set is a bit vector with as many
bits as there are possible labels:
typedef struct _labelSet {char v[LABEL_VECTOR];} labelSet;
The constants have the following relationship (there a 8 bits in a byte):
#define LABEL_VECTOR (LABEL_SET_MAX / 8)
The relationship between label sets and the global label table are shown in Fig-
ure 5.2. Note that the actual content of the label is not important for the propagation
at all. The operations described in the following will mostly involve only label sets.94
It is conceivable to have a further mapping that, given a label, ﬁnds the position in
the table. This may be useful to determine if a potentially new label to the system
is already contained in the label table (and thus is not new). This may be achieved,
for example, with a binary search tree using the label data as a key that maps back
to the position in the global table. The global table will still be necessary, because
once a position has been assigned to a label it must be permanent or the label sets
will carry incorrect information. Plus, we achieve a O(1) lookup for a given position
in the table as opposed to the O(logn) such an operation would take if only a search
tree were realized.
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Figure 5.2. The main kernel data structure for labels
The create label operation takes as arguments a buﬀer containing the label
data and the length of the buﬀer. If the label is already contained in the label table,
a pointer to that label is returned. Otherwise a new label is created in a free slot in95
the table and a pointer to the label is returned. If no free slot is available, then a
null pointer is returned.
Note that the system is not aware of any speciﬁc meaning of a label (i.e. user
identity or location information). The system’s purpose is merely to propagate the
labels according to the operations of the model. Any interpretation of the labels
is done by other extensions of the system (i.e., access control mechanisms, logging
facilities, etc.), which are outside the scope of this work.
The add label operation takes as arguments a label and a label set and sets the
appropriate bit in the bit vector to true.
The update labels operation takes as arguments two label sets: a source and
a target. It then assigns the target label set the bit-wise “OR” of the source and
target vectors.
To provide an interface to user space that allows user programs to query processes’
labels, two new system calls were introduced to the system. The getlabel call
retrieves the label set for a speciﬁed process id and stores it into the supplied buﬀer.
The getlabeldata call retrieves the label data for the speciﬁed entry in the global
label table and stores it in the supplied buﬀer. It is thus the responsibility of the
user space program to compute the position in the label table from the bit vector
and then retrieve the data.
For debugging purposes we also implemented another system call, addlabel,
which binds a new label to a speciﬁed process. This call would not be part of a
regular system.
Note that there are no operations removing labels from the system. That means
that the proof-of-concept implementation will only be useful to a limited degree for
label sets that are not ﬁxed in size. This could be remedied by introducing a reference
count for each label and, once the reference count reaches zero, removing the label
from the table. However, this would imply that the update function no longer is a
simple “OR” operation. The update function now would need to determine which
labels were newly added to label sets as part of the update and increase the reference96
count. Furthermore, whenever a process, shared resource, or label set residing in a
channel gets destroyed the reference count needs to be decreased.
With the removal of labels from the label table we also introduce the problem of
keeping track of the next free available slot in the table. However, this problem is
similar to that of determining the next free process number of a system and can be
solved in a similar manner.
With such a mechanism in place, however, the system could address unbounded
label sets to a limited degree depending on the overall size of the label table and
the retention of individual labels within the system. If a point is reached where no
more labels can be assigned (or some threshold is reached), an alert could be issued,
calling for resolution by a human being.
5.3 IPC: Sockets
From the diﬀerent types of interprocess communication described in Section 5.1.2,
the socket subsystem is the most complex one. The FreeBSD implementation of
pipes utilizes supposedly the socket infrastructure to transmit data [65], but our
performance overhead results in Section 5.5.4 indicate otherwise. Furthermore, the
Sun RPC mechanism also uses sockets and the network subsystem to function. That
and the fact that message queues are commonly not used too often by programs led
us to implement label propagation for the socket subsystem.
As described in Section 5.1.3, sockets utilize send and receive buﬀers to store
pending packets until they are sent over the network or read by the receiving process.
The main data structure used to assemble those packets is the mbuf. Mbufs are used
to build packets. They are small building blocks that contain space for a small
amount of data and can be chained together to provide space for larger packets.
Because of their small size, it is not feasible to store a label set within an mbuf. An
mbuf only has 128 bytes of total space available. Furthermore, not every mbuf needs
to be associated with a label set. The start of each data packet is indicated with a97
special mbuf that has a packet header, and it is suﬃcient to associate labels with
those mbufs. Thus we modify the struct pkthdr for the mbufs to contain a pointer
to a label set. This pointer is initialized to zero every time a new packet header mbuf
is allocated through the M GETHDR macro. When mbuf are released back to memory,
we also need to free the label set associated with it if it is of the type M PKTHDR and
actually contains a label set. This is done in the m free function. When mbufs are
copied with the m copym function a new copy of the label set needs to be generated
to avoid the same label set to be freed twice.
The system calls that we need to consider for an implementation are read, readv,
recv, recvfrom, recvmsg, write, writev, send, sendto, and sendmsg. However,
there are lower level functions that are invoked by those system calls, which, in turn,
all call the soreceive function for the reading calls and sosend for the writing calls.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the function hierarchy and the overall network stack structure
of FreeBSD.9
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Figure 5.3. FreeBSD kernel functions for socket I/O99
The sosend function is responsible for writing data into the send buﬀer and in-
voking the proper protocol’s handling function for the packet through the pr usrreq
function that is associated with the socket [65,99]. Sosend allocates a new mbuf of
type M PKTHDR unless one was already passed down to the function. At this point
we check if the calling process has a label set associated with it. If so, we allocate
a new bit vector for the label set, copy the process’s label set to the new label set,
and set the pointer in the mbuf’s packet header (either the one allocated by sosend
or the one that was passed down) to the new label set. Once passed to the send
buﬀer where the appropriate protocol’s handling function fetches the packets via the
pr usrreq mechanism, the mbufs are passed down the network stack, and if the re-
ceiving endpoint is local, they will be passed through the loopback device and back
up the network stack (see Figure 5.3).
In some instances a protocol in the network stack has to append headers to the
packet. If there is not suﬃcient space at the top of the packet header mbuf for the
new header, then a new mbuf is prepended to the packet as its new header. This
is done via the M PREPEND macro and utilized for example in UDP. Thus the macro
was modiﬁed to switch the pointer to the label set to the new mbuf header. For
some unknown reason, TCP does not utilize the M PREPEND macro. It always uses
M GETHDR and manually prepends the new mbuf. Therefore, the tcp output function
was also modiﬁed to switch the pointer. This means that if support for other network
protocols is required, one needs to make sure that special cases like this are handled
properly.
The soreceive function reads data from the socket’s receive buﬀer, and blocks
if no suﬃcient data is available to fulﬁll the request from the higher level functions.
When the data is received from the socket receive buﬀer, soreceive copies the
data to the user space buﬀers that were supplied by the system calls. Right before
copying the data, both for out-of-band and regular data, the label set of the process
that invoked soreceive indirectly needs to be updated. However, the process id
of that process is not available to the function. Changing the function parameters100
of soreceive would mean having to change the entire modular socket and vnode
generic operations for the “receive” type, because the soreceive function may be
invoked through a pointer that is supplied to map to generic function calls. We
therefore decided to “piggyback” the process id through an unused parameter in
the invocation of soreceive through soo read and recvit. Both those function
have access to the calling process’s id and both of them pass a null value to the
fourth argument of soreceive (an mbuf to which to transfer the receive buﬀer data
directly). Thus a new message ﬂag was created, MSG LABELPID, which, when set,
tells soreceive to interpret this pointer as a pointer to a process table entry. Now
when data is about to be copied whose mbuf packet headers contain a pointer to
a label set, the label set of the process that invoked the reading from the socket is
updated with that label set, or a new label set is created for that process.
5.4 Shared Resources: Files
Looking at the amount of system calls that govern the use of ﬁles in Section 5.1.3,
one can see that ﬁles are by far the most complex among the shared resources in
FreeBSD. Furthermore, ﬁles are the only kind of shared object in the system that
are intended for data exchange (we do exclude shared memory from our analysis;
see Section 5.1.1). Thus our proof-of-concept implementation need to deal only with
ﬁles for label propagation.
FreeBSD, like many other UNIX-like operating systems, supports many diﬀerent
ﬁle systems. To bring many diﬀerent ﬁle systems with diﬀerent layouts and operation
into one single framework transparent to the user space processes, FreeBSD utilizes
a virtual ﬁle system layer. This ensures that standard operations that the operating
system supplies can be properly mapped to the ﬁle system speciﬁc functions. The
generic operations that can be performed on a ﬁle descriptor by a process are mapped
in a structure struct fileops, which contain pointers to the appropriate low-level101
operation for the underlying ﬁle system. This is done for read, write, ioctl, poll, stat,
and close operations.
There are two ways to implement label propagation regarding ﬁle systems: the
labels can be stored with each ﬁle, or the kernel itself keeps track of which ﬁle is
associated with what labels. The ﬁrst approach has the advantage that there is
little computational overhead as there needs to be no explicit mapping of ﬁles to
labels. Simply by accessing the ﬁle, which is done anyway during the operations,
the label set may be retrieved. Plus, the labels for a ﬁle are automatically stored
permanently. However, this way each individual ﬁle system needs to be modiﬁed to
accommodate label propagation. This might not be possible for certain ﬁle systems.
While for some ﬁle systems, such as ext2 [16], there are unused ﬁelds (e.g., the access
control pointer), which can be used to point to blocks containing labels, there is
no such extra space in the Reiser ﬁle system [9], and future ﬁle systems might be
similarly frugal with the space they use. When the kernel keeps track of what the
labels for a ﬁle are, then there needs to be some sort of lookup data structure for
the mapping. However, by keeping the mapping in the kernel, the implementation is
independent of the underlying ﬁle systems, supporting any of those supported by the
operating system itself: Provided a unique identiﬁer can be assigned to each ﬁle on
the system. Furthermore, a data structure that contains all the ﬁles that have label
sets associated with them allows us to eﬃciently answer questions such as: “Which
are the ﬁles that possess label X?”. If labels were stored directly with the ﬁle, then
all the ﬁles on the system would have to be examined, not only those that have a
label set.
Because of those advantages and the fact that an implementation aﬀects fewer
subsystems of the kernel, we have decided to keep track of ﬁle label sets directly in
the kernel. For this, we have introduced a global file labels mapping that utilizes
an AVL tree [1], a version of a balanced binary search tree. This gives us O(logn)
lookup and insertion time, where n is the number of ﬁles with labels. Given a ﬁle
identiﬁer, the get file entry function either returns the label vector associated102
with the ﬁle, or null if the ﬁle has no labels. Plus, labels can be associated with a
ﬁle via the insert file label function, which takes the ﬁle identiﬁer and a label
set as parameters and creates an entry in the search tree, copying the provided label
set.
Files in FreeBSD (and according to the POSIX standard [47]) are uniquely iden-
tiﬁed system-wide by the pair of device and inode numbers. This is because, inode
numbers are unique only within the disk partition where they reside. Both are
currently 32-bit values, so there is a hard upper limit of 64 comparisons for up to
264 total items when performing operations on the binary search tree. The actual
number can be expected to be much lower given that the number of disk devices
(partitions) can be expected to be at most a double-digit number, and the number
of ﬁles with labels to be considerably less than 232. In terms of storage requirements,
each entry of the AVL tree takes up 24 bytes plus the size of the label bit vector.
The system calls that are responsible for data transfer to an from ﬁles are read,
readv, write, writev. The read and readv system calls, both invoke fo read,
which invokes the proper low-level function for read (this is true not only for regular
ﬁles, but also for sockets and pipes). Therefore this is the place to handle the label
propagation. After a successful call to the low-level read function we check whether
the ﬁle descriptor is actually of type DTYPE VNODE. If this is the case we retrieve the
device and inode information from the vnode parameter that was passed to fo read.
If an entry for the device/inode pair exists in the file labels tree, then we update
the calling process’s label set with the one retrieved by the lookup.
Similar to the reading calls, the fo write function is called by the writing system
calls. After a successful low-level write operation and if the calling process has a label
set associated with it, we retrieve the device and inode numbers from the vnode. If a
lookup in the file labels tree yields a pointer to a label set, we update that label
set with that of the process. If no label set previously existed for the ﬁle, an entry
is created in the tree with a copy of the process’s label set.103
We furthermore implemented a new system call, get filelabel, that, given the
device and inode number of a ﬁle, returns the success value of the operation into a
supplied variable and on success the label vector into a provided buﬀer. The device
and inode number of a ﬁle can be obtained via the stat command or through any of
the stat-family library calls. We did not implement a system call that returns the
entire contents of the file labels tree.
For testing and debugging purposes we also supplied a new system call named
set filelabel, that takes the device and inode numbers as well as a label and sets
the label vector of the ﬁle to contain the label. If the ﬁle did not have a label vector
associated with it, a new one is created and bound to the ﬁle.
5.5 Results
In the following we demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of our approach by showing
how to use the implementation to solve some of the problems discussed earlier.
Furthermore, we will measure performance overhead to show that an implementation
of label propagation is feasible.
We have already demonstrated the feasibility of using labels in the form of process
origin information for the goal of gaining information about the true source of denial-
of-service attacks as well as stepping stones [11,12]. Therefore, for demonstrating the
further usefulness of label propagation, we will limit ourselves to addressing the two
problems of user identity and location information as described in Sections 3.2.1 and
3.2.2. Furthermore, we will simulate a server compromise of a well-known service on
the system and illustrate how the impact of the compromise can be determined by
using host causality origin identiﬁers.
5.5.1 User Inﬂuence
We shall demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of user inﬂuence labels by using the exam-
ple from Section 3.2.1. As depicted in Figure 3.1, the process controlled by User A104
reads data from File 1. It then communicates via IPC with a process controlled by
User B, which subsequently creates a new ﬁle with the content of what was commu-
nicated during the exchange with User A.
To associate a user identiﬁer with the processes that are under that user’s control,
we bind the user ID that is assigned to the process at login time to the process as
a label as well. While this may seem redundant at ﬁrst, note that the user ID of a
process that is recorded in the process table is subject to change during subsequent
login and logout operations (e.g., via the su command), while a label is persistent.
The setlogin system call was modiﬁed to add the user identiﬁer as a label to the
process’s label set that invoked the setlogin call.
To illustrate that any labels already attached to the original ﬁle will also be
propagated, we ﬁrst execute the set filelabel system call to bind a label to the
ﬁle. Then we execute a program that opens the ﬁle, reads data from it and then
opens a TCP connection to a second process with a diﬀerent user id and transmits
the ﬁle. The program also prints out the label set to the console before and after
each operation. The second process (listening on the TCP socket) reads the data
from the ﬁrst process and then creates a ﬁle with the data it received. Finally, we
execute a program that calls get filelabel to see what the label set of the newly
created ﬁle is. The output from both user sessions are shown in Figure 5.4.
The setfilelabel program binds the label “File XXX” to the ﬁle XXX on the
system. The sender program opens the ﬁle speciﬁed on the command line, reads a
number of bytes from it, then opens a TCP connection to port 7000 on the local host
and transmits the data that was read from the ﬁle. The receiver program listens for
TCP connections on port 7000. Once a connection is established, it reads a number
of bytes from the socket and then creates a new ﬁle with the data it received. The
sender and receiver program also print out their label sets before and after the
operations that receive data.105
SESSION A SESSION B
% ./setfilelabel 265476 649649 "File XXX"
% ./receiver YYY
Receiver starting with pid 162
Label set at start:
Label 0: User 1002
Listening on port 7000
% ./sender XXX
Sender process starting with pid 163
Label set:
Label 1: User 1001
Label set after reading file:
Label 1: User 1001
Label 2: File XXX
Writing data to socket
Connection established
Label set after socket read:
Label 0: User 1002
Label 1: User 1001
Label 2: File XXX
Writing to file YYY
% ./filelabels YYY
File YYY has labels:
Label 0: User 1002
Label 1: User 1001
Label 2: File XXX
Figure 5.4. Output from the user inﬂuence test from both user sessions106
Initially the two processes have only the user id label bound to them.3 After
reading the ﬁle, Process A now also contains the label “File XXX”. After receiving
data from the network socket from Process A, Process B has three labels associated
with it: “User 1002”, its original label, as well as labels “User 1001” and “File
XXX”. After Process B creates and writes data to ﬁle YYY, the filelabels program
reveals that the label set of ﬁle YYY also contains those three labels. An investigator
examining ﬁle YYY now can determine that both users 1001 and 1002 could have
played a role in the current state of the ﬁle, plus that there is a possibility that the
contents of ﬁle XXX might also have been an inﬂuence. We can further conclude
that no other users could have been responsible in the creation or modiﬁcation of
the ﬁle YYY.
5.5.2 Location Information
To show that the label propagation also works well with non-custom programs,
we also tested the location information case study as described in Section 3.2.2.
Here, we assign origin information to a ﬁle containing C-source code, a library used
in the code, the gcc compiler, and the current session (see Figure 3.2). We do this
manually through programs calling set filelabels and addlabel and then compile
the program. Then we use the program from the previous example to print out the
label set of the newly created ﬁle (see Figure 5.5).
As in the example, we bind a label called “OS-CDRom” to “/usr/bin/gcc”, “Con-
sole” to the “sender.c” ﬁle, “Website” to the ﬁle “printutils.c”, which we compile
in directly as opposed to implementing a library from it ﬁrst; the result is the
same. Plus, we bind a label “192.168.0.1” to the shell process. We then compile
the “sender.c” program. A filelabels lookup on the ﬁle “sender” now shows that
the ﬁle is associated with all of the labels of the entities that played a role in its
creation.
3For better readability we actually use a string ’User nnnn’ as a label as opposed to a 2-byte label
containing only the id itself.107
% ./setfilelabel sender.c Console
% ./setfilelabel /usr/bin/gcc OS-CDRom
% ./setfilelabel printutils.c Website
% ./setproclabel -1 192.168.0.1
% gcc -o sender sender.c printutils.c
% ./filelabels sender
File sender has labels:
Label 0: Console
Label 1: OS-CDRom
Label 2: Website
Label 3: 192.168.0.1
Figure 5.5. Output from the location information case study
5.5.3 Remote System Compromise
A system is compromised, when an unauthorized user has gained control over
the system. This is typically done by exploiting a vulnerability of the system to
receive access to the system and permissions to perform certain tasks. In many
cases, the compromise occurs through the exploit of a vulnerability of one of the
system’s network services. Our label propagation mechanism does not diﬀerentiate
between authorized and unauthorized accesses and operations. If we are able to
bind a location label to the process accepting the network traﬃc, then those labels
are propagated for both legitimate as well as malevolent uses. If a real compromise
occurs from a remote location, all processes and ﬁles aﬀected by it will be labeled
with that location label.
To simulate a system compromise we will run a program that accepts network
connections and supplies a shell. This is the basic functionality of a backdoor pro-
gram, but could also be the result of the compromise of a well-known server daemon
process (be it httpd running as the http user, or even sshd running as the root user).
The nature of the compromise (e.g. buﬀer overﬂow or script vulnerabilities) is not
important, the end result is the same: a remote attacker has access to a shell with108
the privileges of the daemon process that was compromised. Thus it is suﬃcient to
test the label propagation with a “normal” remote login via ssh.
For our labeling approach to capture the entry point of the intrusion, we need to
associate network-location labels to those processes receiving data from the network.
For this, we have modiﬁed the accept system call to bind a label to the process
invoking accept whenever a connection is successfully accepted. For demonstration
purposes, we only use the foreign IP address as a label. For a more complete network
identiﬁer, the 4-tuple of foreign IP address and port as well as the protocol and local
port information can be used. For UDP, a similar addition can be made to the recv
and recvfrom system calls.
Figure 5.6 shows an ssh session with location labels enabled. The process running
the proclabels program is clearly marked with the location label4, which means that
the process running the shell also carries the label. Furthermore, if we create new
ﬁles on the system or modify existing ones, the label is propagated.
florian@schlaraffenland:~> ssh morpheus-8
Password:
Last login: Tue May 17 14:09:40 2005 from schlaraffenland
Welcome to FreeBSD!
%./proclabels
Process ID: 74778
Label 0: 128.10.243.68
%echo test > testfile
%./filelabel testfile
File testfile has device 0x40d04 and inode 651811
Syscall result: 0. Ret: 1
File testfile has the following labels:
Global pos: 0 data: 128.10.243.68
%
Figure 5.6. An ssh session with location labels
The approach we chose of binding the label at the time of accept has the disad-
vantage that the common network server architecture as described by Stevens [98]
4Again, we bind a string containing the IP address as a label for the purpose of better readability109
has the server accept a connection and then fork a child process, which inherits all the
connections from its parents and does the actual handling of that particular session,
while the parent process goes back to the listening state. This means that over time
the server process will accumulate all the labels of the past network connections and
pass those labels on to its children. This can be avoided if we supply a new system
call that accepts the connection, automatically forks a child process, and only then
binds the label to the child. An alternative location to bind the network-location
label is the interface on which the data is received. If the label is generated there and
then associated with the mbufs that make up the network packet, then our socket
implementation as described in Section 5.3 will automatically update the labels to
exactly the processes that receive the data. The disadvantage of this is that every
time data enters the system from the network we need to make a lookup whether
the network-location label is already in the system or not, which may slow down
performance.
5.5.4 Performance Overhead
In this section we will describe the results of performance overhead measurements
we performed for the proof-of-concept implementation. We ran our experiments on a
Sun SunFire V60x with an Intel 2.8 GHz Xeon processor, 512MB RAM, and a 36GB
SCSI hard drive. As a baseline we use the generic FreeBSD 4.12 kernel that comes
with the regular installation of the operating system. We then ran the performance
tests on the same hardware booting the modiﬁed version of the kernel.
To measure the overall performance, we utilize the LMBench [67] benchmark
suite. LMBench is a set of small micro-benchmarks, which measure system latency
and bandwidth of data movement among the processor and memory, network, ﬁle
system, and disk. LMBench is a widely used benchmark suite used to proﬁle many
hardware and software systems, providing more accurate results compared to other
benchmarks in many cases [68]. We have broken down the tests into four categories:110
1. Processor and process tests. These are tests that measure the time it takes a
process to perform certain tasks. These include a basic system call (null call),
the installing of a signal handler (sig inst.), the signal handler overhead (sig
hand.), the time to fork a new process (fork), the time to execute a simple
program (exec), and the time to execute the ’/bin/sh’ program (sh). Of par-
ticular interest to us are the times for the fork and the executions as these are
directly aﬀected by our modiﬁcations. The fork mechanism takes care of the
label propagation by inheritance and the execute test further makes some read
operations to access the speciﬁed programs.
2. File system tests. The ﬁle system tests consist of several simple tests to measure
the execution time of the read system call for a ﬁle (read), the write system
call (write), performing a stat operation on a ﬁle (stat), performing an fstat
operation (fstat), the opening and closing of a null ﬁle (open/close), as well
as the select operation on 500 ﬁle descriptors (select). These tests use the ﬁle
system cache, not the actual time it takes for the disk operation as there are too
many unknown factors to consider to generate reproducible results for those.
Of particular interest are the measurements of the read and write operation as
they are directly aﬀected by our modiﬁcations.
3. Network latency tests. These tests determine the time it takes for network
messages to propagate. Short control messages are sent back and forth between
processes and the round trip time is measured. This is done for pipes as well
as sockets of types AF UNIX, TCP, and UDP, all within the local host. All
of these tests are relevant as they all measure the performance of the socket
subsystem that we modiﬁed.
4. I/O bandwidth tests. The bandwidth test measure the data throughput on
the system. All of these tests write a certain amount of data to a ﬁle or
a communication channel in transfers of constant size. The ﬁle write test
writes 8MB of data in 64K buﬀers. For the IPC bandwidth tests two processes111
are created that transfer the data between them. Pipes transfer 50M in 64K
chunks, and the TCP and AF UNIX sockets transfer 50M in 1M chunks. All of
these tests are relevant as they directly measure the impact of our modiﬁcations
to the I/O throughput of the system.
These tests were run on the regular FreeBSD 4.12 kernel (FreeBSD) as well as
on three variants of our modiﬁed kernel. The ﬁrst version (Label-0) is the kernel
with all the modiﬁcations for label propagation in place but without any labels
actually present in the system. This captures the overhead of a system with label
propagation in place without labels present, but also gives a measure for how the
socket subsystem is aﬀected if the processes involved have no label sets associated
with them. The second version (Label-s), in addition to the Label-0 version also
has a label associated with the shell process that invokes the LMBench test suite.
It is suﬃcient to only bind one label to the process as the entire label vector is
propagated once a process is marked to have labels. Furthermore, a small set of ﬁles
is marked with labels as well. This number is initially one, but as ﬁles are created
during the performance test, the number will increase slightly. This version will give
a measure for the socket subsystem overhead as well as the ﬁle system performance
for a small set of ﬁles with labels. The last version (Label-l), in addition to the
Label-s version, has a large number of ﬁles in the system. This will give a measure
for the ﬁle system overhead for a large number of ﬁles.
To label the ﬁles for the Label-l set, we used a program that utilizes the
set filelabel system call in a for-loop for diﬀerent inode numbers to generate
a set of 100,000 ﬁles – 50,000 for each of the two disk partitions on the system – that
have labels associated with them. The maximum number of labels in the system was
set to 1024, which means that the label vectors are 128 bytes long. The number was
chosen to be signiﬁcantly higher than the number of users on the system (around
20) so that we gain a measure for a large ﬁxed-size label set implementation. For
a ﬁxed-label system this is a large number – for user identiﬁcation labels we would
expect the size to normally lie anywhere between 10 and 100 – so the overhead mea-112
surements are pessimistic. Each test was performed 200 times for each kernel version,
and the results are shown in Tables 5.1 through 5.4. Detailed measurement results
including mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for each version are
included in Appendix 6.
Table 5.1
Processor and process tests – times in µs
Kernel Null call sig inst. sig hand. fork exec sh
FreeBSD 0.4504 0.6643 1.3467 129.0783 594.1023 1176.8880
Label-0 0.4499 0.6666 1.3404 128.3902 596.1760 1173.6708
Label-s 0.4498 0.6650 1.3364 129.1161 602.4783 1185.3990
Label-l 0.4501 0.6658 1.3393 129.1359 604.5881 1187.9500
Table 5.1 shows that our experiments show only a slight increase in execution
time for the process tests. System calls and signal handling is not aﬀected by our
modiﬁcations. The fork system call has to copy an extra 132 bytes, 128 for the label
vector and 4 for the label ﬂag. The measured overhead for this is less than 1%. The
times for the exec and /bin/sh tests are inﬂuenced by the ﬁle system performance.
The observed overhead here lies between 0.3% when no labels are present to 1.7%
for the large set of labeled ﬁles (both for the exec test).
Table 5.2
File system tests – times in µs
Kernel read write stat fstat open/close select
FreeBSD 1.0437 0.9836 2.2547 0.6598 3.3546 19.8101
Label-0 1.1235 0.9839 2.2744 0.6649 3.4365 20.0437
Label-s 1.2139 1.3903 2.2739 0.6662 3.4457 19.9333
Label-l 1.3297 1.4934 2.3362 0.6621 3.4701 19.9283113
Table 5.2 shows the execution times for the ﬁle system calls. As expected, there is
no noticeable diﬀerence between the FreeBSD and the Label-0 kernels. We measured
a an average of 0.0798 µs (7.6% overhead) for the read test, which can be attributed
to the lookup that is performed for the ﬁle. The stat, fstat, open/close, and
select test did not have any noticeable diﬀerences between the kernel versions, as
expected. With labels present on the system the read test now showed a diﬀerence
of 0.1702 µs (16.3%) for the small label set and a diﬀerence of 0.2860 µs (27.4%)
for the large label set. When comparing the Label-s and Label-l versions, the
overhead for the 100,000 labeled ﬁles (a binary search tree depth of about 16) is
0.1831 µs (15.1%). For the write test, there is no noticeable diﬀerence between
the FreeBSD and the Label-0 versions. This was to be expected as no lookups are
performed and no labels need to be inserted into the binary tree. For the remaining
two versions, the write test was measured with an overhead of 0.4067 µs (41.3%)
for Label-s and 0.5098 µs (51.9%) for Label-l, respectively. This is because ﬁrst
a lookup is performed to see if a label set is already present in the search tree, and
if not one needs to be allocated and inserted. When comparing the small and the
large label set versions, we observed an overhead of 0.1031 µs (7.4%). Note that all
the observed diﬀerences lie in the tenths of microsecond range and were performed
on the ﬁle system cache for a small read and write buﬀer. This makes it diﬃcult
to predict what the eﬀect on a “normal” system is. The results do, however, reﬂect
the worst case scenario, where a program performing rapid and short read or write
operations could be slowed down noticeably. For the general case, though, we do not
expect this to occur.
The local networking latency times are shown in Table 5.3. The measured over-
head in all instances is small. There is no noticeable diﬀerence between the FreeBSD
and Label-0 versions, as expected. For Label-s the we measured an average over-
head of 8.2% for AF UNIX sockets, 6.1% for UDP, and 6.4% for TCP. Label-l has
an observed overhead of 8.4% for AF UNIX, 5.9% for UDP, and 6.5% for TCP. The
fact that the measurements for the pipe latency do not vary noticeably between the114
Table 5.3
Network latency tests – times in µs
Kernel pipe AF UNIX UDP TCP
FreeBSD 11.2702 12.5225 17.0421 17.8300
Label-0 11.4273 12.6802 17.1144 18.0908
Label-s 11.4340 13.5479 18.0801 18.9715
Label-l 11.4582 13.5722 18.0479 18.9950
diﬀerent versions leads us to believe that pipes on FreeBSD do not utilize the socket
subsystem despite such claims [65].
Table 5.4
I/O bandwidth tests – in MB/s
Kernel ﬁle write 5 TCP AF UNIX pipe
FreeBSD 63576.9450 377.8209 617.4526 1845.4127
Label-0 63571.9400 385.6075 612.9818 1842.9119
Label-s 63630.4250 365.5163 544.0799 1835.8787
Label-l 63595.2050 366.4497 543.9735 1833.3753
Table 5.4 shows the I/O bandwidth measurement results. Surprisingly, despite
the rather large overhead for the write system call test the ﬁle write performance
does not diﬀer noticeably from that of the original FreeBSD kernel, even outper-
forming it slightly during our measurements for Label-s and Label-l. Between
the FreeBSD and Label-0 versions we did not observe any noticeable diﬀerence.
The fact that there is a 2.0% improvement in our measurements for Label-0 in the
TCP throughput, however, suggests that there is a large variance in the network
bandwidth tests as can also be seen in the standard deviation values in Appendix 6.
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Label-s shows a deprecation of 3.3% in the TCP throughput and a deprecation of
11.9% for the AF UNIX bandwidth. For Label-l we measured a TCP bandwidth
3.0% worse than FreeBSD and an AF UNIX deprecation of 11.9%. Again, pipes are
not noticeably aﬀected by process labeling, which we take as further evidence that
they do not use the socket subsystem.
The overall performance overhead that we observed in our experiments for process
labeling is promising. The overhead for the individual tests ranges from smaller than
1% to no more than 10% in many cases. The read and write tests carry a higher
overhead of up to 51.9%, but the ﬁle write bandwidth was not aﬀected at all. For
programs that frequently write small amounts of data into the ﬁle system cache this
will be a problem, but overall we do not expect the ﬁle system slowdown to be severe,
especially when factoring in the time to write the cache to the disk.
The network measurements were performed for a label vector size of 128 bytes
(1024 labels), and we expect the overhead to be smaller for smaller vector sizes. This
may well be the case for certain ﬁxed-label set size applications of a process labeling
approach, such as user inﬂuence, where we expect the label vectors to be smaller
than 10 bytes for most systems. If a fully dynamic approach with a potentially
unbounded label set size is desired, however, performance is likely to suﬀer more.116
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation we have determined that there is a lack of audit data on current
computing systems. As a result of this certain relations between events cannot be
established or only insuﬃciently so through cost-intensive and manual analysis. We
further presented a label-propagation model, that lets the system propagate arbitrary
labels of information among its principals and objects based on how information ﬂows
within the system. We have demonstrated how those labels can be used to gain
some of the desired information regarding the causal eﬀects of events. Our proof-of-
concept implementation shows the feasibility of incorporating label propagation for
a production-type operating system with little to no overhead.
Of the questions of who did what, where, when, how and why, only a few can be
answered from the information collected by current computing systems. This is in
part because of space constraints, but also, as we have discussed, because some of the
desired information is impossible to obtain on systems that run arbitrary programs.
Forensics and security were not design objectives for the most commonly used ﬁle
systems. Some of our desired information could be obtained by, for example, record-
ing more information on one-time events such as the creation of a ﬁle. The “create”
timestamp, the user who created a ﬁle, and the user agent path could be recorded
in a ﬁxed amount of space. Other information such as detailed ﬁle modiﬁcation or
access information are unbounded in their space requirements and therefore record-
ing them might not be suitable in every situation. Moreover, information such as
user inﬂuence or location of ﬁle operations are generally undecidable, which means
that the information is not recorded and heuristics must be used, or only veriﬁed
programs are allowed to be executed on the system.117
Not every system is suited to collect all of the desired information we have dis-
cussed in Chapter 3. For a typical home computer none of the extra information may
be worth the space requirements or restrictions that would result from recording it.
However, when factors such as due diligence, protecting critical information, or being
able to quickly determine what happened on a computing system are important, all
of the extra information discussed may play an important role. Current systems do
not oﬀer the ability to record much of the desired information even if one wanted to
record it.
Some of the information that we classiﬁed in Section 3.1 outside Category 1 may
immediately be recorded by existing systems. A ﬁle creation time that cannot be
modiﬁed anymore should be present on any ﬁle system. Recording the user id of the
process performing ﬁle creation, access, or modiﬁcation is also a simple inexpensive
addition of more valuable data. In general, however, it will depend on the kind of
system as to which of the information we have discussed in this paper should actually
be recorded and how much of it. Recording everything we have mentioned on every
system is not realistic. However, policies in some organizations may require recording
a large portion of it. These may range from high-security computing systems, where
even the access of certain ﬁles should be documented in its most complete form (who,
where, when, how?), to home computers where maybe only the question of where
certain ﬁles came from matters.
In the future of system and ﬁle system design, forensics and security will play a
more important role. For some of the information we discuss in Chapter 3 we do not
oﬀer explicit solutions on how to implement obtaining and storing it. This is part of
future research in the ﬁeld of digital forensics. Nor do we mandate what kind and
how much information should be recorded. This will depend on individual systems
and the requirements they have in regard to forensics. We do, however, hold the
opinion that if desired, it should be able to record such information.118
In Chapter 4 we have presented a general model for label propagation based on
information ﬂow among principals. Labels may be used to propagate meta informa-
tion about the principals as they communicate with each other. The case studies
demonstrate in which manner labels can be utilized to generate audit data for digi-
tal forensics or intrusion detection, or data that can be used for access control. The
model does not attempt to control information ﬂow, it merely adds new information
in the form of labels to those ﬂows. Because we use a heuristic to determine causality
there will be a number of false positives. This is acceptable because having to infer
which information may have caused the output of a principal from a (small) set of
prospective culprits is better than having no indication at all what caused the output
(any principal could have).
However, labels are mostly meaningful when their presence at principals and
objects is limited. For example, if labels are user identiﬁers, and a User A’s actions
were inﬂuenced by another malicious User B, then A’s process is labeled with both
user ids. If only those two labels are present and there is malicious behavior by A
the list of potential culprits may be narrowed down to A and B. If, for whatever
reason, A is labeled with all possible user identiﬁers on the system, the labels have
become worthless because no information may be gained from them. For this reason,
a production system that implements our model should make sure that labels are
only propagated when necessary and that a principal cannot add new labels to its
label set frivolously to obscure its label set. Our proof-of-concept implementation
in Chapter 5 adheres to these principles. Also, it might be necessary to develop
new, label-friendly programming paradigms. These could include the concept of an
execution context for processes, where a new context is created for a speciﬁc task
and then discarded without the process gaining information about what occurred
while the context was active. This way, labels could be bound to the context and
disappear with it instead of remaining with the process even though they are not
relevant for any new tasks.119
Currently, network services on a system are oﬀered through special daemon pro-
cesses that accept the network connections and then spawn oﬀ a child process that
handles the rest of the communication. If location information were added as a label
to those processes each time a connection is accepted, soon the daemon process as
well as all its subsequent child processes will carry all those labels unnecessarily. To
avoid this situation, the server paradigm needs to be changed. The above situa-
tion could be solved by some sort of combined accept-fork new system call, that
accepts the connection, forks a child process, and then binds the label only to the
child. Alternatively, labels could be generated directly at the network interface to
label network packets. The advantage of the former is that labels are created less
frequently, reducing the cost of lookup for existing labels. The advantage of the
latter is that only processes that actually read the network packets are updated with
the new labels. This way, the existing paradigm need not be modiﬁed at all.
In Section 4.3 we discuss space management models. Whenever a loose space
management model is used, labels will be lost. Depending on which labels are deleted
when and what type of audit recording of labels takes place, a malicious principal
may attempt label washing: getting rid of (some of) his own labels by acquiring
more labels or making other principals take on more labels. While this can not be
prevented, intensive auditing and techniques from intrusion detection for abnormal
system behavior could be utilized to identify those attempts.
If strict space management models are in place, a malicious principal may perform
denial-of-service attacks on the system by exhausting the resources for storing the
labels. If a global label pool exists all principals will be denied further operations. If
label space is localized, then a principal may still perform a denial-of-service attack
on others if he can “trick” other principals to acquire a large label set. This could
be done by “infecting” an object that is accessed by many principals with a large
label set.
For these reasons any framework that utilizes the model should make sure that
labels only be propagated and created when absolutely necessary. Well-behaving120
principals from our case studies should not carry many labels in their label sets. In
a computing system, opportunities need to be created for programmers who develop
label-friendly programs. If the framework is used to enforce policy, then access con-
trol mechanisms need to be implemented in conjunction with the label propagation.
This can further reduce the probability that a well-behaving principal acquires un-
necessary labels. For example, if a user by default does not have any access to other
users’ data, he will only pick up another user label if that user explicitly grants such
access and the data is actually accessed. If the framework is used to monitor policy
violations, some sort of alert mechanism, such as in intrusion detection, could be
utilized to identify principals and objects whose label sets satisfy certain parame-
ters. For this, some sort of human control mechanism that allows an investigation of
the label sets and also removal of labels after the investigation, if necessary, may be
useful to keep the overall label sets small. For example, after a remote compromise
has been detected and contained, the ﬁles that were aﬀected by it should be cleared
of the labels obtained during the compromise and its consequences. Naturally, such
a control mechanism should lie outside the normal system capabilities, such as a
special run-level with an operator sitting at the console.
Given this, it becomes clear that a computing system for the average home user
is not the target platform for our model. Limitations imposed on the system would
be too restrictive to justify the beneﬁts. For example, if peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing
software were executed for a host causality system, a single ﬁle, once completely
downloaded, may already have hundreds of labels bound to it. If the user then
accesses the ﬁle via a shell command, the process running the shell inherits the
labels and so will all the subsequent processes that are executed from that shell and
the ﬁles that are aﬀected by them.
In some cases it might be suﬃcient to address only true data exchange channels
for our label propagation. This means that storage channels through shared objects
are not considered. This can easily be done by not modifying the label sets for the
open and close operations of our model. This is the case for our proof-of-concept121
implementation. Such a framework will capture lesser forms of information ﬂow
but it is still useful as we expect label sets to stay smaller in general. Malicious
principals could now utilize these storage channels to bypass the model, but those
channels are low-bandwidth and for certain cases raising the bar in such a manner
might be suﬃcient.
In Chapter 5 we have discussed how to implement the propagation model for a
production-type operating system, namely FreeBSD. We have chosen an operating
system kernel for our implementation as the kernel’s system call interface to the user
space closely resemble the operations described in our model. For label propagation
to be secure in this scenario, we have to make the assumption that the kernel is
trusted and untampered. Securing the kernel is certainly outside the scope of the
work we presented in this dissertation but project such as LIDS [115] can be used for
such measures. An operating system’s kernel is not the only place where labeling of
principals may be implemented. Integrating label propagation into a virtual machine
will enhance the trustworthiness of the labels but comes at the cost of utilizing the
virtual machine. This approach is already being realized [51]. But label propagation
may also be utilized in user applications or a middle-ware layer. This may be desired
when the label granularity of system objects is too coarse to be of value for certain
applications. Consider a database management system where the databases are
stored in large ﬁles. Associating labels about database transactions with the ﬁles
themselves might result in too many labels being associated with too many entities
of the database system. If instead the database management system implemented
label propagation through the interface it provides to the clients, labels could be
used to analyze or enforce information ﬂow within a database.
The data structures we have used for our proof-of-concept implementation were
designed for a ﬁxed-size label set. Furthermore, we decided to keep the accounting
for ﬁle object label within kernel memory as opposed to implement label support
for a ﬁle system. Overall, the optimal data structures for label propagation will122
depend closely on the types of labels that need to be supported. Our overhead
measurements are conservative. For a ﬁxed-size label set user inﬂuence approach we
do not expect that 1024 labels are needed on the system. The disk I/O measurements
were conducted on the cached portion of the ﬁle system, meaning that when factoring
in time for actual disk access, the overhead we measured for the read and write
calls is negligible, as well. Despite the conservative measurements, the performance
results are encouraging. We have measured an overhead between 0% and roughly
10% for all of our tests except for the read and write system call times. Most of
the overhead measured here we attribute to the managing of the binary search tree.
Thus, if label support is added directly to a ﬁle system, we expect this overhead to
be reduced, signiﬁcantly, as well.
An interesting area of immediate future research in label propagation is therefore
the development of suitable data structures for diﬀerent kinds of labels. This includes
how to manage all the labels known globally to the system, but also how each process
and object is associated with a label set. This research needs also be concerned with
how to permanently store labels on the system, as in our implementation all labels
are lost when the system restarts. This is no trivial problem, as labels preserved on
long term storage may need to be incorporated into a running system at a diﬀerent
time than the system’s start up routine.
The examples we provide in Sections 5.5.1, 5.5.2, and 5.5.3 demonstrate the
eﬀectiveness of our approach. We had already demonstrated the value of labeling for
network traceback in earlier work [11,12]. When examining processes and objects on
the system we now can make statements as to whether or not they were inﬂuenced by
external factors such as diﬀerent users of remote locations. We are not able to assert
for sure that if a label is found there was an actual inﬂuence, but we have proven
in Chapter 4 that the lack of such labels means that no communication took place
through those channels of the system that support label propagation. Keeping the
label sets of the principals and objects of a system small is therefore an important123
goal, which further needs to be addressed by future research. For this, a combination
of label propagation and access control mechanisms could be devised.
Limitations
The work we present in this document addresses many important aspects of
label propagation, the model’s properties, space concerns, and correctness as well
as usability. However, there are limitations that we do not speciﬁcally address but
may be of concern. Some of the limitations we discuss in the following apply to the
implementation of the model only, whereas others are also true for the theoretical
models.
The label data is not encrypted and potentially can be seen by any user on the
system. Depending on the nature of the label, this may lead to privacy concerns.
One simple measure could be to limit access to the labels only to a limited set of
users (e.g. via the getlabel system call), for example the system administrators.
However, this may not be suﬃcient in all scenarios. One can imagine labels whose
propagation is desired but where only the originator of the label should have the
option to disclose the data. Using a random token instead of the actual label data
may solve the problem in some cases, but once the mapping of token to data is
revealed, all users once again have access to the label data. However, because the
only requirement we impose on the label update function is that the label needs
to be preserved (or at least one should be able to deduce the previous label from
the current one), one can imagine the use of cryptographic functions that generate
a unique identiﬁer for the result of each update operation, where the original label
data may be decrypted with a key. However, we would expect that this functionality
would come with a performance cost.
When a principal or an object accumulates many labels, the usefulness of the la-
bels’ presence degrades. When a subject possesses all possible labels, an investigator
has gained no extra information compared to a system that does not utilize label124
propagation. This kind of label obfuscation may be attempted deliberately by a mali-
cious principal to obfuscate his tracks. In many existing systems there exist globally
writable objects that are read by many principals on the system. In FreeBSD there
is the syslog facility to which all processes may report and is further accessed by
many processes on the system. Services such as cron and at also may pick up labels
from all the processes that utilize them. These globally shared objects are a prob-
lem when looking to avoid label obfuscation. One could try to eliminate the global
sharing by providing mini-services that are valid only for one given process. While
this may be acceptable for cron and at, a per-process syslog service would yield
scattered log ﬁles, with much less usefulness than a single log ﬁle would have.
The above discussion about how to deal with label obfuscation and globally
shared resources on an existing system shows that label propagation will not always
work smoothly together with existing systems. Our proof-of-concept implementation
shows that label propagation can work with a system such as FreeBSD, but some of
the limitations will be diﬃcult if not impossible to remove. The intent of our work
lies primarily in the introduction of the label propagation paradigm. While legacy
systems may be adapted for label propagation, we feel that systems designed with
label propagation in mind will beneﬁt the most from the concepts discussed here.
But not only systems should be designed with label propagation in mind. label-
friendly programming techniques could be used to keep the label set of a process
as small as possible. If all “normal” programs adhere to this principle, misbehaving
processes could be better identiﬁed and contained.
The implementation of label propagation we present in this dissertation does
not support separate label sets for threads of a multi-threaded process. As threads
share memory space among them, the system is not able to monitor information
ﬂow between threads. Given that some programs use a large number of threads
to perform tasks, in some cases the granularity of labels for the entire process may
be too coarse, meaning that the process will accumulate all of its threads’ labels.
However, as with shared memory, barring special hardware that can monitor those125
information transfers, implementing label propagation on the operating system level
prohibits label propagation on the thread-level.
Labels are not stored permanently in our proof-of-concept implementation. Once
the system reboots, all labels are lost. Incorporating label support directly into a
ﬁle system, as mentioned above, is one necessary step to achieve a permanent label
retention on a system. In addition to that the labels need to be read from storage
at start-up and be written to storage at shutdown. This introduces the danger that
labels may not be stored when the system is not shut down properly (i.e. it crashes).
Storing the label periodically can reduce the amount of labels that is potentially lost,
but the threat of losing labels remains. Also, if labels sets are stored in label-vectors
as in our proof-of-concept implementation, the global label table needs to keep labels
always in the same order. This is because not all labels are necessarily introduced
to the system at start-up. Some ﬁle systems with labels may be mounted at a later
time at which point the label-vector bits need to point to the correct entries in the
label table. Furthermore, if a ﬁle system from a diﬀerent system is mounted and
also has labels associated with it, the new labels need to be incorporated into the
current system or be discarded. In the former case, the label data has to be stored
on the ﬁle system device, as well.
Future Work
In this dissertation we have demonstrated that it is possible to add signiﬁcantly
useful audit information to a system with little computational overhead by binding
labels that convey information such as user identity or location information to prin-
cipals on the system and propagate those based on how information ﬂows between
principals and objects. The above discussion shows that there is still research to be
done in the area of run-time label propagation and with this dissertation we only lay
the foundation for it. As part of the immediate future work, we see the following:126
• Research if and how existing programs and programming paradigms ﬁt in with
a label propagation framework in regard to the amount of labels they accumu-
late and the implications for access control that has in strict models.
• Determine how to integrate label propagation into access control and intrusion
detection mechanisms.
• Devise a conﬁgurable space management mechanism for labels that allows to
associate subjects with resource groups and enforce label label constraints as
discussed in Section 4.3.
• Explore new uses for labels outside of those discussed in this dissertation.
• Identify scenarios where label propagation and its (possible) limitations award
the most beneﬁts to justify its use.LIST OF REFERENCES127
LIST OF REFERENCES
[1] G.M. Adelson-Velskii and E.M. Landis. An Algorithm for the Organization of
Information. Dokladi Akademia Nauk SSSR, 146(2):1259–1262, 1962.
[2] M. Adler. Tradeoﬀs in Probabilistic Packet Marking for IP Traceback. In
Proceedings of the 34th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC),
2002.
[3] James P. Anderson. Computer Security Threat Monitoring and Surveillance.
Technical report, James P. Anderson Co., April 1980.
[4] D. Bell and L. LaPadula. Secure Computer Systems: Mathematical Founda-
tions and Model. MITRE Report MTR 2547 v2, 1973.
[5] S. Bellovin, Marcus Leech, and Tom Taylor. ICMP Traceback Messages. Tech-
nical report, IETF Internet Draft, February 2003. Work in progress.
[6] S. M. Bellovin. Security Problems in the TCP-IP Protocol Suite. Computer
Communications Review, 19(2):32–48, April 1989.
[7] K. Biba. Integrity Considerations for Secure Computer Systems. Technical
Report MTR-3153, MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA, 1977.
[8] D. Brewer and M. Nash. The Chinese Wall Security Policy. In Proceedings
of the 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 206–214, May
1989.
[9] Florian Buchholz. The Structure of the Reiser File System. http://www.
cerias.purdue.edu/homes/florian/reiser/reiserfs.php.
[10] Florian Buchholz, Thomas E. Daniels, Benjamin Kuperman, and Clay Shields.
Packet Tracker Final Report. Technical Report 2000-23, Center for Educa-
tion and Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS), West
Lafayette, IN, 47901, 2000.
[11] Florian Buchholz and Clay Shields. Providing Process Origin Information
to Aid in Network Traceback. In Proceedings of the 2002 USENIX Annual
Technical Conference, Monterey, CA, July 2002. CERIAS TR 2002-22.
[12] Florian Buchholz and Clay Shields. Providing Process Origin Information
to Aid in Computer Forensic Investigations. Journal of Computer Security,
12(5):753–776, September 2004.
[13] Florian Buchholz and Eugene H. Spaﬀord. On the Role of File System Meta-
data in Digital Forensics. Journal of Digital Investigation, 1(4):298–309, De-
cember 2004.128
[14] Florian Buchholz and Eugene H. Spaﬀord. A Model for Label Propagation
Based on Causality. under submission, 2005.
[15] Michael A. Caloyannides. Computer Forensics and Privacy. Artech House,
Norwood, MA, 2001.
[16] R´ emy Card, Theodore Ts’o, and Stephen Tweedie. Design and Implementa-
tion of the Second Extended Filesystem. In Frank B. Brokken et al., editor,
Proceedings of the First Dutch International Symposium on Linux, 1994.
[17] B. Carrier and C. Shields. A Recursive Session Token Protocol for Use in
Computer Forensics and TCP Traceback. In Proceedings of the IEEE Infocomm
2002, June 2002.
[18] Brian D. Carrier and Eugene H. Spaﬀord. Deﬁning Event Reconstruction of
Digital Crime Scenes. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 49(6), 11 2004. CERIAS
TR 2004-37.
[19] Eoghan Casey, editor. Handbook of Computer Crime Investigation. Academic
Press, San Diego, CA, 2002.
[20] Eoghan Casey. Digital Evidence and Computer Crime. Academic Press, San
Diego, CA, second edition, 2004.
[21] Cisco Systems, Inc. Characterizing and Tracing Packet Floods Using Cisco
Routers. http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/22.html.
[22] Franklin Clark and Ken Diliberto. Investigating Computer Crime. CRC Press,
Boca Raton, FL, 1996.
[23] R.C. Daley and P.G. Neumann. A General-Purpose File System For Secondary
Storage. In Fall Joint Computer Conference, 1965.
[24] Thomas E. Daniels. Reference Models for the Concealment and Observation of
Origin Identity in Store-and-Forward Networks. PhD thesis, Purdue Univer-
sity, West Lafayette, IN, 12 2002. CERIAS TR 2002-31.
[25] D. Dean, M. Franklin, and A. Stubbleﬁeld. An Algebraic Approach to IP
Traceback. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC),
5(2):119–137, May 2002.
[26] S. Deering and R. Hinden. Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Speciﬁcation.
Technical Report RFC 2460, Internet Society, December 1998. ftp://ftp.
isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2460.txt.
[27] Dorothy E. Denning. A Lattice Model of Secure Information Flow. Commu-
nications of the ACM, 19(5):236–243, 1976.
[28] Dorothy E. Denning. Secure Personal Computing in an Insecure Network.
Communications of the ACM, 22(8):476–482, 1979.
[29] Dorothy E. Denning and Peter J. Denning. Certiﬁcation of Programs for Secure
Information Flow. Communications of the ACM, 20(7):504–513, 1977.129
[30] Dorothy E. Denning and Peter F. MacDoran. Location-based Authentication:
Grounding Cyberspace for Better Security. In Internet Besieged: Countering
Cyberspace Scoﬄaws, pages 167–174. ACM Press/Addison-Wesley Publishing
Co., 1998.
[31] Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria. Technical report, Department
of Defense, December 1985. 5200.28-STD.
[32] T. W. Doeppner, P. N. Klein, and A. Koyfman. Using Router Stamping to
Identify the Source of IP Packets. In 7th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pages 184–189, Athens, Greece, November 2000.
[33] D. Donoho, A. G. Flesia, U. Shankar, V. Paxson, J. Coit, and S. Staniford. Mul-
tiscale stepping-stone detection: Detecting pairs of jittered interactive streams
by exploiting maximum tolerable delay. In Proceedings of the 2002 Recent
Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID), 2002.
[34] G.W. Dunlap, S.T. King, S. Cinar, M.A. Basrai, and P.M. Chen. ReVirt:
Enabling Intrusion Analysis through Virtual-machine Logging and Replay. In
5th Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, December
2002.
[35] James P. Early. An Embedded Sensor for Monitoring File Integrity. Technical
report, CERIAS, January 2002. CERIAS TR 2001-41.
[36] Dan Farmer and Wietse Venema. Forensic Discovery. Addison Wesley, Boston,
MA, 2004.
[37] J.S. Fenton. Memoryless Subsystems. The Computer Journal, 17(2), 1974.
[38] P. Ferguson and D. Senie. Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of
Service Attacks Which Employ IP Source Address Spooﬁng. Technical Report
RFC 2827, Internet Society, May 2000.
[39] J. Chapman Flack and Mikhail Atallah. A Toolkit for Modeling and Compress-
ing Audit Data. Technical report, COAST, Purdue University, 1998. COAST
TR 98-20.
[40] FreeBSD Operating System. http://www.freebsd.org.
[41] S. Garﬁnkel, G. Spaﬀord, and A. Schwartz. Practical Unix and Internet Secu-
rity. O’Reilly, third edition, 2003.
[42] T. Garﬁnkel and M. Rosenblum. A Virtual Machine Introspection Based Ar-
chitecture for Intrusion Detection. In 2003 Symposium on Network and Dis-
tributed System Security, February 2003.
[43] J.A. Goguen and J. Meseguer. Security Policies and Security Models. In
Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy,
pages 11–20, Oakland, CA, 1982.
[44] R. Hagmann. Reimplementing the Cedar File System Using Logging and
Group Commit. In Proceedings of the Eleventh ACM Symposium on Oper-
ating Systems Principles, pages 155–162. ACM Press, 1987.130
[45] Nevin Heintze and Jon G. Riecke. The SLam Calculus: Programming with
Secrecy and Integrity. In ACM, editor, Conference record of POPL ’98: the
25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Lan-
guages, San Diego, California, 19–21 January 1998, pages 365–377, New York,
NY, USA, 1998. ACM Press.
[46] Kohei Honda, Vasco Vasconcelos, and Nobuko Yoshida. Secure Informa-
tion Flow as Typed Process Behaviour. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
1782:180–199, 2000.
[47] IEEE Standard for Information Technology - Portable Operating System In-
terface (POSIX). http://standards.ieee.org/catalog/olis/arch_posix.
html.
[48] Institute for Security Technology Studies. Law Enforcement Tools and Tech-
nologies for Investigating Cyber Attacks: A National Needs Assessment. Tech-
nical report, Dartmouth College, 2002.
[49] Institute for Security Technology Studies. Law Enforcement Tools and Tech-
nologies for Investigating Cyber Attacks: Gap Analysis Report. Technical
report, Dartmouth College, February 2004.
[50] J. Ioannidis and S. M. Bellovin. Pushback: Router-Based Defense Against
DDoS Attacks. In Proceedings of the 2002 Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium, San Diego, CA, February 2002.
[51] Xuxian Jiang, Dongyan Xu, and Florian Buchholz. Tracking Worm Contami-
nation: a Process Coloring Approach. under submission, May 2005.
[52] R. Joshi, K. Rustan, and M. Leino. A Semantic Approach to Secure Informa-
tion Flow. Science of Computer Programming, 37(1–3):113–138, 2000.
[53] H.T. Jung, H.L. Kim, Y.M. Seo, G. Choe, S.L. Min, C.S. Kim, and K. Koh.
Caller Identiﬁcation System in the Internet Environment. In UNIX Security
Symposium IV Proceedings, pages 69–78, 1993.
[54] Richard A. Kemmerer. Shared Resource Matrix Methodology: An Approach
to Identifying Storage and Timing Channels. ACM Transactions on Computer
Systems, 1(3):256–277, August 1983.
[55] S. Kent and R. Atkinson. Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol.
Technical Report RFC 2401, Internet Society, November 1998. ftp://ftp.
isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2401.txt.
[56] Gene H. Kim and Eugene H. Spaﬀord. The Design and Implementation of
Tripwire: A File System Integrity Checker. In ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, pages 18–29, 1994.
[57] Samuel T. King and Peter M. Chen. Backtracking Intrusions. In Proceedings
of the Nineteenth ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, pages
223–236. ACM Press, 2003.
[58] Samuel T. King, George W. Dunlap, and Peter M. Chen. Debugging Operating
Systems with Time-traveling Virtual Machines. In Proceedings of the 2005
Annual USENIX Technical Conference, April 2005.131
[59] Warren G. Kruse II and Jay G. Heiser. Computer Forensics: Incident Response
Essentials. Addsion-Wesley, Boston, MA, 2002.
[60] Benjamin A. Kuperman. A Categorization of Computer Security Monitoring
Systems and the Impact on the Design of Audit Sources. PhD thesis, Purdue
University, West Lafayette, IN, 08 2004. CERIAS TR 2004-26.
[61] B. Lampson. Protection. In Proc. 5th Princeton Conf. on Information Sciences
and Systems, Princeton, 1971. Reprinted in ACM Operating Systems Rev. 8,
1 (Jan. 1974), pp 18-24.
[62] Butler W. Lampson. A Note on the Conﬁnement Problem. Communications
of the ACM, 16(10):613–615, 1973.
[63] Paul J. Leach and Rich Salz. UUIDs and GUIDs. http://www.webdav.org/
specs/draft-leach-uuids-guids-01.txt.
[64] P. Loscocco and S. Smalley. Integrating Flexible Support for Security Policies
into the Linux Operating System. Technical report, NSA Information Assur-
ance Research Group, February 2001.
[65] M.K. McKusick, K. Bostic, M.J. Karels, and J.S. Quarterman. The Design and
Implementation of the 4.4 BSD Operating System. Addison Wesley, Boston,
MA, 1996.
[66] John McLean. Proving Noninterference and Functional Correctness Using
Traces. Journal of Computer Security, 1(1), 1992.
[67] L. McVoy and C. Staelin. LMBench: Portable Tools for Performance Analysis.
In USENIX Annual Technical Conference, January 1996.
[68] L.W. McVoy and S.R. Kleiman. Extent-like Performance from a Unix File
System. In USENIX Winter Conference, pages 33–43, January 1991.
[69] Microsoft Corporation. FAT: General Overview of On-disk Format. http:
//www.microsoft.com/hwdev/download/hardware/fatgen103.pdf, 1999.
[70] G. Mohay, A. Anderson, B. Collie, O. De Vel, and R. McKemmish. Computer
and Intrusion Forensics. Artech House, Norwood, MA, 2003.
[71] D. Moore, G. Voelker, and S. Savage. Inferring Internet Denial of Service
Activity. In Proceedings of the 2001 USENIX Security Symposium, Washington
D.C., August 2001.
[72] R.T. Morris. A Weakness in the 4.2BSD Unix TCP-IP Software. Techni-
cal Report 17, AT&T Bell Laboratories, 1985. Computing Science Technical
Report.
[73] Ira S. Moskowitz and Myong H. Kang. Covert Channels - Here to Stay? In
Compass’94: 9th Annual Conference on Computer Assurance, pages 235–244,
Gaithersburg, MD, 1994. National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[74] The National Insistute of Justice. Electronic Crime Needs Assessment for State
and Local Law Enforcement. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/
186276.htm, April 2001.132
[75] J. Palsberg and P. Ørbæk. Trust in the Lambda-calculus. Journal of Functional
Programming, 7(6):557–591, 1997.
[76] C.H. Papadimitriou. Computational Complexity. Addison-Wesley, Reading,
MA, 1994.
[77] K. Park and H. Lee. On the Eﬀectiveness of Probabilistic Packet Marking for
IP Traceback under Denial-of-service Attack. In Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM
2001, pages 338–347, April 2001.
[78] K. Park and H. Lee. On the Eﬀectiveness of Route-Based Packet Filtering for
Distributed DoS Attack Prevention in Power-Law Internets. In Proceedings of
the 2001 ACM SIGCOMM, San Diego, CA, August 2001.
[79] C.P. Pﬂeeger and S.L. Pﬂeeger. Security in Computing. Prentice Hall PTR,
Upper Saddle River, NJ, third edition, 2003.
[80] Rob Pike, Dave Presotto, Sean Dorward, Bob Flandrena, Ken Thompson,
Howard Trickey, and Phil Winterbottom. Plan 9 from Bell Labs. Computing
Systems, 8(3):221–254, Summer 1995.
[81] J. Postel. Internet Protocol. Technical Report RFC 791, Internet Society,
September 1981. ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc791.txt.
[82] T. Ptacek and T. Newsham. Insertion, Evasion, and Denial of Service: Eluding
Network Intrusion Detection. Technical report, Secure Networks, Inc., January
1998.
[83] Hans Reiser. Reiser File System Whitepaper. http://www.namesys.com.
[84] H.G. Rice. Classes of Recursively Enumerable Sets and their Decision Prob-
lems. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, 74:358–366, 1953.
[85] D.M. Ritchie and K. Thompson. The UNIX Time-Sharing System. In Fourth
ACM Symposium on Operating System Principles, Yorktown Heights, New
York, October 1973.
[86] M.K. Rogers and K. Seigfried. The Future of Computer Forensics: A Needs
Analysis Survey. Computers & Security, 26, 2004.
[87] G.-C. Rota. The Number of Partitions of a Set. American Mathematical
Monthly, 71:498–504, 1964.
[88] J. Rowe. Intrusion Detection and Isolation Protocol: Automated Response
to Attacks. Presentation at Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID),
1999.
[89] A. Sabelfeld and A. Myers. Language-Based Information-Flow Security. IEEE
Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 21(1), 2003.
[90] Douglas S. Santry, Michael J. Feeley, Norman C. Hutchinson, Alistair C.
Veitch, Ross W. Carton, and Jacob Oﬁr. Deciding When to Forget in the
Elephant File System. In Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, pages
110–123, 1999.133
[91] S. Savage, D. Wetherall, A. Karlin, and T. Anderson. Practical Network Sup-
port for IP Traceback. In Proceedings of the 2000 ACM SIGCOMM Conference,
August 2000.
[92] B. Schneier and J. Kelsey. Secure Audit Logs to Support Computer Forensics.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 1(3), 1999.
[93] Geoﬀrey Smith and Dennis Volpano. Secure Information Flow in a Multi-
Threaded Imperative Language. In Conference Record of POPL 98: The
25TH ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming
Languages, San Diego, California, pages 355–364, New York, NY, 1998.
[94] A.C. Snoeren, C. Partridge, L.A. Sanchez, C.E. Jones, F. Tchakountio, and
W.T. Strayer S.T. Kent. Hash-Based IP Traceback. In Proceedings of the 2001
ACM SIGCOMM, San Diego, CA, August 2001.
[95] D. X. Song and A. Perrig. Advanced and Authenticated Marking Schemes for
IP Traceback. In Proceedings of the IEEE Infocomm 2001, April 2001.
[96] S. Staniford-Chen and L.T. Heberlein. Holding Intruders Accountable on the
Internet. In Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
pages 39–49, Oakland, CA, May 1995.
[97] W.R. Stevens. Advanced Programming in the UNIX Environment. Addison-
Wesley, Reading, MA, 1993.
[98] W.R. Stevens. Unix Network Programming, volume 1. Prentice Hall PTR,
Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1998.
[99] W.R. Stevens. UNIX Network Programming: Interprocess Communications,
volume 2. Prentice Hall PTR, Upper Saddle River, NJ, second edition, 1999.
[100] R. Stone. CenterTrack: An IP Overlay Network for Tracking DoS Floods.
In Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Security Symposium, Denver, CO, August
2000.
[101] Sun Microsystems. SunSHIELD Basic Security Module Guide. http://docs.
sun.com/db/doc/802-5757.
[102] A.M. Turing. On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entschei-
dungsproblem. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 42:230–265,
1937. Reprinted in The Undecidable (Ed. M. David). Hewlett, NY: Raven
Press, 1965.
[103] A.M. Turing. Correction to: On Computable Numbers, with an Application to
the Entscheidungsproblem. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society,
43:544–546, 1938.
[104] Unix System Manual Pages. Finding ﬁles: ﬁnd(1).
[105] Unix System Manual Pages. make(1): GNU make utility to maintain groups
of programs.
[106] Wietse Venema. TCP WRAPPER, A Tool for Network Monitoring, Ac-
cess Control, and for Setting Up Booby Traps. In Prococeedings of the 1992
USENIX Security Symposium, September 1992.134
[107] D. Volpano and G. Smith. Probabilistic Noninterference in a Concurrent Lan-
guage. In Proceedings of The 11th Computer Security Foundations Workshop.
IEEE Computer Society Press, 1998.
[108] Dennis Volpano, Geoﬀrey Smith, and Cynthia Irvine. A Sound Type System
for Secure Flow Analysis. Journal of Computer Security, 4(3):167–187, 1996.
[109] Eric W. Weisstein. Bell Number. http://mathworld.wolfram.com/
BellNumber.html.
[110] Christian Wettergren. Runtime Information Flow Analysis and Security:
Licentiate Thesis Proposal. http://www.it.kth.se/~cwe/phd/licprop.ps,
1996.
[111] A. Whitaker, R.S. Cox, and S.D. Gribble. Conﬁguration Debugging as Search:
Finding the Needle in the Haystack. In Proceedings of USENIX OSDI 2004,
December 2004.
[112] A. Whitaker, R.S. Cox, and S.D. Gribble. Using Time Travel to Diagnose
Computer Problems, September 2004.
[113] Edward Wilding. Computer Evidence: A Forensics Investigations Handbook.
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997.
[114] S.F. Wu, L. Zhang, D. Massey, and A. Mankin. Intention-Driven ICMP Trace-
Back. IETF Internet draft, February 2001. Work in progress.
[115] Huagang Xie and Philippe Biondi. Linux Intrusion Detection System. http:
//www.lids.org.
[116] A. Yaar, A. Perrig, and D. Song. Pi: A Path Identiﬁcation Mechanism to
Defend against DDoS Attacks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, May 2003.
[117] K. Yoda and H. Etoh. Finding a Connection Chain for Tracing Intruders. In
Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
(ESORICS 2000), October 2000.
[118] Diego Zamboni. Using Internal Sensors for Computer Intrusion Detection.
PhD thesis, Purdue University, 2001. CERIAS TR 2001-42.
[119] Shu Zhang and Partha Dasgupta. Denying Denial of Service Attacks: A Router
Based Solution. In The 2003 International Conference on Internet Computing,
pages 301–307, June 2003.
[120] Y. Zhang and V. Paxson. Detecting Stepping Stones. In Proceedings of the
9th USENIX Security Symposium, Denver, CO, August 2000.APPENDIX135
Appendix A: Detailed Performance Results
Table 1
FreeBSD kernel results
Test Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Simple syscall 0.4504 0.0030 0.4453 0.4625
Sig inst. 0.6643 0.0068 0.6590 0.7080
Sig hand. 1.3467 0.0574 1.2860 1.6540
Process fork+exit 129.0783 3.2668 122.4000 137.7073
Process fork+execve 594.1023 10.1764 563.3000 622.6667
Process fork+sh 1176.8880 19.9638 1113.0000 1215.0000
Simple read 1.0437 0.0149 1.0207 1.1109
Simple write 0.9836 0.0397 0.9479 1.2274
Simple stat 2.2547 0.0418 2.1703 2.4678
Simple fstat 0.6598 0.0173 0.6435 0.7232
Simple open/close 3.3546 0.0515 3.2460 3.5216
Select on 500 fd’s 19.8101 0.3660 19.3444 21.4862
Pipe latency 11.2702 0.0838 11.1587 12.0729
AF UNIX latency 12.5225 0.0717 12.3987 12.7805
UDP latency 17.0421 0.1113 15.9089 17.3074
TCP latency 17.8300 0.2080 17.6456 19.5522
File write bandwidth 63576.9450 370.2997 62130.0000 64002.0000
Socket bandwidth 377.8209 21.7406 342.7500 402.5900
AF UNIX bandwidth 617.4526 2.8237 602.8400 621.9300
Pipe bandwidth 1845.4127 13.6448 1756.6700 1874.1400136
Table 2
Label-0 kernel results
Test Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Simple syscall 0.4499 0.0019 0.4423 0.4666
Sig inst. 0.6666 0.0094 0.6580 0.7540
Sig hand. 1.3404 0.0360 1.2980 1.5310
Process fork+exit 128.3902 2.5452 122.7222 138.3250
Process fork+execve 596.1760 8.2989 570.9474 614.5882
Process fork+sh 1173.6708 17.4250 1119.5000 1198.3000
Simple read 1.1235 0.0336 1.0807 1.2916
Simple write 0.9839 0.0290 0.9469 1.1514
Simple stat 2.2744 0.0547 2.1665 2.5250
Simple fstat 0.6649 0.0201 0.6450 0.7531
Simple open/close 3.4365 0.0960 3.2972 4.0867
Select on 500 fd’s 20.0437 0.3377 19.3631 23.8216
Pipe latency 11.4273 0.2647 11.2593 14.2089
AF UNIX latency 12.6802 0.4095 12.5021 16.1295
UDP latency 17.1144 0.1865 15.1329 17.6448
TCP latency 18.0908 0.4819 15.7554 21.9137
File write bandwidth 63571.9400 373.0444 62303.0000 64002.0000
Socket bandwidth 385.6075 28.4093 324.6300 415.7700
AF UNIX bandwidth 612.9818 4.7987 563.8100 618.4900
Pipe bandwidth 1842.9119 10.5459 1811.4800 1872.4000137
Table 3
Label-s kernel results
Test Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Simple syscall 0.4498 0.0019 0.4494 0.4682
Sig inst. 0.6650 0.0067 0.6560 0.6880
Sig hand. 1.3364 0.0261 1.3060 1.5540
Process fork+exit 129.1161 2.1423 122.6444 136.9268
Process fork+execve 602.4783 7.6896 576.6000 617.2222
Process fork+sh 1185.3990 17.1613 1118.6000 1212.2000
Simple read 1.2139 0.0394 1.1284 1.3454
Simple write 1.3903 0.0509 1.3116 1.5767
Simple stat 2.2739 0.0783 2.1796 2.5328
Simple fstat 0.6662 0.0209 0.6444 0.7495
Simple open/close 3.4457 0.0744 3.3386 3.7203
Select on 500 fd’s 19.9333 1.6248 19.3259 40.5520
Pipe latency 11.4340 0.0521 11.3264 11.6137
AF UNIX latency 13.5479 0.0720 13.3962 13.8179
UDP latency 18.0801 0.1492 17.7706 18.9459
TCP latency 18.9715 0.2525 16.5678 19.2630
File write bandwidth 63630.4250 326.9002 62478.0000 64002.0000
Socket bandwidth 365.5163 29.6615 320.9600 397.3400
AF UNIX bandwidth 544.0799 13.8608 450.0500 551.4300
Pipe bandwidth 1835.8787 18.6896 1790.7000 1880.0400138
Table 4
Label-l kernel results
Test Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Simple syscall 0.4501 0.0025 0.4487 0.4683
Sig inst. 0.6658 0.0085 0.6560 0.7300
Sig hand. 1.3393 0.0259 1.2970 1.5390
Process fork+exit 129.1359 2.1143 122.9778 136.3902
Process fork+execve 604.5881 7.8515 577.0000 620.0000
Process fork+sh 1187.9500 17.7554 1122.0000 1223.4000
Simple read 1.3297 0.0492 1.2599 1.4668
Simple write 1.4934 0.0387 1.4354 1.5906
Simple stat 2.3362 0.1001 2.1991 2.5577
Simple fstat 0.6621 0.0145 0.6435 0.7580
Simple open/close 3.4701 0.0978 3.3426 3.7235
Select on 500 fd’s 19.9283 1.4843 19.3408 40.2463
Pipe latency 11.4582 0.2381 11.3235 14.7124
AF UNIX latency 13.5722 0.1859 11.7654 15.0804
UDP latency 18.0479 0.2078 15.6827 18.4821
TCP latency 18.9950 0.2842 16.4914 20.4588
File write bandwidth 63595.2050 339.2577 62478.0000 64002.0000
Socket bandwidth 366.4497 27.7231 324.0000 397.0400
AF UNIX bandwidth 543.9735 9.5682 431.7300 551.9100
Pipe bandwidth 1833.3753 17.3504 1767.1600 1866.7300VITA139
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